I'll watch but will Hill/Bill try to have it pulled before it airs? I saw on DU the other day they are having a write in campaign not to show it.
Thanks, Howlin!
btt
Thanks for the ping, Howlin...will certainly watch.
THANK YOU, Howlin.
Calendar marked and emails going out now!
Glad someone wrote a review of this, because I was wondering if this was going to be good or bad, fair, or lopsided. I saw an ad for it on ESPN on Monday night during Monday Night Football.
Thanks! Will set the DVR now, before I forget.
Path to 9/11 ABC link:
http://abc.go.com/movies/thepathto911/
Front Page Magazine interview with the writer/producer:
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=23865
Thanks for the ping, will tape it since we are flying to Manchester, England on Sept 11th.
Thanks for the ping!
Hopefully one of my friends will record this.
On Sunday, September 10, 2006, at 6:30 p.m. ET, the Washington, D.C. America Supports You Freedom Walk will begin at the Washington Monument and will follow a route across Arlington Memorial Bridge to the crash site at the Pentagon. A concert will follow the Walk at the Pentagon South Parking Lot, and will end by 9:00 p.m ET.
I will put it on my calendar....thanks for the heads up!
Thanks for the ping
(PS .. CNN is running OBL special right now.)
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Lest we forget that vile person ... always sermonizing and rationalizing, perpetually feigning how hard he worked to protect us, when all the while his cowardice, uncontrollable sociopathic bent and pathological narcissistic lust for adulation rule his every move. (Bringing up another point: what kind of woman would be attracted to this diabolically brilliant misfit?? But I digress .........)
Clinton Signed Off on Berger bin Laden Blunders
"Documents uncovered by the 9/11 Commission suggest that disgraced former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger vetoed several attacks planned in 1999 and 2000 on Osama bin Laden's Afghanistan hideouts.
But while Berger may have advised against attacking bin Laden, remarks by President Clinton two years ago indicate that he personally quashed the plans.
As first detailed by the New York Sun on Friday, the 9/11 Commission report cites a document detailing a June 1999 plan to launch cruise missiles into a bin Laden encampment known as Tarnak Farms.
In notes handwritten in the margin, Berger cited "the presence of 7 to 11 families in the Tarnak Farms facility, which could mean 60-65 casualties," then warned, "if he responds, we’re blamed."
In February 2002 President Clinton discussed what sounded like the same plan to target Tarnak Farms, which is located near Khandahar. [In his version, Clinton inflated the potential casualties from 65 to 200.]
"The real issue is should we have attacked the al-Qaida network in 1999 or in 2000 in Afghanistan," he told a Long Island business group two years ago.
"The only place bin Laden ever went that we knew was occasionally he went to Khandahar, where he always spent the night in a compound that had 200 women and children. So I could have, on any given night, ordered an attack that I knew would kill 200 women and children that had less than a 50 percent chance of getting him."
Clinton continued:
"Now, after he murdered 3,100 of our people and others who came to our country seeking their livelihood you may say, 'Well, Mr. President, you should have killed those 200 women and children.' But at the time we didn't think he had the capacity to do that. And no one thought that I should do that. Although I take full responsibility for it."
According to the Commission, Berger advised against at least three other plans to capture or kill bin Laden during the same 1999-2000 time frame.
But in his 2002 speech, Clinton explained that he made the final call on at least one of those plans to snare the al-Qaida leader.
"We actually trained to do this. I actually trained people to do this. We trained people," the ex-president recalled.
"But in order to do it, we would have had to take them in on attack helicopters 900 miles from the nearest boat - maybe illegally violating the airspace of people if they wouldn't give us approval. And we would have had to do a refueling stop."
Without mentioning Berger, Clinton said that "the military recommended against it [because] there was a high probability that it wouldn't succeed."
In his April 8, 2004, testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Clinton took two aides with him: longtime damage controller Bruce Lindsey - and Sandy Berger."
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More background .... sad excerpt (amazing ..the things we don't know --- so many cogs in the machine. I can only imagine all the behind-the-scenes intrigue and treachery of the last 5 years, not to mention the handiwork of the CIA rogues .. wonder if we'll ever know.) :
The Tragedy of Abdul Haq - Commentary / Robert McFarlane / Wall Street Journal 2nov01
Mr. McFarlane served from 1983 to 1985 as President Reagan's national security adviser.
"Abdul Haq
More than a year ago it became clear to any casual reader of news from Afghanistan that there was growing opposition to the Taliban. The resistance came not just from the Northern Alliance, but from villagers and fighters throughout the country, especially in southern Pashtun areas. This ought to have been a clear signal that the Taliban were vulnerable, and that the opposition could play a critical role in bringing them down.
It should have led the CIA to engage with grass-roots opposition, to support and nurture people like Abdul Haq, a commander who last week was caught and executed by the Taliban.
Unfortunately no such effort was made. And therein lies a scandalous, tragic story of bureaucratic incompetence with profound implications for our national security in the years ahead. Let me go back to the beginning.
Respected Commander
At about this time last year, I was approached by Joseph Ritchie, a successful Chicago businessman and friend who had spent much of his childhood in Afghanistan. He shared my sense of the potential for Afghans to take back their country from the Taliban, and asked my advice as to how they ought to go about it.
I felt that the organizing and support of any effort to bring down the Taliban was beyond the means of, and inappropriate for, private sponsors. It was a role for governments, and I offered to help him bring the concept to the attention of appropriate officials in Washington.
Together we first reconnected with one of the most successful commanders from the struggle to force the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in the 1980s, Abdul Haq. I had first met Haq while serving as President Reagan's national security adviser in 1984. When he came to the White House, Haq had already established a reputation as a courageous combat leader and brilliant tactician. President Reagan and later Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher were equally impressed.
Through our talks over the next several months, culminating in February of this year, I became convinced that with fairly modest support Haq and 50 to 60 of his fellow commanders had the forces, and the necessary skill and determination, to take on the Taliban.
I believed, however, that parallel to his military campaign, there needed to be a political framework -- a process to form a post-Taliban government -- that would bring civil order back to the country and manage its reconstruction. Abdul Haq and Joe Ritchie agreed and devoted several months to enlisting the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, to serve as the catalyst and moral foundation of this process.
We received attentive hearings and encouragement at the departments of State and Defense, as well as the White House. In each case, however, we were told that the CIA had responsibility for this mission. Unfortunately, the CIA made it clear that it was reluctant to take on the assignment.
In a series of meetings, we urged that CIA officials begin planning with proven commanders with well-documented track records. They responded with flimsy criticism of the commanders, all of it based on hearsay. Disclaiming any personal stake in our preferred nominees, we then asked only that they go into the field and do their own due diligence, and especially talk to the dozens of commanders who were disposed to help.
To this we received only dismissive comments and indifference. In one astonishing exchange we were told, to paraphrase, "We don't yet have our marching orders concerning U.S. policy; it may be that we will end up dealing with the Taliban." Such an attitude obviously turns the mission of intelligence gathering -- to inform policy makers -- on its head.
Faced with this persistent recalcitrance, Haq -- who had been reluctant to seek U.S. help and never expected to get it -- decided in mid-August to go ahead and launch operations in Afghanistan. He returned to Peshawar, Pakistan, to make final preparations.
After six weeks' work coordinating with other commanders, and a short trip to Rome to coordinate with the king, on Oct. 21 he re-entered Afghanistan and headed for Jalalabad. He knew that he had been under surveillance by Taliban operatives in Peshawar and was very vulnerable, but believed he could evade them and join up with his colleagues.
Unfortunately, due to his popularity, he was recognized -- and compromised -- as he transited villages along his way. After four days, while proceeding with his party up a narrow road in the mountains near Jalalabad, he was ambushed.
While under attack his nephew, a member of the group, called Joe Ritchie's brother, James, in Peshawar and asked, "Can you do something?" James called me, and I, in turn, called the CIA operations center. An unmanned surveillance aircraft was vectored to the battle area. It successfully attacked a convoy at some distance from the ambush, but by then, almost five hours later, Haq had already been captured. The next day the Taliban executed him."