Posted on 09/08/2006 2:03:18 PM PDT by jmc1969
Long before the United States invaded Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld forbade military strategists to develop plans for securing a post-war Iraq, the retiring commander of the Army Transportation Corps said Thursday.
In fact, said Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, Rumsfeld said "he would fire the next person" who talked about the need for a post-war plan.
Rumsfeld did replace Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff in 2003, after Shinseki told Congress that hundreds of thousands of troops would be needed to secure post-war Iraq.
Scheid, who is also the commander of Fort Eustis, made his comments in an interview with the Daily Press. He retires in about three weeks. snip.
"The secretary of defense continued to push on us that everything we write in our plan has to be the idea that we are going to go in, we're going to take out the regime, and then we're going to leave," Scheid said. "We won't stay."
Scheid said the planners continued to try "to write what was called Phase 4," or the piece of the plan that included post-invasion operations like security, stability and reconstruction.
"I remember the secretary of defense saying that he would fire the next person that said that," Scheid said. "We would not do planning for Phase 4 operations, which would require all those additional troops that people talk about today.
"He said we will not do that because the American public will not back us if they think we are going over there for a long war."
Why did Rumsfeld think that? Scheid doesn't know.
"But think back to those times. We had done Bosnia. We said we were going into Bosnia and stop the fighting and come right out. And we stayed."
Was Rumsfeld right or wrong?
Scheid said he doesn't know.
(Excerpt) Read more at duluthsuperior.com ...
Yeah, they just deployed for their 3rd visit to Iraq.
Some did:
SEN. LEVIN: General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war?
GEN. SHINSEKI: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements. But I think --
SEN. LEVIN: How about a range?
GEN SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point -- something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground- force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment, to ensure that people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this.
Could you please tell me what you have read and /or where on ..the invasion of Iraq.. perhaps some internet sources?
My neighbor is "amazed"..., actually enthralled with this Cobra II book. I have no other counter info that I could use in a discussion. I have not read the Cobra II book. My neighbor is not a fan of Bush .
He just believed every word of this cobra book and proceeded to tell me " whatever could have been done wrong with this invasion Bush and Rumsfeld did it!."
I agree, but possibly for a different reason. One of the reasons we were in Vietnam so long is that we tried to fight the war and accomplish the reconstruction at the same time.
War is war and General Patton had the right idea. Who was the general who said the way to fight a war is to draw your sword and throw the scabbard away?
Well put.
People are going to arm-chair quarterback and find fault no matter what you do, so you do what you think is best, adjust, learn, go forward, adjust, learn, go forward.
The thing to remember is: There are many people who are emotionally, psycholgically and physically in America's defeat and humiliation. These people are going to take the opposite stand of whatever you do, and say you are doing it wrong. The old saw about a stopped clock being right twice a day is the standard that liberals must be aiming for, because they have been so wrong on every single thing. They seem to be waiting for those two moments that occur each day.
I say screw them. Do the best you can with what you've got and put earplugs in.
"We really have to hold the line in November. No teaching RINOs lessons, no teaching the GOP a lesson (although I understand the impulse). We need to crawl naked over broken glass, if necessary and GOTV. These people are frickin' dangerous."
ABSOLUTELY. The lies are coming thick and fast and history is going to be rewritten by the liberals to convict the innocent and make the guilty go scott-free.
Broken-glass time, Republicans! Save the Congress!
"As for Rumsfeld planning for the aftermath: that is and always has been the job of the Iraqi people and I have heard Rummy, Bush and Cheney, as well as Condi say that or things to that effect repeatedly."
Darned fine point.
Who was the general who said the way to fight a war is to draw your sword and throw the scabbard away?
General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson: "When war does come, my advice is to draw the sword and throw away the scabbard." (http://CapitolHillCoffeeHouse... has a good article by Brian C Melton).
"I've read quite a bit about the pre-war planning, and here's my conclusion: no matter what we would have done, and no matter what we would have found on the ground in Iraq, it was going to be wrong. NOt in the sense that it was wrong to take out SH, but the entire endeavor was going to contain problems such that the US/Allied presence was going to inherit a snake pit."
That is certainly true wrt to how the Al Qaeda insurgency has evolved.
There is nothing we could have done, 1 million troops, a gazillion troops, that would have stopped some suicide bombers.
I don’t doubt this story. It’s consistent with what I’ve heard.
This summer I spoke with someone connected with top Marine generals, and although he didn’t suggest any widespread disrespect for Rumsfeld like the old media would love us to believe, I sense that a consensus is forming to holds him rather than Franks responsible for staffing and planning parameters of our postwar occupation.
I heard slightly conflicting opinions on how troop levels were determined, but as best I can tell, it started with Rumsfeld leading Franks before the President and championing a framework that ignored Zinni’s long maintained plans for 400k troops, starting over with half that. Zinni’s plans to administer Iraq were not just amended, but round filed. Even their previous existence was unknown to some people commanding post war Iraq administration. Granted there’s politics influencing versions of the story, but I think something like that’s taking root in the military.
Also, Remole makes a good point that having a 200k footprint rather than 400k may have avoided an appearance of occupation and all the associated problems. And who knows how much Iraqis would have taken responsibility for their democracy if we handed it to them rather than them dieing at 15 times greater numbers than us to win it. That’s not even mentioning our questionable ability to maintain that force.
On the other hand, I’m not big on the “more troops equal more targets” argument. They may be a larger political target, but militarily, 400k “targets” shoot back. 170k left us far from meeting Iraq’s post war security needs. Population centers were not patrolled, police and allies were unprotected, borders were open, ammo dumps exposed, unprotected roads and supply lines, and contractors and projects were paralyzed (and had to be resized).
Given the tradeoffs, the need for more postwar troop levels is debatable, but I’d lean strongly toward more if this had to be done again.
I appreciate your post...and respect your opinions. I also have NO facts that it is/was any different.
Where I have the major problem with ALL of these stories...is that it is Monday morning quarterbacking on MOST of the General's part...perhaps not Zinni if your story is correct.
But, perhaps not...IOW, if it has worked out...and things had moved more smoothly, Rummy would be hailed a genius.
Also, I wonder how many of the critics in and out of the military have studied WW11 or were alive then...to know if the Sec. of Defense then...was SO much better.
I am in the minority in the whole USA, I think, because I don't ever complain about "how long this is taking"..I think, considering what has been accomplished, re: elections, the Military being turned completely over to the Iraqi Government, etc....things are moving QUITE quickly...
Compare to WW11, Korea, Vietnam, where we never GOT this far....and I am embarrassed for a our country that feels that WE have to have a microwave war....when those people in Afghanistan and Iraq have had to live under those tyrannys for DECADES...and we complain about 3-4 YEARS???
C'mon....our revolution and writing for constitution and having elections took much longer...and we also ended up fighting a civil war....
This is NOT a complaint to you, elfman....just my frustration with some Americans in general.
I am in the minority in the whole USA, I think, because I don't ever complain about "how long this is taking"..I think, considering what has been accomplished, re: elections, the Military being turned completely over to the Iraqi Government, etc....things are moving QUITE quickly...
Compare to WW11, Korea, Vietnam, where we never GOT this far....and I am embarrassed for a our country that feels that WE have to have a microwave war....when those people in Afghanistan and Iraq have had to live under those tyrannys for DECADES...and we complain about 3-4 YEARS???
C'mon....our revolution and writing for constitution and having elections took much longer...and we also ended up fighting a civil war.... "
A perspective well said and worth repeating. The only observation I might add is that the British evacuated tens of thousands of loyalists after our revolution as part of our recognition deal, where Iraq’s neighbors are inserting tens of thousands of insurgents.
Yes...and the difference you point out about the Brits leaving the new America...but the insurgents coming in to Iraq...
is the type of enemy...and the coddling that the Middle Eastern Countries have gotten over the years.
Iran never had to "suffer" after 1979 hostage taking...Iraq, until Bush, never had to suffer for the Oil for food...the bounties paid to suicide bombers...
My gosh, Yasser Arafat got a Nobel Peace prize, fgs.
As long as they are coddled by the rest of the world, through the UN, and now the EU, not counting the Arab Leagues....why should they quit fighting...why should they give the Iraqi people peace???
Israel hasn't had a day of peace in over 50 years.
Interesting. From the 1980s US perspective, Iran and Iraq policy was a component in the wider Cold War. Punishing Iran for their embassy takeover was secondary to countering the Soviets in Afghanistan considering their desire for a warm water port, perhaps through Iran. We have common priorities with Israel now, but we’re still stepping over the debris from old wars.
Curious that.
I would also bet that the criticism has come from Generals who were on the wrong side of "transformation". Their own personal meal tickets didn't get punched...and they're pissed.
Good points...
One last comment on this topic…it was not Rumsfeld’s decision to decide post-war Iraqi operations. The State Department had the key role in that, with the DoD playing a supporting role. It truly is overly-simplistic to try to pin any miscalculations in post-war Iraq operations on Rumsfeld. He was NOT calling the shots, and really shouldn’t have been.
“They may be a larger political target, but militarily, 400k “targets” shoot back.”
The counter to that is a VAST majority of our casualties in Iraq have involved no shooting at all. And when there is shooting involved, we win every time with the numbers we have. Instead, most of our casualties are the result of IED’s of one form or another. It is nearly impossible to keep them from being emplaced, and increasing the number of their potential targets does little more than increase their number of potential victims. And a heavy presence of American military forces did not prevent problems in Ramadi, Fallujah, Mosel, Samarrah or Sadr City. The problems in those areas were established a decade (or decades) before we got anywhere near them. We may have postponed the disorder in all those places if we’d had more soldiers pressing the lid down, but that would only delay the inevitable. The reality is, you cannot kill the cancer infecting all these Islamic )#&(holes with military might. You can suppress it, but not kill it. Saddam used suppression as his tool, but that was guaranteed to fail at some point, and his perpetual state of paranoia proves he was well aware of that. The only way to prompt lasting change is to change the entire environment in which it breeds. That is going to take time, no matter how many soldiers we put on the ground in Iraq. But Iraq is coming around very quickly. It is on the road to success despite the current level of pain. Failure would be indicated by a lack of progress. But everyday, buried in page 32 of the daily news are indicators that progress is being made. And if/when it becomes impossible to deny that Iraq is on the road to success, will people still be blaming Rumsfeld?
That's another quality reply, with lots of good information and thought.
I don’t know much about Zenni until an hour ago when I began reading. It looks like he was worthless. But I hear that he predicted that Iraq could be taken with actual force levels but it would take more to keep it secure. At least that was right. Maybe the administration plans he maintained were worthless after the battle reshaped everything. Good point.
I remember the rapid reopening of Baghdad International and Umm Qasr, and how it directly impacted our forces and the Basra population. That was so critical to operational logistics and foundational to national reconstruction that it would have been absurd to overlook. But I don’t think that’s what Rumsfeld reportedly “forbade military strategists to develop plans for securing [in] a post-war Iraq”. I presume Scheid was referring to more subsequent security requirements. I took “post war” more to mean post war security for travel, contractors, government infrastructure etc…, but it’s not explicitly stated.
I think a ridiculous portion of our reconstruction budget had to be redirected to contractor security. State may have been responsible for predicting more international support that they failed to secure, leaving the coalition and DOD hanging, but Rumsfeld’s initial force follow-on plan presumably could have made the difference, and its trigger was never pulled.
There’s an optimum force level for any environment. Roughly, when security is adequate for our goals and bringing more brings diminishing returns, more is a burden. When we don’t have forces to counterambush IED emplacement (eventually somewhat successful) or to protect informants, police, ammo dumps, reconstruction etc… we’re way below optimum. I don’t think the fall of all that was “inevitable”. Yes, most of our casualties “didn’t involve shooting at all”, exactly because our absence enabled support for the insurgents’ more successful methods of attack.
I don’t know what’s meant by our “heavy military presence in Fallujah, Ramadi Sadr City etc… didn’t prevent problems”. We had none. We often rolled through in force and that’s all we could do. That’s what enabled the support and coordination of so many insurgents and foreign terrorists and rise of militia. We could inaugurate leaders, police chiefs and swear in hundreds of men, but we couldn’t protect them or their families. In weeks we’d either lose their loyalties or their lives, leaving areas free for IED construction and emplacement. Sorry about the “Monday morning quarterback squawking ”, but from what I’ve heard, Rumsfeld championed the staffing and planning parameters that restricted us to that, not State, and I don’t want it repeated.
It wasn’t until we refocused on defeating bad guys one city at a time and continuously defended local Iraqi forces and projects that we progressed in Anbar. It’s roughly what we’re now successfully doing in Baghdad. Granted, those ISFs were few and ineffective early, but with so few of us, they were more so.
Like Rumsfeld, I misunderestimated the insurgency during its delayed rise and after our initial successes. I initially wasn’t aware of how fragile our minimal presence was in hostile areas and how disengaged we were in order to avoid inflaming them, that we in effect began rebuilding before defeating the enemy.
Rumsfeld reportedly directed our initial Fallujah invasion and retreat, the latter in part because of our questionable ability to manage any countrywide insurrection with the forces we had. Sure, If any of that would have added to victory, few would be blaming Rumsfeld. Maybe he still is a genius, but his success is now mixed I agree that we can’t succeed by throwing risk takers to the wolves, but we also can’t succeed by rallying so fully around them that we don’t acknowledge their mistakes, much less learn from them.
BTW, I understand Franks draws some resentment for retiring immediately after invasion to go on the lecture circuit, being that removal of Saddam was always promoted as less than half the job.
Her sentence, "Rumsfeld did replace Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff in 2003, after Shinseki told Congress that hundreds of thousands of troops would be needed to secure post-war Iraq" is carefully crafted a la Clinton to mislead without being factually wrong. Rumsfeld did put another general in Shinseki's place after he retired, thereby "replacing" him. And this did happen after Shinseki gave his worthless opinion to Congress.
Shinseki proposed the number at 300,000 because he knew we didn't have 300,000. It was not like 1991 when the Army had several hundred thousand troops in Europe and was in a "use them or lose them" mode.
Heavy colonel. The Navy doesn't even have the equivalent rank.
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