Posted on 08/31/2006 6:51:35 AM PDT by slowhand520
“Burning Up SEALs” Misuing special-warfare assets.
By W. Thomas Smith Jr.
Petty Officer 2nd Class Marc Alan Lee was one of the world’s most highly skilled unconventional warriors — a U.S. Navy SEAL. But on the morning of August 2, the 28-year-old Oregon native was detached to a conventional U.S. Army force tasked with hunting-down guerrillas in a Ramadi neighborhood where four U.S. Marines had been killed the previous week.
When a firefight erupted between the Americans (and an accompanying Iraqi force) and a band of guerrillas, one SEAL was wounded, shot in the cheek by an enemy sniper.
In the ensuing hour-long fight, stretching over several city blocks, another SEAL was struck in the shoulder.
Lee, who positioned himself between the two men, provided covering fire as they were evacuated. But he was later killed by a blast of machinegun fire.
Lee was the first SEAL to die in Iraq. His actions during the fight have been reported as “heroic,” and he has been posthumously awarded the Silver Star to go along with his Bronze Star medal (with Combat V), Purple Heart, and a Combat Action Ribbon.
But some members of the Naval Special Warfare community are telling me he did not have to die, with one officer contending, “they’re burning up SEALs.”
The problem lies in the manner in which SEALs and other special operators are being deployed and for what kinds of missions.
“Special Operations warriors are not dispensable assets,” says Reserve SEAL Commander Mark Divine, who has been to Iraq several times and was tasked with evaluating the performance of a new Marine Corps special operations force during its developmental stages in 2004. “It will take two years to replace Lee with another combat-ready SEAL. The SEAL community is undermanned as it is, and it is the Navy’s number-one recruiting priority.”
Divine’s concerns are based on the fact that the U.S. Defense Department is looking to boost its numbers of special operators, currently totaling about 40,000, by 15 percent over the next four years. SEALs, less than 2,500 men, must increase by about 20 percent, and without reducing standards.
The Global War on Terror — with all of its backdoors and shadows and high-tech, asymmetrical, rapidly changing battlespaces — has placed an enormous demand on U.S. special-warfare units. After all, these are the guys tasked with operating in the darkest environs. Consequently, taking a smart, committed young man with an athletic bent (Lee himself was a star soccer player in high school) and transforming him into a Navy SEAL is neither cheap — about $350,000 a copy — nor easy. Most SEAL hopefuls are unable to pass the entry physical fitness test. And most who do pass the PFT simply don’t have what it takes to become a SEAL.
The attrition rate is extremely high for SEALs: A staggering 80 percent fail to complete the hellish six-months of Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL training (BUD/S). Those who do survive BUD/S must again prove themselves in an equally demanding post-graduate period with an active SEAL Team before officially becoming SEALs.
Special-operations teams like SEALs — including the super-secret Naval Special Warfare Development Group (formerly SEAL Team Six) — the Army’s special-operations forces (from Rangers to Green Berets to Delta), Air Force special-tactics teams, and the Marine Corps’ Force Recon and the brand-new Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) teams, are responsible for conducting special missions, including counterterrorism, hostage rescues, prisoner snatches, foreign military training, special reconnaissance, sabotage, direct action, and the targeting of enemy leaders, among other highly sensitive operations. And many of those operations — though unknown thus never reported — have tremendous strategic relevance.
“In the context of Iraq, SEALs, who comprise a fraction of the Navy’s total force, are trained to handle those kinds of missions,” Divine tells National Review Online. “Every man is a critical asset in the war on terror. So to squander a life in support of a general cordon and search operation is just wrong.”
Divine says he first witnessed such misuse of SEALs back in 2004.
“The conventional commanders would send a formal or informal request to the JSOTF [Joint Special Operations Task Force] for some sniper team support, and if the guys [special operators] were not employed they would usually say, ‘okay,’” Divine says. “The [SEAL] Team guys did not mind because they wanted action.
“But a 24-year-old’s motivation, and then the sound battlefield judgment on the part of the special-operations force leaders are two different things altogether. SEALs will always run toward the sound of the guns. It’s up to the leaders to protect them so that they can perform the high-value missions the taxpayers put them through training for.”
Former SEAL John Chalus, who had one combat tour in Vietnam and whose two sons would later serve in the Navy (one of whom was a SEAL), tells NRO, “SEALs should not be combined with regular units unless the regular unit is used to support the special operation.”
Conventional units often provide security for special operators, setting up a perimeter around the operation and “keeping the bad guys at bay,” says Chalus. And of course, special operators often conduct reconnaissance and gather intelligence for conventional operations.
Richard Marcinko, the founder and first commander of SEAL Team Six, as well as the best-selling author of the Rogue Warrior book series, compares employing SEALs in a conventional capacity to “driving a Ferrari across the desert like a dune-buggy.”
It is a “waste of training,” Marcinko tells NRO. “The conventional force commanders use them for conventional missions for two primary reasons. First, they know they have a mature warrior [in a SEAL]. He’s been to a lot of schools, and he’s not some 19-year-old kid with limited training. Second, using SEALs or other highly trained Spec Ops guys protects whoever is in charge of the conventional operation. It’s kind of a political cover you’re a** thing to say, ‘hey, I sent in the teams that wouldn’t embarrass me.’”
Conventional commanders know SEALs will almost always kill or capture any bad guys encountered. Commanders also have an appreciation for the war-fighting skills special operators like SEALs might impart to conventional soldiers and sailors. And the SEALs themselves are always willing to pitch in on missions outside of their traditional roles.
“Particularly the young kids who have just come out of BUD/S,” says Marcinko. “They’ve never been in combat, and they want to test what they’re made of.”
Some SEALs have told me that actual operations seem not nearly as tough as their training. But unlike a gun battle, almost no one dies in training, even training as high-speed and dangerous as that of the SEALs.
— A former U.S. Marine infantry leader, W. Thomas Smith Jr. writes about military issues and has covered conflict in the Balkans and on the West Bank. He is the author of five books, and his articles appear in a variety of publications.
He was hunting down guerrillas in a hostile urban area.
That's not same as an infantry engagement with uniformed troops on an open battlefield.
He was likely there because his special skills would prove useful in ferreting out high-value targets in that confusing and challenging environment.
Had he been killed by an IED while on a routine infantry patrol on the streets of Baghdad, your claims would make perfect sense to me.
But he was fighting in a very challenging situation where his special skills could well have made a very big difference.
more like using your quarterback, wide reiciever, and offensive coordinator as a blocking dummy...you are right on a lot of levels..
lack of cohesive plan on attacking guerrillas, ..so the commanders are "looking" for a justification and looking for assignments....
this is just getting to be a cluster f#ck... Marines getting charged by PC jag offs, SEALs doing "come along" missions...
the Spec op guys (or so I've heard) are carnivores and will never turn down a request to get in a fight.... that's what they do... it's in their "nature". Smart command decision isn't necessarily when to pull the trigger, but when to look at the big pic and just pass.
The flip side is for line troops to see the professionalism of the SEAL, Green Beret, Recon, SAS or even Task Force 121 is inspiring and makes guys take note of methods and tactics....
Like they say, "If you want to be a good golfer, go out to dinner with the best putters"
"He was hunting down guerrillas in a hostile urban area."
That is what infantry do.
I think part of the problem here is you think of Spec ops as being great shooters, and good at kicking in doors.
Believe me the years of training and expensive schools spec ops go to that the regular army never sees, are about things far beyond shooting and conducting raids.
Eh. This article is very strange indeed.
For decades, we in the SOF community bitched that the mainstream, conventional military did not value and respect us.
In this war that has all changed. Yes, conventional commanders want SF, SEAL and Ranger (among other SOF) assets in their operations, but they want them because they know that these men can make the operations with which the commander's unit is tasked more successful.
At the same time, the conventional military brings some things that the SOF do not have, to the table: numbers, firepower, and logistics to name three key factors the conventional military does better than we do.
They can fight a harder, more sustained, fight, in a more lethal combat area, because they have armour, crew-served and supporting weapons, and supply lines.
I will second 2banana on the risks of normal SOF training. SOF conducts high-risk operations and training activities around the world and around the clock. I have lost more friends, teammates and classmates in accidents than in combat; that's just the way it is. My career was over 26 years, and all but time in training, a year in language school, and a couple years in a non-SOF classified assignment, was spent on an SF ODA or ODB. Damn straight the training is scarier than the combat!
Back to my point: the military today does a much better job of integrating SOF capability into its ongoing operations today, as it did in the European campaign of 1944-45, than it did for all the intervening years.
Marcinko (a very controversial guy) belongs to a way of thinking where SOF are not "wasted" just fighting the war but are held in reserve for "super strategic" missions. This is what has led to the current situation where the JSOC consumes 90% of the special operations money to produce 10% of the special operations results. Most of that extra money goes to staffs, HQs, and assets that don't operate.
Waiting for the perfect shot to employ your asset means your assets get rusty. This is the only war we've got right now, of course the young guys want to get into it. And of course, their commanders will release them to do it when they can add to the success of an operation.
By the way, this might have been the first SEAL whacked in Iraq, but they've surely bled in Afghanistan. And nobody's talking about the wounded. The paradox is, the author seems to be using the death of the SEAL to argue against risking SEALS... that makes me wonder if he understands SEALs or warriors at all.
This isn't a chess match. Even when you do everything right, you may just lose somebody, and the worst guy in our ranks is a better human being than any number of jihadis you might whack to avenge him. But while history is replete with stories of very successful special operations, wherein no one on the assault side was killed (Eben Emael, Son Tay, Entebbe - almost), that's hindsight speaking. Every one of those operations was a colossal risk and might have had a long casualty count (complete with second-guessing in the papers, from reserve staff officers no less).
Just my opinion, of course, but my opinion is that his opinion is fulla you-know-what.
d.o.l.
Criminal Number 18F
This has happened in history, for instance with the Ranger Companies in Korea, or the expenditure of SF recon teams from the Delta Project by the 1st Cav and other conventional units that had them OPCON in 65-66. This latter was largely a failing of the Delta commander, IMHO.
Look at all the ground combat troops that die to save pilots, it is simply because it takes so long, and costs so much to replace the pilot.
I must respectfully disagree with you there. I do not believe that this economic/comparative-advantage argument is really what's behind these actions, even though we have often articulated such a rationale to sell CSAR to Congress and the public. I think it's simpler than that: we have a bond with our fellow Americans. That is especially true in this war, with the satanic, bestial conduct of our enemies. You may recall the extensive efforts to find the two young riflemen who were reportedly captured (actually, killed) in Iraq recently. We didn't do it because of the training we invest in a PFC ammo bearer -- we do it because he's an American and a human being.
For the same reason, you may be sure that American SOF were standing by to rescue the journalists who have been taken captive, regardless of the low opinion we have of them and their profession. It is a human duty to use your skills to protect your own kind -- and like them or not, they are ours.
By the way, CSAR and the more general PR (Personnel Recovery) are by definition SOF missions. However, conventional forces have the flexibility to execute them where able. Would you use your linguists interchangeably with your other troops in a combat situation?
Depends on the situation.
As in all aspects of life you have to use your assets in a wise way, like the article said, it will take two years to supply a replacement for that SEAL.
Soldiers get hurt in wartime (operators get hurt in peacetime, too). It happens and while you take measures to control it, I cannot fault the actions of the slain SEAL, nor of his commander, nor of the conventional force commander who asked the SEALs for help. If you were in any of their shoes, what would you have done differently?
The article itself was written by a marine infantryman.
Yeah, an expert on special operations, since 2004.
Look, if we want to preserve the SEALs for what they do best and that no one else can do as well, we need to get them back in Little Creek and Coronado swimming. Ain't no littorals where they're playing now. Even drinking water has to be shipped in. (And yes, there are actual and potential operational areas in this war where the SEALS' maritime specialities CAN be put to best use). Indeed, after Panama, the then-Commander of the SEALs vowed that they would never again be employed on missions without "a maritime nexus." (Since then, I've crossed paths with them in landlocked Bolivia -- where one died scaling a cathedral spire on a dare, or was that Ecuador? -- and in Afghanistan, 600 nautical miles from the nearest navigable water).
The fact is, we have a non-trivial number of SEALs, and we can cover contingencies, keep SEALs assigned to JSOC for national-level strategic missions, maintain SEAL individual and collective training standards, AND supply SEAL elements to the theater combatant commanders. Would we do better to have more SEALs? Of course we would. And responsible people are working on that, in a responsible way.
This kind of in-the-press whinging is not responsible. It's a junior officer saying his commanders are all soup. That is a typical JO point of view, which will change if and when he ascends to command.
d.o.l.
Criminal Number 18F
"Look at all the ground combat troops that die to save pilots, it is simply because it takes so long, and costs so much to replace the pilot."
"I must respectfully disagree with you there. I do not believe that this economic/comparative-advantage argument is really what's behind these actions,"
I didn't take the time to go through the, every body is just as important thing, because I think everybody interested in the US military knows that, but at least since WWII special efforts and resources are devoted to recovering pilots.
Even in large sloppy wars where soldiers are lost to reasons unknown, downed pilots are tracked and sought more carefully.
The people that are loose behind enemy lines, are, in order or frequency, downed aviators, special ops elements who had extraction problems, and individuals and small elements that strayed from conventional patrols.
Of these, the whereabouts of aviation personnel are usually best-known. Artillerymen or maintenance technicians get less opportunity (if that's the word) to be evaders. But we go after them just the same (recall J. Lynch and the other survivors of that ill-led and ill-fated missile maintenance company).
Doctrine is still overloaded with the lessons of SEA and needs updating, six or seven years from now the proponents will have manuals that sort of describe what's really being done today.
d.o.l.
Criminal Number 18F
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