Independent Working Group Report on Missile Defense, Space Relationship, & the 21st Century

Wasting interceptors on flying soon-to-be-submarines, is dumb.

No. Its a demonstration of capability. A wake-up-call. And far more important still, and what gives credibility to the doctrine of deterrence you are relying on...an undeniable assertion of capability and resolve.

As far as restoring security goes, we still have it, and the bad guys now know they can't find out how well our stuff works by using a cheap fireworks display.

No they don't. They regard us as a paper tiger, and China is busy burrowing out what few secrets we have. I still can't believe Bush caved into the Chinese Premier Hu Jintau's demand for resumed "military exchanges".

China was no doubt behind the launches, they were HOPING we would engage so they could learn how our defenses work.

I suspect China already has a fair idea.

But if they want to know, they have to actually shoot at something. They blinked, not us.

Actually they fired damn close to Hawaii... they didn't blink. They malfunctioned. And way too much comfort is being taken from that.

As a more-thorough rejoinder to your question, I commend to your attention this piece by Henry Cooper (Fmr. Head of the SDIO), at this link:

http://www.highfrontier.org/documents/PolicyBrief84.pdf

Here is a snippet from that:

High Frontier Strategic Issues Policy Brief July 14, 2006
“Six Scuds and a Dud” – Why should we care?
By Henry F. Cooper 1 (Stanton Coalition Presentation)
On Fox News Sunday, Brit Hume referred to North Korea’s intrusion on our July 4 celebration with their launch of “Six Scuds and a Dud,” and implied this was not a particularly significant event. I beg to differ.
The Dud Problem
First, the “dud,” their failed test of a Taepodong-2, involved a three stage rocket presumably intended to deliver a modern nuclear weapon to Hawaii, Alaska or the Northwestern continental United States. And if – more likely, when – fully developed, it will be able to deliver a lighter weapon of mass destruction (a chemical or biological weapon) to attack most U.S. cities. We should not take great comfort that this test failed. After all, North Korea already demonstrated its ability to stage its rockets – remember August 31, 1998 and the 3-stage Taepodong-1 that caught the intelligence community by surprise?
It also failed to achieve its objective – putting a light weight satellite in low earth orbit, but it succeeded in over-flying Japan and spreading its debris almost to U.S. territory. Had it succeeded in orbiting that satellite, it could have also de-orbited it to strike any U.S. city, potentially with a chemical or biological weapon. Did the North Koreans understand and fix what went wrong with this test six years ago?
Sometimes one learns more from failure than success. After all, it has been four years since we had a successful intercept test of the defensive interceptor system that is supposed to shoot down long-range North Korean missiles (2 of the past 3 tests did not achieve a successful launch) – and the administration alleges to have confidence in it. So why take great comfort in the fact that North Korea still has work to do in successfully developing and demonstrating its ability to attack U.S. with its long-range missiles?
The Scud Problem
Regarding the Scuds – which were 6-out-of-6 on July 4, are we to be relaxed because we think they threaten only Japan, South Korea, other neighbors of North Korea and our nearby troops?
In fact, achieving 6-out-of-6 was a great marketing demonstration for a major North Korean “cash crop.” It is well known that North Korea sells these rockets – and they have a great many – to anyone with cash, including terrorists. And they can be launched from ships – e.g., a few hundred miles off our coasts. Terrorists could take their pick of cities within 200 miles of our coasts where live two-thirds of all Americans live.
Don’t take my word – consider that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld pointed out in a September 16, 2002, Pentagon press conference:

“Countries have placed ballistic missiles in ships – dime a dozen – all over the world. At any given time, there’s any number off our coasts – coming, going. On transporter-erector-launchers, they simply erect it, fire off a ballistic missile, put it down, cover it up. Their radar signature’s not any different than 50 others in close proximity.”

This threat was also pointed out in the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission’s unanimous bipartisan assessment of the ballistic missile threat. And we have been told that capability has been demonstrated – so this is not a hypothetical possibility.
It shouldn’t take Tom Clancy to imagine scenarios in which terrorists buy several such missiles, arm them with weapons of mass destruction, put them to sea, and launch them at several cities, making September 11, 2001 look like ants at a picnic by comparison. So, clearly we should care about “Six Scuds and a Dud!” And clearly we should have doubts about the prospects of diplomacy doing much more than delaying this threat.
Without question, we need effective defenses to protect America against both long and short range ballistic missiles – and we need them now!
What to Do – Quickly!
The ground-based defenses in Alaska and California are intended to intercept a North Korean ballistic missile. But Americans near our coasts have no defense against terrorist Scuds that could be launched by nearby ships – a fact that can be rectified rapidly by employing proven sea-based interceptors aboard Navy cruisers and destroyers that operate near our coasts.
The Navy is 8-out-of-9 in it’s testing over the past four years – and is already beginning to deploy a missile defense capability on 3 cruisers and 13 destroyers in the Pacific (where all testing currently is conducted with operational crews in ever increasingly complex test configurations), primarily to defend Japan, other allies and our troops near North Korea.
Some of these ships might be diverted in a crisis to defend our west coast. And the Navy had planned to provide by 2007 this same capability to 2 destroyers in the Atlantic, which could have provided some defense for our east coast, but that plan was delayed by Missile Defense Agency officials in favor of funding other programs – delaying for several years efforts that could protect Americans who live within 200 miles of our east coast.
These programs should be accelerated – and supplemented. Operations should be adapted to extend the capabilities of the Pacific Test Range in helping protect Americans who live near the West Coast from Scuds on ships in the Pacific. And more ships in the Atlantic should be outfitted with the SM-3 and tested in an East Coast Test Range to help protect those who live along the Eastern Seaboard against Scuds on ships in the Atlantic. Modest Costs First, for $100 million, a significant number of 100 already existing SM-2 Block IV air defense interceptors, one of which was successfully tested against a short-range missile on May 24, can be modified and begin operating on ships that are already near our coasts within a year after program authorization and funding.
Second, we should accelerate and expand current plans to equip our warships with much more capable SM-3 interceptors as part of our joint program with Japan. Japan is purchasing this same capability for their Aegis equipped warships and joining with the US to improve the SM-3 to fly faster and farther to defend wider areas than the already formidable current Aegis SM-3 abilities. Given normal Navy rotational cycles, a third to half of our ships are available at a moments notice for use at any given time. More could be made available in a crisis or higher state of alert.
Third, we should accelerate outfitting currently planned and additional ships with the SM-3 capability – for about $100M per ship – $20M for the gear and $80M for 8 SM-3 missiles. So, 10 more Aegis ballistic missile defense capable ships, each armed with SM-3 missiles as well as their normal load out of other missiles would cost $1B. These capabilities should be tested in both the Pacific and Atlantic in ways that build the infrastructure for protecting Americans within 200 miles of our coasts against Scuds on ships.
Finally, the Navy should be funded to make the SM-3 interceptor all it can be as quickly as possible – preferably managed by a Spartan, competent technical team in the Aegis Program Office. Key improvements would be to: 1) demonstrate confidence in an ascent phase intercept capability, so that the SM-3 system on ships in the Sea of Japan can shoot down missiles from North Korea that are headed toward US cities; 2) include light-weight technology in miniaturizing the kill vehicle carried by the SM-3, thereby increasing its capability to defend a greater area; and 3) accelerating the development of subsequent block improvements to the current SM-3.
These significant improvements are quite affordable – they would involve increasing the current Navy missile defense effort from about $1 billion a year to less than $2 billion a year. In considering the meaning of “Six Scuds and a Dud,” this investment is responsive to obvious requirements illustrated by the events of July 4. Indeed, there are no better 'bargains" in purchasing needed missile defense capability quickly.

______________________________________________
1 Cooper was Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) during the Bush-41 administration and Ronald Reagan’s Ambassador and Chief Negotiator to the Geneva Defense and Space Talks with the former Soviet Union.

I'm with you as far as improving missile defense to ensure security.

I do not believe your advice of using a show of force doctrine of deterrence would be wise or effective. It seems to me you think we have an inexhaustible supply of bullets to shoot at "missiles" destined to splash in the water. You also don't grasp the value of having an enemy estimate versus confirming our capabilities. You will get lots of folks around here to praise you for your ideas, however you can have the armchair generals. I have no doubts that we did the right thing on 4 July.

I'm with you as far as improving missile defense to ensure security.

Good.

I do not believe your advice of using a show of force doctrine of deterrence would be wise or effective.

There is always room for someone to disagree with common sense, eh?

It seems to me you think we have an inexhaustible supply of bullets to shoot at "missiles" destined to splash in the water.

No, I don't. But we do need to have an appropriate moment to announce the implementation of the strategic "paradigm shift" that Reagan so vividly described, a switch from the Mutual Assured Destruction mentality, to Assured Survival. Anyways, we should have many thousands of these missiles for what has been squandered on the ground based interceptor component. And the Brilliant Pebbles program...with thousands of orbiting sentries... could have been deployed and operational all for $11 billion.

You also don't grasp the value of having an enemy estimate versus confirming our capabilities.

No, again, you're failing to seperate and distinguish the need for operational security, and the opposed necessity for a certain degree of publicity as to capability for deterrent and other purposes...such as the embarassment of North Korea and Iran helping promote regime changes.

You will get lots of folks around here to praise you for your ideas, however you can have the armchair generals.

I am not talking about armchair generals. Caspar Weinberger espoused this very approach, as have others.

I have no doubts that we did the right thing on 4 July.

I do.

Interesting.

Interesting.

I find it so. Unfortunately, I don't think we're going to be seeing President Bush publically receiving this Independent Working Group on Missile Defense report. Certainly not in any photo ops, warmly or otherwise, as Reagan assiduously provided to emphasize the national dangers we were in: