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Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula September 12, 2000

The FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1233) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. This report provides an assessment of the warfighting capability of the Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command when compared to the armed forces of North Korea. It also provides an assessment of the North Korean threat to the Republic of Korea. Finally, it examines the current status and future direction of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) FORCES INTRODUCTION
North Korea remains the major threat to stability and security in Northeast Asia and is the country most likely to involve the United States in a large-scale war. While the historic summit between the North and South leaders holds the promise of reconciliation and change, no evidence exists of the fundamental precursors for change. There is little or no evidence of economic reform or reform-minded leaders; reduction in military forces; or a lessening of anti-US rhetoric. A decade of steep economic decline has not deterred the North's leaders from allocating precious resources to improving their military forces. The DPRK maintains a dogged adherence to a "military first" policy even against the backdrop of a nation facing severe economic and social challenges.

LEADERSHIP
Less than six years after the death of his father, Kim Jong Il has consolidated power and is firmly in control of North Korea. The leadership continues to focus on its three fundamental themes—regime survival, reunification, and achieving status as a "great and powerful nation." Lacking his father's revolutionary credentials, the North Korean leader relies upon military and security forces to maintain his chokehold on the citizenry. The North Korean leader relies heavily upon military and security forces to maintain his regime. Kim Jong Il sustains regime support by providing resources to key areas at the expense of lower priority sectors of the economy and society. The result is neglect of entire segments of society selected by geography, age, and political reliability. Meanwhile, his inner circle, insulated from the economic and social trauma impacting the lives of ordinary citizens, remains an exclusive group in which relations by blood or marriage, revolutionary ties, and loyalty are the primary prerequisites for power.
MILITARY FORCES
1. The "Military First" orientation has always been the heart and soul of the North Korean regime. It provides the only conceivable means by which the regime can survive and achieve its ultimate security through reunification. The military continues to grow in both conventional and asymmetrical forces with increasing emphasis on the latter. The military provides deterrence, defense, and a massive offensive threat, as well as leverage in international negotiations. The army is much more than just a military organization; it is North Korea's largest employer, purchaser, and consumer, the central unifying structure in the country, and the source of power for the regime.

2. Pyongyang's military goal is to reunify the peninsula by force. North Korea's fundamental war-fighting strategy mandates achievement of surprise, prosecution of a short and violent war, prevention of major United States reinforcement of the peninsula, and negation of the Republic of Korea's mobilization. The North Korean Armed Forces today are the fifth largest in the world. The ground forces, numbering one million active duty soldiers, provide the bulk of the North's offensive war-fighting capability and are the world's third largest army. They are supported by an air force of over 1,600 aircraft and a navy of more than 800 ships. Over 6 million reserves augment the active duty personnel. Seventy percent of their active force, to include 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 tanks, is garrisoned within 100 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. Much of this force is protected by underground facilities, including over four thousand underground facilities in the forward area alone. From their current locations these forces can attack with minimal preparations.

3. North Korea fields an artillery force of over 12,000 self-propelled and towed weapon systems. Without moving any artillery pieces, the North could sustain up to 500,000 rounds an hour against Combined Forces Command defenses for several hours. The artillery force includes 500 long-range systems deployed over the past decade. The proximity of these long-range systems to the Demilitarized Zone threatens all of Seoul with devastating attacks.

4. Realizing they cannot match Combined Forces Command's technologically advanced war-fighting capabilities, the North's leadership focuses on developing asymmetrical capabilities such as ballistic missiles, special operations forces, and weapons of mass destruction designed to preclude alliance force options and offset our conventional military superiority.

5. The North's asymmetric forces are formidable, heavily funded, and cause for concern. The progress of the North's ballistic missile program indicates it remains a top priority. Their ballistic missile inventory now includes over 500 SCUDs of various types. They continue to produce and deploy medium-range No Dongs capable of striking United States bases in Japan. Pyongyang is developing multi-stage missiles with the goal of fielding systems capable of striking the Continental United States. They tested the 2,000-kilometer range Taepo Dong 1 and continue work on the 5,000 plus kilometer Taepo Dong 2. Pyongyang is one of the world's largest missile proliferators and sells its missiles and technology to anyone with hard currency.

6. In late 1999 North Korea agreed to a moratorium on future missile test firings for the duration of discussions with the US to improve bilateral relations. North Korea publicly reaffirmed that moratorium in June 2000. The US continues to engage North Korea in talks to resolve the threat of North Korean missiles in the region as well as broader concerns with proliferation of North Korean missiles globally. 7. North Korea's Special Operations Forces are the largest in the world. They consist of over 100,000 elite personnel and are significant force multipliers providing the capability to simultaneously attack both our forward and rear forces.

8. North Korea possesses weapons of mass destruction. A large number of North Korean chemical weapons threaten both our military forces and civilian population centers. We assess North Korea is self-sufficient in the production of chemical components for first generation chemical agents. They have produced munitions stockpiles estimated at up to 5,000 metric tons of several types of chemical agents, including nerve, choking, blister, and blood. We assess that North Korea has the capability to develop, produce, and weaponize biological warfare agents, to include bacterial spores causing anthrax and smallpox and the bacteria causing the plague and cholera. While North Korea denies possession of nuclear weapons and has frozen its nuclear program at Yongbyon, we remain concerned the North could revive a weapons production program. The Perry process provides a diplomatic roadmap for addressing that threat as well as the missile threat.

TRANSPORTATION
North Korea has taken steps to upgrade its transportation system in support of its industrial and military needs. Infrastructure improvements are ongoing, with rail and highway repairs and construction projects progressing during the past few years. However, electrical power problems and poor equipment continue to hamper major construction and upgrade projects. The major project during the past 18 months has been the Pyongyang-Nampo expressway, which is probably designed to enhance the movement of goods should trade be opened through the port of Nampo. At the same time, it could also be used to transport troops during a defense against an amphibious attack on the West Coast. The transportation system, which includes a 30,000 kilometer highway system (15% paved) and a 5,000 kilometer rail network (mostly single track) could support initial combat operations during wartime; however, the infrastructure would experience difficulties supporting sustained operations. Rugged terrain; limited east-west routes; numerous bridges, tunnels, and other chokepoints; and inferior road surface types would be limiting factors during combat operations.

The summit related promises of massive road, rail, and electrical infrastructure improvements poses an dilemma for the ROK. Without any simultaneous reduction in the DPRK’s conventional military capability, such infrastructure improvements enhance the North's ability to rapidly mobilize and invade south with minimum warning.
LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINABILITY
1. During the Korean War, lack of adequate logistics hampered North Korea’s military forces and kept them from completely controlling the peninsula. After the war, sustainability of its military forces became a primary requirement of the North’s military doctrine. Pyongyang continues to implement military doctrine that calls for maintaining war reserves for all classes of supply for six months of sustainability for regular forces and three months for reserve units and paramilitary forces. A major increase in the number of active forces and the deployment of many new types of weapons systems in the past 20 years complicate this doctrine; however, North Korea’s massive war reserve stockpiles continue to expand despite the tremendous cost to its economic structure and hardship to its people. 2. North Korea is expanding its ammunition and equipment storage capacities by building additional hardened and underground facilities and enlarging existing facilities. Major national-level storage installations have been built, and construction of unit-level storage depots continues, especially near the DMZ. Current ammunition stockpiles are estimated at over one million tons. A major military POL war reserve exists, despite the severe shortage of fuel supplies for the civil economy. Substantial food and combat ration war reserves are stockpiled, despite widespread starvation and malnourishment in recent years. 3. North Korea has over 200,000 vehicles, 1,000 locomotives, and over 20,000 railcars that are mostly nonmilitary but would be mobilized to support a conflict. Much of this transportation is tied to reserve force units that would provide a substantial part of the logistic support required by military forces and would move personnel, ammunition, and supplies into the ROK during a conflict. Truck transportation units would provide a full range of support. Rail assets would provide heavy-lift capacity to move armor, self-propelled artillery, and resupply from national depots. Merchant and fishery vessels would support naval forces and ground troops along the peninsula’s coastal waters, and the civil air transport fleet would be mobilized to carry troops and high-value cargo and possibly for aerial delivery of chemical and biological warfare agents. FORCE IMPROVEMENTS North Korea continues to improve its military. In the last 12 months, North Korea has worked hard to arrest a decline in readiness and to improve its military capability. Highlighting these enhancements is an ambitious program to improve ground forces capabilities. A key component of this initiative involves the deployment of large numbers of long-range 240mm multiple rocket launcher systems and 170mm self-propelled guns to hardened sites located near the Demilitarized Zone. Other force improvements include emplacement of anti-tank barriers in the forward area, establishment of combat positions along major routes between Pyongyang and the Demilitarized Zone, repositioning of key units, beefing up of coastal defense forces in the forward area, construction of missile support facilities, preparations for extended range missile testing, and procurement of fighter aircraft. Applying lessons from US operations in Europe and Southwest Asia, the North Koreans have modified key facility defenses, dispersed forces, and improved an already impressive camouflage, concealment, and deception effort. Summer and fall 1999 training levels were extremely high. Key activities during the 1999-2000 winter training cycle were at record levels and demonstrated a concerted effort to improve readiness. Additionally, early indicators reflect that this summer training cycle (Calendar Year 2000) may well be headed toward near record levels. Production of limited numbers of military equipment, to include missiles, aircraft, submarines, and artillery systems also continues.

Is there a more recent copy of that? The thing it doesn't mention is the specifics that their Air Force is almost entirely obsolescent at best against our Air Force and Naval air arm, and the South Korean and Japanese air forces. They wouldn't last long in a full scale conflict against our superior planes, and superior numbers when you add the carrier groups in the area and those planes in Japan.

Their Navy is almost all corvette and patrol type craft, few Destroyers and no capital ships. Their sub fleet is mostly diesel electric and pose a minimal threat also. We always have SSNs in the area, and what the air arm didn't send to the bottom, they would. Most of their ships are a minmal threat in any case. If you're talking 800 ships like Soviet Udaloy or Sovrymenny DDGs or Kresta or Kara CGs or similar capability ships, that's one thing, but they're all much smaller, lower speed, much less armament, and few have any real "blue water" capability.

Their tanks are old Soviet tanks, barely modified since the 80s, and it wouldn't take long for them to lose 2,000. I would't give their armored force more than a couple weeks, and the 2,000 they do have are at best T-65s and T-72s, totally obsolete by today's standards. The artillery would not last long either. Sure it would devestate Seoul and many facilities in range from the border, but air strikes would take many of those out in short time, and most of them their locations are known.

Their Air Force would not last long for obvious reasons. It's mostly made up of old MiGs and SU type attack planes. Maybe some SU-27s, but their pilots are not as good as ours. Their Air Force would last about as long as their navy if they really tried to engage for a long period of time.

Their army is a big threat, but with massive bombing, and other close air support, it doesn't take long to eliminate a million man army now a days even with just conventional weapons. We've killed over 100,000 terrorists in Iraq the past three years (that number is from central command in Baghdad, not official, but the number they use to keep track) and that's fighting an enemy that doesn't mass together in traditonal unit formations like North Korea would.

Their chem and bio weapons are a huge threat, but if they use them, our nukes are on the table, and they know that. Il can't unite the north if his whole nation is glowing in the dark, and I believe that if he launched a chemical or bioligical attack against the South, we would have no alternative but to respond likewise or with nukes. Either way, it would destroy almost all of that huge army of his. And it can't be ignored that many of the North Korean army is not interrested in the facist power hungry plans of their "leader". After 50 years of living in hell under him and his father, they hate him and it's unlikely that those millions of North Korean troops would fight to the death like their grand father's did in the 50s. They have quite a different mindset.

And it's not like the South hasn't been preparing also. They have some hellacious defenses lined up along the border opposing the North. And our soldiers and Marines are d**n good. It's not like we've been sitting around whistling dixie the past 50 years. They have a big army, but most of it's equipment is obsolescent or obsolete, and they don't even have the numerical superiority like the Soviets did in Europe. And while their army is huge, is would take Il 17 years to grow replacements. And he wouldn't last that long. Our equipment is better, and we have the space to deploy much of it out of range of a North Korean first strike, which he can't do because of the relative small size of his country. His navy is out manned and out gunned by ours, same with his air force. And using chem and bio weapons, or nukes against us would result in his total destruction. The world would not tolerate that and we would have to respond by wiping him out completely. A couple tactical nukes right in the middle of his massed troops, far enough that our troops would be safe, would eliminate many of the North's troops if Il pushed us to that. But that won't happen. He wouldn't use chem or bio or nuke weapons. MAD is at least one thing that would work on him that wouldn't with the islamic terrorists. He can't take over the south, if the north is obliterated, and that's what would happen if he used nukes or chem or bio weapons. We'd do to his country what we did to it in the 50s before the Chinese came in. The whole country was ours exceptfor the tiniest of areas and the North was defeated. That's just my take on it. And those reports are always made to sound as ominous as possible, though it is a very serious situation and would make Iraq look easy. The defenses in the South are VERY good, and I'd much rather fight a defensive war than an offensive war. It's always easier to defend your own back yard then go into someone elses and try to take it from them. So defending gives us an extra advantage if he ever attacked. But God willing he won't and the government will some day collapse under it's economic weight. God willing.