Combating Global Terrorism and Crime (+ Terror Cell in Torrance, CA)

John Miller, Assistant Director for Public Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice Foreign Press Center Briefing Washington, DC April 11, 2006

MODERATOR: Good afternoon and welcome to the Foreign Press Center. It's nice to see some familiar faces. We're delighted to have the FBI back to give a briefing today. We welcome John Miller, who's the Assistant Director for Public Affairs at the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Department of Justice. He's here to talk about counterterrorism and other issues, but I know that we'll try to keep this informal.

There's coffee and sweets out there for those of you who want some. Please help yourself. We ask you to turn off your cell phones -- we are taping this -- and to identify yourself and your institution when you ask questions. That's for the transcript. And there will be a transcript available for this, hopefully, by this evening.

MR. MILLER: Thanks, Duncan, I appreciate it and I thank the Foreign Press Center for giving us this opportunity.

First, just a little background on myself: I come from the same end of the business that you all do. I was a journalist for NBC, the American television network, ABC, another American television network for 20-some odd years before moving into the public affairs realm. During that time I covered organized crime for a great deal of the time based in New York and then terrorism, which took me all around the world. After that, I accepted an offer to become Deputy Chief of the Los Angeles Police for their counterterrorism unit after September 11th and started that job in 2003.

Interestingly, for me as a journalist, I had an opportunity to conduct an interview with Usama bin Laden, so it makes me one of the few people in the FBI who's actually met with him among the very, very many who would very much like to. (Laughter.) So I come at this from a slightly different direction than many of my predecessors.

I've been at the FBI about six months and one of our priorities after initially kind of reconfiguring the public affairs operation, in some ways, was to do a more effective and hopefully, more often, in terms of outreach, to the foreign press. So I appreciate your ability to get together with us today.

I'd like to give you a brief overview of FBI programs and priorities just to set the table about where the FBI has come since September 11th. One of the first things the director did was to set a list of priorities. First among them is counterterrorism and not just the investigation of, or the gathering intelligence about, but the prevention of terrorism as a top priority for the FBI. The way the FBI is structured and the priorities as they cascade down are counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber crime, and then the top criminal priority is public corruption.

But as they cascade down, resources go to the top priority. If that top priority needs more resources, no lower priority is given resources in terms of people, overtime, equipment unless the top priority's resources are covered. One of the reasons to have priority is to make sure that the things that the FBI considers its core missions, its top missions, are done in the most effective way possible.

And the FBI's top priority, which is counterterrorism, we've seen a marked shift over the short span of years since September 11th. If you examine the terrorism paradigm before 9/11, what you essentially had was a principal among them, groups like al-Qaida and several others that were hierarchical groups in a kind of paramilitary way. There was a boss, in that case, Usama bin Laden; an underboss, captains who ran crews of operators.

If you compared it from an investigator's standpoint to the structure of a mafia family, you would see a lot of similarities in terms of how it was run in terms of command and control. What you've seen since: the invasion of Afghanistan; al-Qaida being moved from its bases, its leadership being captured and/or killed; its subgroup of leaders then being captured to a large extent, is that al-Qaida in terms of its organization structure, in terms of its hierarchal layers, has been essentially broken to some degree.

What you've seen then in the shift over those period of years is that it has gone, in some degree, from being a group with a strong organizational structure almost to a movement or a state of mind. What we see that shift evidencing itself in is events like the Madrid train bombings or the London bombings, either the first instance or the second instance or a case that we had experienced in Torrance, California in the Los Angeles area where a terrorism cell spawned itself from a cell, a prison cell in Folsom Prison where a particular leader appointed himself, recruited others, and then as they got out of jail, sent them out to recruit more and to plan attacks and did so, including obtaining the weapons, selecting the targets, the financing and so on.

So the old model would have been that a terrorist cell in the United States or anywhere else in the world would have essentially gone to the mother ship, the control entity, al-Qaida, and said, "I need logistical help. I need false documents. I need financing. I need a bomb maker. I have a plot and I need help making it go forward." These people might have been through the training camps and so they would have known what they needed and what that group had to offer.

Now what we're seeing is a format that resembles much more of a kind of do-it-yourself terrorism. You can log on to the Internet. You can become radicalized on the Internet. You can be radicalized already and get training on the Internet. The kind of training you used to get in the camps is now offered on some websites in terms of how to conduct surveillance, how to plan, how to make these devices. So we've gone from having a university for terrorism to having a correspondence course over a computer. So we've seen a number of key shifts in the terrorism realm over the past four-plus years.

In the criminal program, just to shift to the other programs, we've seen a number of changes. If you go through the FBI's history, we've always been driven by social changes brought on by technology. If you go back to the days of Bonnie and Clyde, the reason the FBI had to chase the gangsters of the 1920s, 30s in this country was because of the advent of the automobile. Suddenly, they could cross state lines over which the local sheriff or even the state police couldn't follow them, but the FBI had national jurisdiction.

So because of the automobile, as these criminals swept the country, the FBI's mission began to change and evolve. I think the next step in that was cheap airfares, where anybody could hop on a plane and go across international borders. And so we saw, either with La Cosa Nostra or Eastern bloc crime groups, a large shift of their ability to operate transnationally.

The Internet would be the third piece of that. It really took the borders away from crime. We now see cases of identity theft, credit card fraud, very complicated con operations being run by computers that are doing everything, from setting up phony Hurricane Katrina aid sites, when in fact, the source the money is going to is going through three or four layers of different internet blinds, but ending up in the former Soviet Union, in places from Albania to a number of Eastern bloc countries, former Eastern bloc countries there.

So we've seen a tremendous shift there and that is where our international partnerships, our international cooperation from counterterrorism to criminal matters, has become so much more important than ever before and we've done a great deal to expand that. That is kind of, in a nutshell, a brief history and overview in the short term. I'd be happy to entertain any questions you have.

QUESTION: Joyce Karam from Al Hayat newspaper. I'm particularly interested in knowing how is it that you decide to send FBI teams to overseas, like when Prime Minister Hariri was assassinated in Beirut, February 2005, and then you had several other assassinations. The FBI decided to go there. We've had many assassinations before, but we don't see you going there.

MR. MILLER: Without addressing that specific case, in those instances, whether it was at the request of the War Crimes Commission to offer forensic aid in Bosnia or in Hariri's assassination, the request comes either direct to the FBI or, more commonly, through the State Department for assistance from either an authority that's been charged with investigating it or from the host government asking for assistance. And we respond to those on a case-by-case basis.

QUESTION: Yes, sir. Khaled Dawoud from Egypt TV and Al Ahram newspaper. Actually I have two questions. Since you're directly involved in combating al-Qaida, do you think the term, global war against al-Qaida, or putting it at an equal level with, say, the former Soviet Union is the right comparison, like we always hear from the Administration here? Or as you said, it's a mafia group, you know, rather just small cells here and there that requires more police and security action rather than military intervention and action?

And then my second question is more on the U.S. side. There have been so many cases of anti-terror, like the one you've described in California. We've heard of some in Buffalo in New York and many places and it turned out to be false in the end. The record, in general, doesn't tend to be in favor of the cases that you bring up. Can you explain this to us, please?

MR. MILLER: Let me answer those in order. First of all, the common term that I see and read is the global war on terrorism. It certainly is a global war. It certainly is against a non-state enemy, which makes it no less of a war. In fact, it makes it more difficult and it certainly requires partnerships and coalitions, so it is what it is. It would be something more akin to La Cosa Nostra if it were profit-motivated crimes from groups that were interested in making money only and that the killings were largely internecine battles between criminal groups, as is the history with La Cosa Nostra and affiliated criminal groups.

When you have a situation where, in a single act of aggression by a stateless enemy, 3,000 people are killed, towers are caused to tumble, the seat of government is attacked at its core, at the Pentagon, and against other targets, and innocent civilians are used in that attack, both as passengers on the very weapons that were deployed and as victims in non-military targets like the World Trade Center, you can search the lexicon for a word other than war. But it would be hard to find one that would be appropriate. And the response to that has to be in kind.

On the second question, those cases are a part of a process; in other words, part of an American process that is not special. We have -- we've heard conversations about military tribunals and other things, but when you get to cases such as the Lackawanna case or the Lodi case or the Torrance case, which hasn't gone to trial yet, the process is that these are brought before a grand jury of 23 people and they are presented with evidence to decide whether there's prima facie evidence, there's probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed.

If they say, "What you're showing us isn't enough," then they do not vote to indict. In a case where they say there's probable cause to believe a crime has been -- being committed, they come up with an indictment. That indictment says there's probable cause for this to be examined in a public forum, not a secret forum. The reason the grand jury exists is because if those 23 people say, "I don't think you made your case here. I don't think that this is up to snuff," they can reject it and, therefore, that person's reputation remains intact because they're not indicted.

In the case where they hand it up for trial, that goes to a public airing in the American system to a jury of their peers and they come to a decision. We will learn what that decision is in the Lodi case, but we certainly see it unfold in a public way, not the way it happens everywhere in the world.

In the Lackawanna case, a number of people pleaded guilty, which means they reviewed the evidence against themselves and said, "Yes, I did that." In the Torrance case, there is a very lengthy and very inclusive indictment with an awful lot of details on the public record about what was found and about what was alleged.

So in the American system, whether the government prevails or not, those cases go through a series of vettings that are built into the Constitution. You don't have to be American to be afforded those rights; it's part of the system and we're proud of it. And where the government prevails at trial, they hold those up as an example that their evidence was deemed credible by a jury. And where the government doesn't prevail at trial, I hold it up -- I think the rest of us do -- as evidence of a system that works.

MODERATOR: I have to intervene here. I've been informed that there is a fire on the third floor of the building and we have to evacuate.

MR. MILLER: Well, that's good, because I think the hard question was just coming up.

MODERATOR: We'll restart -- I mean, recontinue. We'll continue with a small group.

MR. MILLER: Well, the last two questions from Al Hayat were so hot the building caught fire, so it'll have to be somebody easier. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: My name is Arshad Mahmood and I'm from the Pro Thom Alo in Bangladesh. I have a couple of questions. The first is related to the professional one, as perhaps I was discussing with you before. How to get a response from the FBI when it comes to a country-to-country basis relationship? For instance, reportedly, the United States Government gave $100 million to setup a counterterrorism unit in Bangladesh and obviously, I called the State Department people and I was referred to this gentleman, that gentleman and I never got a reply. So what is the best way to get feedback or response from your department? This is one question.

And the number two is, when you go on an overseas mission, how often does it overlap with the works of CIA and whether it hinders your activities? How do you resolve these things? Thank you.

MR. MILLER: Well, on the first question, in terms of funding, unless the funding is coming from the FBI, and if it was $100 million, I would have noticed, it's not our question to answer. I mean, we don't want to answer questions that aren't FBI business, so that would be a State Department issue.

As far as when the FBI goes overseas, as you know, we have a number of legal attaches who are permanently stationed all over the world and that number --

MODERATOR: Here's the thing. They're not permanent. The position is permanent and they get occupied by people on tours, right?

MR. MILLER: Well, a legat can be there for a couple of years or more and then rotate out and someone else will come in. But as Duncan pointed out, the post is always occupied. That's their main function; to be there and conduct liaison with the host country law enforcement agencies and others. So not in every case do we have to send somebody; there's often people. When we do send somebody, the liaison between the FBI and the CIA isn't on a case-by-case; that's a constant.

One of the difficulties pointed out after September 11th was that there was not the seamless connectivity between the FBI and the CIA on all issues about terrorism and intelligence. And a great deal has been done since then to strengthen that. So if the FBI needs information from the CIA, whether that FBI person in-country contacts a CIA person in-country, that's a possibility. It's just as likely that he may contact FBI headquarters and route that through CIA headquarters, but either way, the communication is greatly improved and constant.

QUESTION: I don't know whether -- are we also supposed to ask you about ground situation in other places? And if it has already been asked, then you can ignore it because I was delayed by the fire. I'm Anwar Iqbal and I work for Pakistan's Dawn newspaper. And I wanted to know your assessment of these reports about Usama bin Laden and Mullah Omar and others; where are they hiding, are they inside Pakistan, they're in the tribal areas, they're in Afghanistan, do they keep moving, do they visit one place. I mean, what is the situation?

MR. MILLER: I don't know the answer to that. I know there are people who have ideas about that based on how they assess and analyze intelligence. But candidly, if anyone actually knew, I think that we would see Usama bin Laden in custody or otherwise.

MR. MILLER: You know, it's hard to tell when you're close. Every time that they hit a location for Saddam Hussein during that search for him, they generally believed, going into that location, that he was probably going to be there and they were generally wrong in every case until they went into the one where they found him.

That's the nature of a manhunt or looking for a fugitive; you go where the intelligence takes you, or you go where the clues point. And as long as you never stop searching, at some point, they'll be captured. I mean, in every case where they've looked for a fugitive relentlessly, there have been rare incidences where they did not get their man.

QUESTION: My name is Munir Mawari. I represent Asharq Al Awsat newspaper, a pan-Arab newspaper. And I would like to know more about your interview with Usama bin Laden and did the FBI benefit from that interview?

MR. MILLER: Well, I'm sure that they did, but I wasn't working for them at the time.

QUESTION: The second one, we published in our newspaper that there are 31 Arabic writers here in the U.S. and Canada -- received threat from an organization in Asia or somewhere that they're going to kill them and they published their name in that e-mail. And since they -- some of them U.S. citizen from Arabic origin and some of them are permanent residents, how do the FBI deal with this kind of issues?

MR. MILLER: On the first question, the interview I conducted with Usama bin Laden was in 1998 when I was employed by ABC News. After the interview was broadcast, the government took great interest in it. I believe the U.S. Attorney's Office that was prosecuting the embassy bombing cases actually subpoenaed the transcript of the interview and entered it into evidence at trial, principally because in the course of the interview, bin Laden declares war on America and says -- gives a number of reasons why he has to use violence against the United States.

So I mean -- I guess in that sense, it did become part of the government's record in the case. But again, I wasn't working for the FBI, nor in 1998 did I have any idea that I would ever be working for the FBI. In fact, if you had said to me or most people in the FBI what the chances of that were, they probably would have said very small.

On the second question, I am personally not aware of that particular case, so I will have to go back and get you the answer to that. So if you leave me a card, I'll check up on that and find out what the status of that is. Normally, in a threat case, what the FBI will do is look at the threat, do a threat assessment, determine if it's the kind of threat that has a high probability of being carried out, a low probability of being carried out, if we can tell what the source of the threat is, and if there's a violation of federal law there.

There is always the potential that making a threat of violence through the use of interstate commerce, or in this case, international commerce, is a violation of a certain federal statute. But I can't address that case specifically until I get familiar with it. And if you can give the details to Mark and exchange information, I will follow up.

QUESTION: I have a simple question. What would you like our audiences, like in my case, in the Middle East, to know about the FBI, you know? What kind of an image?

MR. MILLER: I think that is the precise reason that we're here today. And I think the precise reason that you'll be seeing us back on a fairly regular basis is, between 9/11 and today, although even before that, the world became a very small place. It went from being the vast expanses of the globe, where people could go through life never brushing up against each other in person, to a place that, through cheap travel and the internet and communications and so on and the global politics and how those issues bleed over and spill over into each other's countries, that we're really a very small town.

And in that way, particularly in the war on terrorism and violence that would strike out at innocent victims, as well as transnational crime, with the world being such a small place, not only has the FBI found itself new partners all over the world in terms of other law enforcement agencies, but we also find a real use to reaching out and getting people beyond the United States to get to know the FBI, how it works, what it's about, what its principles are.

Because at this point, you don't even have to make a long distance telephone call or go to that much trouble to feed information into this endeavor. You can log on to your computer and send an e-mail or visit a website and learn about us and I would encourage people to do that in all these cases.

So to talk to foreign press, we would concentrate on the Washington press, then the national press, and our field offices would concentrate on the press in their town. But you know, now, everywhere is everyone's town. So I think we need to make a much bigger investment in this group because we're hoping to reach beyond you to your people.

QUESTION: Sir, I'm Khalil from Pakistan. The question must have been asked and I am sorry about that, but we came late. But you know, what -- is there any overlapping between the working of CIA and FBI or what are the different parameters, you know?

MR. MILLER: Yeah, it's codified by law. Principally, the FBI's activities are focused on overseas and in gathering intelligence on --

MR. MILLER: I have it backwards. Presently, the CIA's efforts are focused overseas and gathering information intelligence principally on non-U.S. citizens, whereas the FBI has generally been focused on U.S. citizens and domestically.

Now, in the war on terrorism, there's an awful lot more crossover as we see people in the United States, both citizens and non-citizens, that have come up in investigations and been involved in criminal activity. We see people overseas, both citizens and non-citizens, and a lot of communication between them. That has caused what used to be a fairly black and white division between the CIA and the FBI, in many cases, to get grayer. The rules haven't gotten grayer, but the amount of contact between the two agencies and the amount of projects and investigations that they do together has increased, as each one of them functions in its own discipline, but communicates better across those lines.

QUESTION: Thank you. There are several things there. One is the sleeping cell. I mean, how do you define it? When does a member of such a cell -- it constitutes sleeping and when does he or she become

QUESTION: Active, awake. How many cells are there? How many of them have -- how many members have been arrested?

The other thing is there were some investigations of U.S.-based Muslim organizations for money laundering. And it was said that they had connections to various terrorist groups. Has anyone been proven guilty? Have they been cleared of those investigations? I mean, what is the situation there? And also, the third thing is that there is international reports about Zarqawi being replaced by another person as the al-Qaida chief in Iraq. I mean, do you have information about that?

MR. MILLER: Okay. I'm going to try and do these in order. On sleeper cells, the principle of a sleeper cell, the theory behind it was that al-Qaida, for example, a well-funded organization that according to the testimony of former al-Qaida members, had a budget in the millions of dollars that it took to run every year, had cells of terrorists in place, ready to be given the signal to attack. That assumed that al-Qaida had a headquarters that was effectively functioning, that it had the ability to conduct world communications between those cells, that it had the ability to fund those cells to keep them in place.

Since September 11th, a great deal has changed. It is much more likely today that rather than the presence of sleeper cells awaiting a signal, that as we've seen in London, as we've seen in Madrid, and as we've seen in California, we're more likely to see self-starter cells, cells that put themselves together; likeminded people who ascribe to using violence and fear to achieve political or social change will find each other, form a small group, raise their own money and activate themselves at a date and time certain for a specific operation. That is more realistic today than the concept of al-Qaida-run sleeper cells in the United States, just based on the changes we've seen in the form and format of attacks and who's been behind them over the last two and half, three years.

MR. MILLER: Money laundering cases. A number of money laundering cases have been brought by the Department of Justice. A number have been brought by the Treasury Department to the Department of justice. And I would have to go back through them to say which ones are awaiting trial, which ones resulted in convictions. And if you want the numbers on that, I'd have to follow up. There was a major case in Chicago that I'll check on. There's a recent case that was just indicted a few weeks ago. I think that's also in Chicago. Obviously, that wouldn't have been the trial yet. It probably won't go to trial for a number of months. But we can certainly get those numbers for you. What was the last piece?

MR. MILLER: Zarqawi. We've certainly looked at that intelligence in terms of the postings on a web site that said Zarqawi was going to be replaced. The website suggested he was going to be replaced by an Iraqi. And frankly, at this moment, other than the posting on that website, it's hard to analyze the voracity of that.

QUESTION: No. I mean, the website that you're referring to, the website say that he is being replaced by a person called Azzam, whose last name was Azzam. Is he related to the Azzam that organized Afghan jihad and every --

MR. MILLER: I don't know the answer to that. But I mean, as you know, Azzam is a very common name.

QUESTION: And also you posted an FBI agent deployed in -- FBI agent in Lodi, California. Do you think it is like, morally right to plant an agent to instigate a community and then sort of file charges against them, also involve members of that community in terrorism? Is it the right sort of thing? Is it morally right to do that?

MR. MILLER: I can't subscribe to the question, because it would say that I agreed with the premise of the question, which is that we planted an agent to instigate the elements that became that case. Right now, that case is on trial and will be before a jury and that will be for them to decide on the merits.

One of the rules of the Department of Justice is that no public official with the Department of Justice or any of its self entities should, during a trial, make comments that could reasonably prejudice that case or sway the minds of the jury. The jury should go by what they hear in the courtroom more than what they see on TV or read in the newspapers. So because of that, I shouldn't comment on that specific case now.

But I also think that we'll have an answer soon in terms of what the jury thought and ultimately, whether they agree with the government's case or they go a different way on that. That is the system we go by.

QUESTION: Since you said that your purpose is to reach out to the foreign press and that image-building, how difficult do you think it has become on the part of the United States agencies like FBI and CIA against a backdrop of all these tortures, news of tortures coming out? And what exactly are you trying to do to counter that kind of thing and how difficult it has become for you? Thank you.

MR. MILLER: Well, I can't speak for the rest of the government, which is not anything I want you to read into about the rest of the government. I can only speak for the FBI's role. Along those issues, the FBI has not engaged in torture, has not engaged in the practices that have been called into question in those stories. Again, for another agency, I can't qualify or quantify those things, whether they happened, or why.

But as far as the FBI's standpoint goes, not only have I not seen a report or an instance or a story about where an FBI agent engaged in any alleged abuses along those lines, because I think the FBI has been very deliberate about how it conducts itself in the course of investigations, which is to adhere tightly to a very specific set of rules. But there have been other cases, which are available to you on the public record, where the FBI has brought forth allegations about conditions or things that its agents observed in the course of conducting investigations by other government employees that it's complained about.

So I think as far as the FBI's record there, I don't have anything to defend, because the question hasn't come up, vis-à-vis the FBI. And as far as other agencies, you need to take your questions about those allegations to them.

QUESTION: No, I understand your point, but when you deal with the overseas people, you know, the line becomes too blurred between FBI or CIA or Department of -- you understand this, right?

MR. MILLER: You know, as far as that goes, if our mission is to vindicate, in everybody's mind, every course of conduct of the U.S. Government in a very difficult and protracted situation, I'm not sure we'll be able to do that. I think our goal is to introduce the FBI to people as a single agency with its issues, with its outreach, and have people reflect back on us what they know of the FBI. And so far, as far as those issues go, all we can say is we haven't had those issues come up. We've been very careful to avoid them.

QUESTION: You might have seen them at some -- if their agents wrote memos about human rights violations in Guantanamo Bay --

QUESTION: -- (inaudible), so would you like to give us more about that? What did they observe? Who were there and -- you know, what happened to their complaint?

MR. MILLER: Well, that's all on the public record. I think it's been extensively written about. It's been reported on. It's contained in some government reports. And rather than my reiterating it, you know where to find those documents. I think it hearkens back to my earlier point, which is, the FBI has a very tightly regulated set of conduct that it has to go by when questioning detainees, prisoners, suspects.

And essentially, the word from the director after 9/11 has gone forth that we are not going to alter or change or modify those in any particular case; that we're going to go by the FBI's book as far as the FBI conducts itself. Now, other agencies may have other protocols and they have to answer to their chain of command and that is up to them.

But as far as the FBI goes, not only have we stuck with our rules and protocols, but when we have seen what agents have perceived as violations, they have reported them to the FBI. The FBI has then reported those observations to the agencies concerned, other government agencies. And in the cases where those agencies have launched investigations, the FBI has cooperated in those investigations.

QUESTION: Sir, why should the FBI be concerned with the image factor, you know? I mean, the criminals, they should be fearing you as such, or as your image was. I mean, can there be any elaboration? You are facilitating for the journalist community or for the investigation (inaudible), you know? I'm not sure.

MR. MILLER: I mean, our -- the people we're trying to reach out to is the public. The best way to reach out to the public is through journalists. Journalists around the world are the public's surrogates. We can't get a million people to come here from all of your respective countries sit and hear me prattle on. But we can get you and you can deliver that message home and we hope you do fairly and accurately and I have confidence you will. That is the way to communicate.

Now as far as the criminals go, we would be happy if criminals continue to fear the FBI and that they fear being caught and being brought to justice and that being done, as we just discussed, within the rule of law of the United States and the international community.

I think that the criminals don't need much inspiration to fear the FBI. If you go back to the embassy bombings of August 1998 or to the instance of any of the other attacks you can think of, the FBI has shown that it can and will track criminals down or terrorists to the ends of the earth and even many, many years after the alleged crime or terrorist act and bring them to justice. I think they know that. I think that's why they run, but I think they cannot hide. It's not like if you hide long enough, they take your name off the list.

A lot of very interesting information.

I found it, because I was looking for a mention of a terror cell having been discovered in Torrance, CA (in greater Los Angeles) -- because FoxNews mentioned that yesterday, but I couldn't find any more info, until this brief mention in this discussion.

"What you've seen then in the shift over those period of years is that it has gone, in some degree, from being a group with a strong organizational structure almost to a movement or a state of mind. What we see that shift evidencing itself in is events like the Madrid train bombings or the London bombings, either the first instance or the second instance or a case that we had experienced in Torrance, California in the Los Angeles area where a terrorism cell spawned itself from a cell, a prison cell in Folsom Prison where a particular leader appointed himself, recruited others, and then as they got out of jail, sent them out to recruit more and to plan attacks and did so, including obtaining the weapons, selecting the targets, the financing and so on. "

John Miller, FBI

He did one of the best personal stories on Osama bin Laden, including
an interview in the field before 9-11.

I was unhappy when he took his fairly lucid mind from ABC over
to work for LAPD/Bratten.

I guess his little gaffe (caught taking gun on plane w/o permit in hand)
didn't hurt him in getting an FBI gig.

Here is a better link to most of the Torrance articles.

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/keyword?k=levarwashington

According to the Daily Breeze (no longer available online), the trial has been postponed:

Daily Breeze. Torrance, Calif.: Jul 28, 2006. pg. A.4

Alleged terrorist plot trial delayed

The trial of four men charged in an alleged plot to attack local military recruiting centers and Jewish synagogues has been put off until August 2007 to give defense lawyers more time to prepare.

Jury selection was set to begin in October. The four men face life in prison if convicted.

Court papers state that defense lawyers have about 40,000 pages of documents, 14 computer hard drives as well as several video and audio recordings to review. Prosecutors agreed to the delay.

The plot was cracked last year after ex-convict Levar Haney Washington, 26, of Los Angeles and Gregory Patterson, 22, formerly of Gardena were arrested by Torrance police in connection with a string of gas station robberies. Investigators allegedly found documents in Washington's apartment outlining a terrorist plot.

Prosecutors allege that Kevin James, the founder of a militant prison-based group called Jamiyyat Ul-Islam-Is-Saheeh, was behind the plot. James and Washington met in prison. Hammad Samana, 22, of Inglewood, is also charged.

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