I am bit mystified by some of the authors' conclusions in the handbook. For instance, they acknowledge that the jihadis' ultimate goal is to re-establish the caliphate. But then they argue that it is a mistake for the United States to attempt to use direct action to prevent this from happening -- ignoring the fact that if our actions in Iraq are successful then it will be impossible for the caliphate to be re-established.
They also argue that direct action in Iraq and Afghanistan has been good for the jihadi movement. But they don't base this conclusion on anything other than the word of certain jihadist scribblers. And in positing such a conclusion, they completely ignore the fact that bin Laden himself traced the growing potency of the jihadi movement to our failure to respond to their earlier attacks on us. Scholars such as McCants and Brachman can't have it both ways. If they are to maintain their credibility, they can't point to jihadi theories when they support the authors' conclusions and then completely ignore the chief jihadist's theory that Muslims will back the strong horse over the weak horse everytime.
If that theory were applied by the authors to the current reality, one wonders what conclusion they would reach? Would they really say that the more jihadi leaders we kill or capture, the stronger the movement grows? Would they really conclude that the growth in potency of a military force can be directly attributed to how many of its leaders are living the lives of wanted bank robbers?
Finally, after 9/11, I just don't understand how any thinking American can argue that the best approach to take with people who are attempting to kill us is to attempt to use proxies to go after them. That didn't work for the Israelis when they tried to use Arafat to keep a lid on Hamas and it hasn't worked for us in attempting to use Mussharef to keep a lid on the jihadists in Wazirstan. Simply put, using an enemy to kill an another enemy that is already attacking you, is a fool's suicide pact.
The lessons of history are clear. When you are in a fight with the devil, you don't have the luxury of farming out the fight to the devil's acolyte
" they acknowledge that the jihadis' ultimate goal is to re-establish the caliphate. But then they argue that it is a mistake for the United States to attempt to use direct action to prevent this from happening -- ignoring the fact that if our actions in Iraq are successful then it will be impossible for the caliphate to be re-established."
I myself see no incongruency in this line of thought, they are 100% certain that our efforts will be UNsuccessful. Nobody can predict whether we will or will not be successful, but, that being said, if we assume the text is genuine, it would appear that we are playing more by their gamebook than ours. Now, at this moment, in what I think most would consider a work in progress. And really, that's my takeaway bottom line.
"They also argue that direct action in Iraq and Afghanistan has been good for the jihadi movement."
I know it's quite the liberal argument, but at some level, the idea that our actions have galvanized the other side has some merit, wouldn't (or would) you say? We may characterize their actions as desperate, vile, murderous, chaotic, etc; but those reactions on our part appear to mesh with their endgame strategy. We're definitely outkilling them, but they are arguably outchaosing us.
"But they don't base this conclusion on anything other than the word of certain jihadist scribblers. And in positing such a conclusion, they completely ignore the fact that bin Laden himself traced the growing potency of the jihadi movement to our failure to respond to their earlier attacks on us."
But I think that one has to consider that the post-UBL jihadi movement has morphed along with the new improved US response. I haven't developed a full opinion on this tome, I just find it remarkably lucid, whether it's accurate or coherent in all respects or not.