United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of al-Qaida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qaida will continue to pose the greatest threat to the homeland and U.S. interests abroad by a single terrorist organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement, which includes al-Qaida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups and emerging networks and cells, is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.
It is good news that al-Qa'ida is on the ropes. Their leadership is on the run, and scattered. Unfortunately, it appears that the hydra has more than one head.
-- Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.
When you hear talk about the 'global jihad' as an organization, it's wrong. It's more like a constellation of like minded persons spread throughout the world. There's no way to tally them overall, since there's no 'global jihad' ID card or criteria for qualifying. They're considered part of the same threat only in that they have the potential and possibly inclination to turn violent for the same root causes.
-- If this trend continues, threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.
Keeping tabs on that type of problem is a staggering task, from both a law enforcement and intelligence perspective. The 'good guys needed to track bad guys' ratio is huge, and will quickly outpace our available resources. This is already happening in the U.K.
-- Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim-majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time, such progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qaida, could erode support for the jihadists.
Translation: All politics is local. The way to win the GWOT is to fix the problems, real or perceived, in the Mulsim communities. Those communities will then be far less inclined to incubate jihadist philosophy.
We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global strategy and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups.
The real threat of AQ inspired homegrown terrorists is that they come out of nowhere, but have access to expertise and tactics, via the internet, that let's them coalesce quickly and quietly. Intelligence agencies try to find pieces of certain puzzles, not new puzzles entirely. Law enforcement can deter crime, but it can't prevent it, so they're basically stuck in a reactive posture until they have good reason to believe a crime happened, or is about to.
-- We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the homeland.
Translation: The more practice we give them against our CT efforts, the more sophisticated they'll become, in an evolutionary "survival of the fittest" manner.
Always amazes me that Americans, who blithely accept such grotesque levels of incompetence in their politicians, their "news media", their Government Agencies etc etc etc seem to think a War can be run efficiently and effortless.