[weegee]

Felten and graduate students Ariel Feldman and Alex Halderman found that malicious programs could be placed on the Diebold by accessing the memory card slot and power button, both behind a locked door on the side of the machine. One member of the group was able to pick the lock in 10 seconds, and software could be installed in less than a minute, according to the report.

BUT could it be done while unobserved and could it be done without trigger any internal reset codes?

I know that some PCs have a "tamper" setting to note when the last time the lid was removed.

[antiRepublicrat]

BUT could it be done while unobserved and could it be done without trigger any internal reset codes?

Yes and yes, especially by a local Dim staffer.

I know that some PCs have a "tamper" setting to note when the last time the lid was removed.

That's just a switch that trips something that can be reset by the administrator. That shouldn't be a problem given that they've figured out how to completely control the machines.

What I like best is that they put a lock on it that can be picked in 10 seconds. That's just sad. It sounds like they're using something like the cheap display counter locks you see at stores. Even a moderately good security lock should take a lot longer than that to pick. I just flat-out do not trust a company that would even think of putting such a cheap lock on a voting machine.

[free_at_jsl.com]

Who's to say who did it (or could do it)? Election workers have physical access to the machines. If the machines are in an environment near PEOPLE, then they are vulnerable.
Electronic voting is a solution in search of a problem. Paper ballots are far more reliable. If somebody wants to implement an electronic voting system, it should include paper input or at the very least, paper output so there is a permanent record of the transaction.