[Ben Mugged]

Since the 1970s Syria has pursued what is now one of the most advanced Arab state chemical weapons (CW) capabilities. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missiles, and has engaged in the research and development of more toxic and persistent nerve agents such as VX.

Syria is fully committed to expanding and improving its CW program, which it believes serves as a deterrent to regional adversaries. Syria continues active chemical munitions testing, although it has not used chemical agents in any conflicts. Although Syria is more self-sufficient than most other third-world CW capable states, foreign assistance has been a key element in the establishment and operation of Syria’s CW program. In particular, Syria remains heavily dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its chemical warfare program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. As a result Syria will need to continue foreign procurement activities—something the PSI is designed to counter—in order to continue its CW program. Syria is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Biological
We believe that Syria is continuing to develop an offensive biological weapons capability. Syria has signed, but not ratified, the Biological Weapons Convention. These “poor man’s nuclear weapons” do not require a large production capability, and depending on the agent and dissemination method, can be extremely lethal.

Missiles
Syria has a combined total of several hundred Scud and SS-21 SRBMs, and is believed to have chemical warheads available for a portion of its Scud missile force. Syria has also developed a longer-range missile—the Scud D—with assistance from North Korea. Syria’s missiles are mobile and can reach much of Israel from positions near their peacetime garrisons and portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the country. Damascus is pursuing both solid- and liquid-propellant missile programs and relies extensively on foreign assistance in these endeavors. North Korean and Iranian entities have been most prominent in aiding Syria’s recent ballistic missile development. Syrian regional concerns may lead Damascus to seek a longer range ballistic missile capability such as North Korea’s No Dong MRBM.

Testimony of John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia September 16, 2003

[sionnsar]

That's what the patriots are for then... ugh.

[tyrem1166]

Thanks for that post. That's what we need: facts.