The original use of the Commerce Clause was to remove barriers to commerce among the states. It was used later to prohibit commerce among the states. Both actions are allowed under the definition of "to regulate".
The original intent and meaning of the CC was to regulate which doesn't mean nor intend to prohibit. You are as wrong as congress and the courts when you misinterpret the original intent and meaning of the CC. Y'all abide the ideology that the constitution is a Living Document
Wrong. I already told you. President Jefferson and his Secretary of State, James Madison, used the power of "to regulate" commerce with foreign nations to prohibit trade with Europe in 1807 and used the power of "to regulate" commerce with the Indian tribes to prohibit the sale of alcohol to the Indians in 1802.
These are the Founding Fathers. Madison wrote the Commerce Clause. They would have known better what "to regulate" meant than either you or I.
In a landmark case, Gibbons v Ogden, 1824, presided over by Chief Justice John Marshall (another Founding Father) it was stated in the opinion:
The 'power to regulate commerce,' here meant to be granted, was that power to regulate commerce which previously existed in the States. But what was that power? The States were, unquestionably, supreme; and each possessed that power over commerce, which is acknowledged to reside in every sovereign State. The definition and limits of that power are to be sought among the features of international law; and, as it was not only admitted, but insisted on by both parties, in argument, that, 'unaffected by a state of war, by treaties, or by municipal regulations, all commerce among independent States was legitimate,' there is no necessity to appeal to the oracles of the jus commune for the correctness of that doctrine. The law of nations, regarding man as a social animal, pronounces all commerce legitimate in a state of peace, until prohibited by positive law. The power of a sovereign state over commerce, therefore, amounts to nothing more than a power to limit and restrain it at pleasure. And since the power to prescribe the limits to its freedom, necessarily implies the power to determine what shall remain unrestrained, it follows, that the power must be exclusive; it can reside but in one potentate; and hence, the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving nothing for the State to act upon."
Geez Louise. What don't you get?