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It's more than lobbing one missle at another:

Since the Clinton presidency, U.S. military and political leaders have wrestled with the effectiveness, cost, and practicality of implementing a ballistic missile defense system that would protect all fifty states and eventually provide protection for our allies. To some, the current National Missile Defense Program (NMD) might appear to be nothing more than a revision of President Ronald Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), more commonly known as “Star Wars,” a technologically-challenged program that was conceived as an overly ambitious defense system poised against any possible onslaught of thousands of nuclear-tipped missiles. At the time, Reagan had claimed that a fully-deployed SDI program would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete,” more Star Wars in its hype than its reality. The end of the Cold War, however, and the dismantling of a large portion of the strategic missile systems of the former Soviet Union and the United States has ended the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine that both superpowers ascribed to and against which SDI was envisioned. With MAD, huge arsenals of land and sea-based nuclear delivery systems had assured each party that a massive Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) attack by either side would almost assuredly bring about the mutual annihilation of the aggressor country as well. The philosophy of MAD was retaliatory, not defensive. Frightening in its simplicity, MAD held the destructive nuclear possibilities of the U.S.S.R. and the United States in abeyance for decades.

In 1991, President George H. Bush revised the ambitious SDI program, and authorized research and development of the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) program which was also intended' like SDI, as a missile defense system that would have the limited capability of dealing with no more than 200 incoming warheads, a reflection of the nuclear stand down between Moscow and Washington. In 1997, President Clinton reduced the defensive objectives of the newly-named National Missile Defense (NMD) program to handle no more than twenty incoming missiles. At the time, two so-called “rogue” nations were assessed by the government as possible aggressors in an ICBM attack on the U.S.---North Korea and Iran---although neither country had yet achieved development of a long-range missile delivery system nor a nuclear payload. But after the failures of certain aspects of the system during tests and the completion of only three of the nineteen scheduled intercept tests were conducted, President Clinton concluded that the U.S. would not deploy the costly missile defense system.

During the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush pledged, if elected, to build and deploy a nationwide missile defense. The differences in views between Republican and Democratic leadership and their political philosophies is no more apparent than in the parties' approaches to a national missile defense system. During the Clinton years, the Republican-dominated Congress was a strong supporter of the system, with Clinton and the Democratic Party seemingly going along, albeit somewhat reluctantly, with the NMD program. After the technological shortcomings of the deployment of the missile defense system became more apparent, and questions arose as to the system's ability to deal with countermeasures, Clinton was able to stop any further plans to implement the system, although testing of the system continued. But with a go-ahead from Bush after taking office, and an emphasis on homeland security after 9-11, the Pentagon outlined a plan of stepped-up missile intercept tests and a deployment date of late 2004. Democratic critics of a national missile defense concede that any previous ideological philosophies concerning arms control that their party might have once embraced have now been pushed aside to the simpler and quantitative argument of how much to build and how fast, all part of the 9-11 glow and poll results that indicate that the majority of U.S. citizens are in favor of the deployment of some form of defense system from a missile attack.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is currently responsible for developing an integrated and layered missile defense system, now known as the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). When fully employed, proponents claim the BMDS will be capable of handling threats from not only ICBMs, but also intermediate, medium, and short range missile attacks. When completed, the BMDS will consist of an integrated Boost Phase Defense, a Midcourse Phase Defense, and a Terminal Phase Defense, all backed by satellite sensors and various radar systems.

The Boost Phase Defense is the most ambitious phase and most reminiscent of a “Star Wars” approach to defense. As an attack missile leaves its launching pad, struggles against the forces of gravity and is still within an altitude of 300 miles or less, high power lasers beams will be used to kill the threatening missile. As a second resort---a back-up---Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI) launched from mobile systems will be used to bring down the missiles. The window for targeting and destroying attack missiles in the first few minutes of flight is short, only three to five minutes after launch, but offers an easily-targeted heat signature from the engine. This short time frames precipitates a sea-based defense that would have to be deployed to a region in anticipation of attack. Current plans are for this phase to be fully tested by 2011.

The Terminal Phase Defense is one of last resort. This phase typically last thirty-seconds to one minute or so as the attack missile falls back into the atmosphere and heads towards its target. It consists of a combination of truck-mounted missile launchers, including Arrow and Patriot Pac-3 systems, jet interceptors, radars---to include a towering X-band radar system that will be built to float at sea on two motorized pontoons the size of Trident submarines---and command, control, and battle management (C2BM) features. The C2BM integrates external defensive systems with the national military command structure.

A key part of the BMDS is the currently deployed Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system which employs various ground and sea-based defensive missile systems during the Midcourse Phase Defense. This middle range phase for the interception of attack missiles currently offers the greatest degree of kill success, with a window of up to twenty minutes. Multiple launches of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) could be used to ensure a high rate of success, boosted by the predictable path of an attack missile as it goes through and completes its trajectory. At a predetermined point, the GBI would release a Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) that is fifty-five inches long and weighs 140 pounds. This device has its own infrared seeker, guidance system, and motor. As it nears its target, the EKV would integrate data from a sophisticated radar system, adjust its flight path if necessary, and lock on to its target. If successful, the interceptor would collide with the attack missile and destroy it and its payload. A challenge to this defensive phase of missile intercept, however, is the ability of the offensive missile to employ countermeasures to thwart multiple intercept missiles. It is this phase that is currently being deployed and awaiting testing.

Critics charge, however, that the current GMD system is as fraught with problems as earlier defensive versions and question the costs of deploying a missile defense system untested in real-life situations. Added to these criticisms are the skewered conditions employed during testing, the limitation of decoys deployed during the tests, and the possible influence of countermeasures on the system's overall performance. A “successful” intercept test in October 1999, for instance, minimized a number variables that in turn enhanced the system's performance, including placing a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) receiver in the target missile to ensure that the interceptor missile had reliable information as to the target's true position, an event that would not take place in a real-world situation. In another test in early 2000, a failed “kill” of the target missile was blamed on a leaky gas line used to cool on-board sensors on the intercept missile. This fatal flaw in a meticulously hand-built test missile brings in to question how durable an assembly-line-built missile, farmed off, perhaps, to the lowest government contract bidder, would hold up after sitting for years in a silo in the frozen Alaskan tundra? Since December 2002, flight tests have been delayed or canceled six times because of technical problems and test failures. With these more glaring examples of problems with the testing and reliability of the current missile system, it's easy to further question the wisdom of deploying an entire missile defense system when test variables are tightly controlled and component failures are common. Since 2004, however, there have been six out of seven successful intercepts against short and medium range unitary and separating ballistic missile targets.

Chief among critics for the deployment of the missile defense system are former presidential candidate and Senator John Kerry (D-MA), his vice-presidential nominee in 2004, Senator John Edwards (D-NC), former Army General and once presidential candidate Wesley Clark, and the ousted former Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) who opined that “There is such a rush to deploy that I think it would be an embarrassment to them---to the country---if we rush to judgment, rush to the commitment of resources.” Lt. General Ronald Kadish, director of the Missile Defense Agency argues, however, that “You can't operationally test a system until you put it in place,” a valid, but costly point when test conditions can only go so far in simulating a real-world environment.

A statement by the MDA echoes the concerns of critics and proponents alike. “Although the system will initially have a limited capability when it becomes operational later this year, it will mark the first time the United States has a capability to defend the entire country against a limited attack by a long-range ballistic missile. Apparently the Republican-controlled Congress agrees with the MDA's assessment. Ten intercept systems have been deployed. Eigh of them are located at Fort Greeley, Alaska and two are deployed at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Sixteen more interceptors have been ordered for the site in Alaska. Talks are also underway with several European countries to establish more intercept sites, possibly with Iran in mind.

All components of the BMDS, however, have been untested in a real-world scenario. Senior officials at the Pentagon and the White House insist, however, that the untested system will provide, at least, limited protection. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claims that even in its current form, the rudimentary system is a viable start to a national defense against a missile attack. “I mean, they'd still be testing at Kitty Hawk, for God's sake, if you wanted perfection” he argued last year.

Another compelling argument against any further deployment of the missile system is cost. Since the SDI program was ballyhooed more than thirty years ago, $50 billion has been spent on the evolving SDI/GPALS/NMD/BMDS systems. Current plans call for an additional $10 billion a year to be pumped into the missile defense project.

The current strategic locations in Alaska and California, employing a missile defense system that some estimates place having a success rate of only twenty-five percent---and thus necessitating multiple launch sites---are aimed at countering a small number of missiles that could be fired from North Korea. Until this week, the chance of North Korea unleashing ICBMs with deadly warheads seems remote. Their missile capability currently consists of the middle-range Taepodong-2 that could accommodate a two or three-stage booster and reach the U.S. West Coast, Alaska and further inland. That missile modification, along with a nuclear payload capability, is still seen by some experts as a future, and not imminent, threat. However, in 2003, then-CIA Director George Tenet told a Senate committee that North Korea indeed had the ability to strike the West Coast with a long-range missile. A concurrent fear of North Korea's missile capability is the possibility that it would sell a more sophisticated missile to another country and not directly take the U.S. head on with a missile threat. After successfully launching its No Dong missile a decade ago, the North Koreans went looking for buyers in other countries.

Beyond the threat from North Korea, Iran poses a possible threat to European allies and any U.S. troops in Europe or the Mid-East, thus the talks with European countries to deploy intercept missiles in the region. Recent revelations that Iran is continuing with nuclear research has heightened concerns in Washington, but as with North Korea, the ability of Iran to install a nuclear device in a warhead, even in a short or mid-range missile, is some years off. Lighter chemical or biological payloads, however, are a possibility.

Since the U.S. intelligence currently projects a possible ICBM threat from either North Korea or Iran in the next fifteen years or so, as current technological hurdles in their missile programs are surmounted, the deployment and eventual testing of the BMDS in upcoming years seems warranted.

Critics of a missile defense system also argue that nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks from rogue states can also be delivered to the heart of any U.S. city in a low-tech “suitcase” form. A ship sitting in the harbor of New York with a nuclear device in a cargo container could wield unthinkable destruction. This is certainly a valid argument. Does a rogue state or even a terrorist group really need to develop an offensive missile capability when the smuggling into the country of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon of mass destruction would be cheaper and more accurate?

On the other hand, can the United States afford to sit back and watch countries with different political and cultural philosophies develop and test WMDs while simultaneously developing missile systems that can strike anywhere in the country or be used to hold us hostage to their demands? Russia and China, both with the capability to reach the U.S. with missile strikes, have demonstrated a political willingness to sign treaties and integrate trade and cultural programs with other countries, including the U.S. The Ballistic Missile Defense System takes the missile attack capability of these countries into account. It is not designed, however, for any form of large-scale missile assault on the U.S., relying instead on a combination of deterrence and political accommodation. However, in the case of North Korea and Iran, the behavioral records of both countries indicate regimes that are often indifferent to the fate of their people and the concerns of the greater world community. Has deterrence and political negotiations thus far worked in stopping further development of their nuclear programs? Looking back since 1980, ballistic missiles have been used in seven regional conflicts, including the first Gulf War in which twenty-eight U.S. service personnel died from an Iraqi missile attack. A viable national missile defense system could offer a key component to an integrated approach to the overall security of the United States, its territories, and its allies.