Princeton prof hacks e-vote machine

Associated Press via Yahoo News ^ | September 13, 2006 | Chris Newmarker

[Gordongekko909]

Felten said he and his colleagues felt it necessary to publish the paper as quickly as possible because of the possible implications for the November midterm elections.

This is both factually accurate and intentionally misleading.

[antiRepublicrat]

claims that electronic voting machines used across much of the country are vulnerable to hacking

Claims? It's pretty much proven.

[antiRepublicrat]

Radke also question why Felten hadn't submitted his paper for peer review, as is commonly done before publishing scientific research.

Felten does have a problem in that he's been threatened with lawsuits from companies over the presentation of previous research that he's done.

[weegee]

The machine Felten tested, obtained in May from an undisclosed source,

Potential Democrat source FOR such machines to tamper with?

[kingu]

Does this mean we can go back to punch cards?

And can elections boards across the nation sue the DNC for a refund?

Seriously, electronic voting, paper receipt, put into a locked box after being verified by the voter. Not a very hard concept - a basic voting system.

[weegee]

Felten and graduate students Ariel Feldman and Alex Halderman found that malicious programs could be placed on the Diebold by accessing the memory card slot and power button, both behind a locked door on the side of the machine. One member of the group was able to pick the lock in 10 seconds, and software could be installed in less than a minute, according to the report.

BUT could it be done while unobserved and could it be done without trigger any internal reset codes?

I know that some PCs have a "tamper" setting to note when the last time the lid was removed.

[ozoneliar]

If somebody could simply upload a program with a memory card that will reprogram the machine, we are in a lot of trouble.

[Paperdoll]

It really doesn't take a rocket scientist. I've been saying the computer count can be programmed for 25+ years. Now they've got us voting by mail in Washington State, and many ballots will not be counted at all because so many people don't read the new special instructions before marking them!

[ozoneliar]

Link to paper's site:
http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/

[Stashiu]

If they are not networked and physical access is limited, I don't understand what the hype is all about. I worry much more about physical ballot box stuffing and in-eligible voters.

I sense this is a bogus issue meant to muddy the waters now that the Dems won't have their chads.

[antiRepublicrat]

BUT could it be done while unobserved and could it be done without trigger any internal reset codes?

Yes and yes, especially by a local Dim staffer.

I know that some PCs have a "tamper" setting to note when the last time the lid was removed.

That's just a switch that trips something that can be reset by the administrator. That shouldn't be a problem given that they've figured out how to completely control the machines.

What I like best is that they put a lock on it that can be picked in 10 seconds. That's just sad. It sounds like they're using something like the cheap display counter locks you see at stores. Even a moderately good security lock should take a lot longer than that to pick. I just flat-out do not trust a company that would even think of putting such a cheap lock on a voting machine.

[WmShirerAdmirer]

Thanks for the link.

[coconutt2000]

Electronic voting machines should just be electronic card punchers.

Input your vote, the machine punches your card, you verify it, and feed it into a machine built by a second manufacturer, which electronically counts and securely stores the card in tamperproof cases.

[free_at_jsl.com]

Who's to say who did it (or could do it)? Election workers have physical access to the machines. If the machines are in an environment near PEOPLE, then they are vulnerable.
Electronic voting is a solution in search of a problem. Paper ballots are far more reliable. If somebody wants to implement an electronic voting system, it should include paper input or at the very least, paper output so there is a permanent record of the transaction.

[ozoneliar]

Watch the video on the website: http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/

It seems pretty simple to do. It can be done in under a minute.

[BadAndy]

Put the operating system into rom that requires 256 based encryption to reprogram. Eack box gets it's own individual code and the rom chips are embedded such that thay are inacessable without dismantaling the machine.

[antiRepublicrat]

If they are not networked and physical access is limited

Physical access is not that limited, and standard procedure consists of a lot of sneakernetting. If a Dim gets to just one machine, and SOP is to accumulate results on one machine before sending them up, one or many machines can be infected and all votes changed.

[ARealMothersSonForever]

Get me physical access to two or more machines, and two or more of the removable media devices(the "ballots"), and I guarantee that the results can be pre-programmed across the entire network. And changed at will.