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She can understand why the former prez is upset ..

the conclusions that the 911 Omission took 20 months to complete

the 911 Omission report finds many many efforts that the C admin made, and gave C plaudits for understanding the threat

he had very few shots at OBL

failed at the effort .. but he made it and was criticized for it

the WALL: re existing wall was bolstered by her?

She thought she was coming on as a 911 Omission member

"THERE WAS NO WALL ... THERE IS NO WALL .. THERE NEVER WAS ONE"

'95 memo by Reno -- reconfirmed statute passed by Congress in '78 -- Ashcroft re-issued it

Even after the FISA act changed the law, it was still in effect .. it's "just a bunch of hooey"

She has been asked before the 911 Omission to testify about the wall .... asked to get more answers from her?

she said the Omission is over.

Look, if this interview is about I did, you can read what I did in the 911 Omission Report

John Ashcroft put the rules in the place .. not me .. and I think this is just silly ...

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YUP, I'M SCREAMING ................. and laughing at HER defensiveness, too .. LOL.

The Phone Number in Yemen

In 1998, an al-Qaeda operative who had been involved in the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi was captured and interrogated by the FBI. One key bit of information acquired during his questioning was the telephone number of a safe house in Yemen, owned by bin Laden associate Ahmed Al-Hada, Almihdhar’s father-in-law. [Newsweek, 6/2/02] US intelligence wiretapped the phone line and soon learned that the safe house was an al-Qaeda “logistics center” used by the organization to plan their attacks. Al-Qaeda operatives around the world, including Osama bin Laden and other top leaders, used the phone line regularly to pass on information. [Newsweek, 6/2/02] It is known that from 1996 to 1998, the two years bin Laden had a traced satellite phone, he called the phone number of the safe house dozens of times. [Sunday Times, 3/24/02, Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02]

At the end of December 1999, the CIA, FBI and State Department discovered from communications it intercepted on the phone line of the Yemeni safe house, that there would be an important al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia in January and that Almihdhar and an associate named Nawaf would attend. [Newsweek, 6/2/02, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] Accounts vary, but either during or slightly after the meeting, they learned that Nawaf’s last name was Alhazmi. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02, New York Times, 9/21/02] During a stopover on Almihdhar’s flight to Malaysia on January 5, an unnamed country secretly checked Almihdhar’s passport on behalf of the CIA, discovering his full name, Saudi passport number, and a multiple-entry visa for the US issued on April 7, 1999 and good until April 6, 2000 (Alhazmi got the same kind of visa in the same month, but it isn’t known when US intelligence learns this [Copley News, 10/17/02]). [PBS Frontline, 10/3/02, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02, New York Times, 9/21/02, New York Times, 10/17/02] The intelligence agency also learned that Almihdhar “made his travel arrangements through a Yemeni organization that is well known to US intelligence as a ‘logistical center’ and ‘base of support’ for al-Qaeda.” [Newsweek, 9/20/01] By the time of the meeting, the CIA was very aware of Almihdhar’s ties to al-Qaeda, and knew that he had been to an al-Qaeda logistics facility in Yemen. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]

The al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia

The Malaysia meeting took place from January 5-8, 2000. In hindsight, it may have been the most pivotal gathering of al-Qaeda prior to 9/11, and has been called a “top-level al-Qaeda summit.” [San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/02] The CIA Director later claimed that at the time he thought the meeting was to plan an al-Qaeda attack somewhere in Southeast Asia. [CIA Director Congressional Testimony, 10/17/02] US officials now contend that there is “no doubt” that the planning for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen and the 9/11 11 attacks occurred at the meeting. This was reportedly confirmed in interviews with people detained in the wake of the attacks. [USA Today, 2/12/02, CNN, 8/30/02]

The meeting was held in an upscale condominium complex on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia. “About a dozen” people attended, posing as tourists. [CNN, 8/30/02] The Special Branch, Malaysia’s security service, followed and photographed the suspected terrorists at the request of the CIA. “They snapped pictures of the men sightseeing and ducking into cybercafes to check Arabic Web sites.” [Newsweek, 6/2/02] As the CIA Director later noted, “Surveillance indicated that the behavior of the individuals was consistent with clandestine activity—they did not conduct any business or tourist activities while in Kuala Lumpur, and they used public telephones and cyber cafes exclusively.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] Some of the attendees, including Almihdhar, were even captured on videotape. [Ottawa Citizen, 9/17/01, Observer, 10/7/01, CNN, 3/14/02, New Yorker, 1/14/02] It appears that the meeting was not wiretapped. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/02] The presumed failure to monitor the planners’ actual discussions during their four-day retreat in Kuala Lumpur would later prove to be one of the most consequential missed opportunities.

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