"Of the half that was left, about a million were needed to keep an eye on the Chinese, maybe 750,000 to keep Eastern Europe as "allies" (can you say occupation troops?) and maybe half a million to keep the restive people in the Soviet Union under control. That left about 250,000 for active deployment in foreign adventures. They committed about half of that to Afghanistan (and maybe another tenth as advisors, world-wide)."
If that is true (and I grant you 500,000 MVD and/or uniformed KGB were used for "internal security") then why did a US Army Captain (field artillery) tell me in Dec. 1978 that if the balloon went up that we'd lose half our people in Europe and Ivan would reach the Ruhr no problem. Pretty hard to do that with a couple-hundred-thousand guys who can't suppress a bunch of goat-humping bandits.
"If that is true (and I grant you 500,000 MVD and/or uniformed KGB were used for "internal security") then why did a US Army Captain (field artillery) tell me in Dec. 1978 that if the balloon went up that we'd lose half our people in Europe and Ivan would reach the Ruhr no problem. Pretty hard to do that with a couple-hundred-thousand guys who can't suppress a bunch of goat-humping bandits."
There were a few reasons why many of our military personnel believed that back then.
1. They did have those 750,000-odd troops plus another 500-750K Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe. That's a lot of force, especially if you get to choose the time of the attack. If half your tanks break down due to mechanical failure in the first week you still outnumber your enemy.
2. The fact that they could choose the time of attack. That gives you a big edge. Remember that in Afghanistan the Russians occupied the whole country in less than a month, and got worn down by the guerilla warfare that followed. Similarly, the Soviets had the capability to occupy Germany (which is what your artillery-officer friend believed), but not necessarily keep it.
3. We probably overestimated the Soviet threat. We subconsciously believed that their soldiers were as good as our soldiers -- that they would demonstrate the same degree of initiative, competence and motivation. In actuality, *every* time a Soviet-style army has come up against a western-style army it has been either (a) stopped butt-cold (Korea, Vietnam), or collapsed in short order (Arab-Israeli Wars, Gulf War) (And yes, we won militarily in Vietnam. The NVA did not achieve military victory until the ARVN ran out of ammunition after a Democrat-controlled Congress took it away from them.)