Posted on 06/16/2006 2:08:19 PM PDT by DAVEY CROCKETT
All or Nothing (The quest for a moderate Islam may be futile.)
City Journal ^ | 4 June 2006 | Theodore Dalrymple
Posted on 06/12/2006 1:19:04 PM EDT by Lorianne
NEW from Theodore Dalrymple: Romancing Opiates: Pharmacological Lies and the Addiction Bureaucracy
Our Culture, What's Left of It: The Mandarins and the Masses
Life At the Bottom: The Worldview That Makes the Underclass
EMAIL | PRINT | RESPOND | VIEW SELECTED RESPONSES Theodore Dalrymple All or Nothing The quest for a moderate Islam may be futile. 4 June 2006
Islamic Imperialism: A History, by Efraim Karsh (Yale University Press, 288 pp., $30)
The week following the Muslim protests in London against the Danish cartoons—with marchers carrying signs calling for the beheading of infidels—other Muslims demonstrated to claim that Islam really meant peace and tolerance. While their implicit recognition that peace and tolerance are preferable to strife and bigotry did these Muslims personal honor, the claim regarding Islam was both historically and intellectually preposterous. Only someone ignorant of the most elementary facts could believe such a thing. From the first, Islam was a religion of pillage, violence, and compulsion, which it justified and glorified. And it is certainly not “the evident truth of the doctrine itself,” to quote Gibbon with regard for what, with characteristic irony, he called the primary reason for the rapid spread of Christianity throughout the civilized world, that explains the exponential growth of the Dar-al-Islam in its early history.
It is important, of course, to distinguish between Islam as a doctrine and Muslims as people. Untold numbers of Muslims desire little more than a quiet life; they have the virtues and the vices of the rest of mankind. Their religion gives to their daily lives an ethical and ritual structure and provides the kind of boundaries that only modern Western intellectuals would have the temerity to belittle.
But the fact that many Muslims are not fanatics is not as comforting as some might think. Consider, by way of illustration, Eric Hobsbawm, the famous, much feted, and unrepentantly Marxist historian. No one would feel personally threatened by him at a social gathering, where he would be amusing, polite, charming, and accomplished; if you had him to dinner, you wouldn’t have to count the spoons afterward, even though he theoretically opposes the idea of private wealth. In short, there would be no reason to suspect that he was about to commit a common crime against you. In this sense, he is what one might call a moderate Marxist.
But Hobsbawm has stated quite openly that, had the Soviet Union managed to create a functioning and prosperous socialist society, 20 million deaths would have been a worthwhile price to pay; and since he didn’t recognize, even partially, that the Soviet Union was not in fact on the path to such a society until many years after it had murdered 20 million of its people (if not more), it is fair to assume that, if things had turned out another way in his own country, Hobsbawm would have applauded, justified, and perhaps even instigated the murders of the very people to whom he was now, under the current dispensation, being amusing, charming, and polite. In other words, what saved Hobsbawm from committing utter evil was not his own scruples or ratiocination, and certainly not the doctrine he espoused, but the force of historical circumstance. His current moderation would have counted for nothing if world events had been different.
In his new book, Islamic Imperialism: A History, Professor Efraim Karsh does not mince words about Mohammed’s early and (to all those who do not accept the divinity of his inspiration) unscrupulous resort to robbery and violence, or about Islam’s militaristic aspects, or about the link between Islamic tradition and the current wave of fundamentalist violence in the world. The originality of Karsh’s interpretation is its underlying assumption that Islam was, from the very beginning, a pretext for personal and dynastic political ambition, from the razzias against the Meccan caravans and the expulsion of Jewish tribes from Medina, to the siege of Vienna a millennium later in 1529, and Hamas today.
Contrary to its universalistic pretensions, Karsh argues, Islam has never succeeded in eliminating political power struggles within the Muslim world, where, on the contrary, such struggles have always been murderous. Islamic regimes, many espousing in the beginning the ascetic principles of what one might call desert Islam, invariably degenerate (if it be degeneration) into luxury- and privilege-loving dynasties. Like all other political entities, Islamic regimes seek to preserve and, if possible, extend their power. They have shown no hesitation in compromising with or allying themselves with those whom they regard as infidels. Saladin, a mendaciously simplified version of whose exploits has inflamed hysterical sentiment all over the Middle East, was not above forming alliances with Christian monarchs to achieve his imperial ends; the Ottoman caliphate would not have survived as long as it did had the Sultan not exploited European rivalries and allied himself now with one, now with another Christian power.
In short, Islamic imperialism, in Karsh’s view, illustrates three transcendent political truths: the Nietzschean drive to power, Michels’ iron law of oligarchy, and Marx’s economic motor of history. Religious feeling, on this reading, is but an epiphenomenon, a mask for what is really going on.
This interpretation raises the difficult and perhaps unanswerable question of what should count in history as a real, and what as merely an apparent, motive for action. When Bernal Diaz del Castillo claims a religious motive for the conquest of Mexico, at least in part, should we just dismiss it as a sanctimonious lie to justify a more rapacious motive? That he ended up a rich man does not decide the question; and Diaz himself would have taken his material success as a sign that God smiled upon his enterprise, just as Muslims have viewed their early conquests as proof of God’s approval and the truth of Mohammed’s doctrine. (On the other hand, failure for Muslims never seems to provide proof of the final withdrawal of God’s favor, much less of his non-existence, but rather shows his dissatisfaction with the current practices of the supposedly faithful, who will return to His favor only by restoring an earlier, purer form of faith.)
Karsh seems to oscillate between believing that Islamic imperialism is just a variant of imperialism in general—imperialism being more or less a permanent manifestation of the human will to power—and believing that there is something sui generis and therefore uniquely dangerous about it.
I hesitate to rush in where so many better-informed people have hesitated to tread, or have trodden before, but I would put it like this. The urge to domination is nearly a constant of human history. The specific (and baleful) contribution of Islam is that, by attributing sovereignty solely to God, and by pretending in a philosophically primitive way that God’s will is knowable independently of human interpretation, and therefore of human interest and desire—in short by allowing nothing to human as against divine nature—it tries to abolish politics. All compromises become mere truces; there is no virtue in compromise in itself. Thus Islam is inherently an unsettling and dangerous factor in world politics, independently of the actual conduct of many Muslims.
Karsh comes close to this conclusion himself, when he writes at the end of the book:
Only when the political elites of the Middle East and the Muslim world reconcile themselves to the reality of state nationalism, forswear pan-Arab and pan-Islamic dreams, and make Islam a matter of private faith rather than a tool of political ambition will the inhabitants of these regions at last be able to look forward to a better future free of would-be Saladins. The fundamental question is whether Islam as a private faith would still be Islam, or whether such privatization would spell its doom. I think it would spell its doom. In this sense, I am an Islamic fundamentalist. The choice is between all and nothing.
[a post to study and research, unknown url]
havez hands out rifles, says US won't defeat him
Wed Jun 14, 2006 4:35 PM ET
By Patrick Markey
CARACAS, Venezuela (Reuters) - Wearing his old army uniform and red
paratroop beret, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez handed new Russian-made
rifles to troops on Wednesday, vowing Washington would not defeat his
socialist revolution.
Venezuela received a shipment of 30,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles
earlier this month just weeks after Washington banned U.S. arms sales to
Caracas over concerns about Chavez's close ties to longtime U.S. foes
Cuba and Iran and what it called his inaction against Marxist FARC
guerrillas in neighboring Colombia.
Chavez, a left-wing former soldier who says the United States wants to
topple him, has ordered officers and civilian reservists to train for a
resistance war against U.S. troops who he says plan to seize
Venezuela's vast oil reserves.
"The U.S. empire has a campaign around the world trying to isolate
Venezuela so no one will sell us even a shotgun. This is an act of
victory," Chavez told troops after inspecting and sighting a target with one of
the new rifles.
"We keep warning the imperialist U.S. government that they won't ever
defeat us," he said.
Washington dismisses his invasion talk as nationalist bluster from a
tyrant who is eroding democracy and using his oil wealth to muscle in on
neighbors. U.S. officials have blocked arms sales to Caracas they say
will destabilize the region.
Soldiers, sailors and airmen, in battle fatigues and faces daubed with
camouflage paint, took turns marching up to hand Chavez old rifles and
receive new AK103 rifles -- the first batch of 100,000 Venezuela
purchased last year.
"Fatherland or death," Chavez told soldiers as he slapped the black
rifles into their hands. "These are the best rifles in the world."
Chavez, who as a young army officer led a coup attempt before winning
power at the ballot box in 1998, received the first of the new weapons
as a gift.
With Russian help, Venezuelan plans to build a Kalashnikov rifle and
ammunition factory near Caracas that will start producing the weapons in
about three years.
Venezuela has already purchased 10 Russian attack helicopters and plans
to buy more. Chavez said his government had also decided to buy Russian
Sukhoi 30 jets to replace its U.S.-made F-16 fighters, but gave no
details.
© Reuters 2006. All rights reserved.
Scientology comes to mind.<<<
Good example.I would not go there, if I wanted to find God.
But if I were weak and wanted to be led it would be a good choice.
When I was young, before the 1950's, there were many Churches, that met, kept meeting and one day had a name.
I think of them as "Open Bible" churches and never see them today.
You could expect to get a strong message, prayer and a host of loving members, who were meeting for God's service.
Money and getting on television was not the goal.
The members did the painting, gardening and keeping it as bright as possible, for the one reason of "It is God's House".
Churches of today, bore me and I go to sleep, at once.
The singing of songs that do not rejoice in the giving of thanks, leave me cold.
Many of our simple churches, as I see it in the west, vanished after Waco and the clintons.
Today, a small church, would be considered a radical church, and would not survive.
I did not understand as they disappeard, but think I do today, it is all in the communist manifesto of 1963.
It is printed in our 2nd thread, on page 1, of the last thread and will be in my next post, as I have it copied.
So many of the rules and new laws and actions we see taken today, go right back to the communist manifesto.
Below, is the communist manifesto as presented to Congress in 1963 and the muslim manifesto, we should all read it and not forget that it is what we are fighting today.
granny.....
Congressional Record--Appendix, pp. A34-A35
January 10, 1963
Current Communist Goals
EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. A. S. HERLONG, JR. OF FLORIDA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, January 10, 1963
Mr. HERLONG. Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Patricia Nordman of De Land, Fla., is
an ardent and articulate opponent of communism, and until recently
published the De Land Courier, which she dedicated to the purpose of
alerting the public to the dangers of communism in America.
At Mrs. Nordman's request, I include in the RECORD, under
unanimous consent, the following "Current Communist Goals," which
she identifies as an excerpt from "The Naked Communist," by Cleon
Skousen:
[From "The Naked Communist," by Cleon Skousen]
CURRENT COMMUNIST GOALS
1. U.S. acceptance of coexistence as the only alternative to atomic
war.
2. U.S. willingness to capitulate in preference to engaging in atomic
war.
3. Develop the illusion that total disarmament [by] the United States
would be a demonstration of moral strength.
4. Permit free trade between all nations regardless of Communist
affiliation and regardless of whether or not items could be used for
war.
5. Extension of long-term loans to Russia and Soviet satellites.
6. Provide American aid to all nations regardless of Communist
domination.
7. Grant recognition of Red China. Admission of Red China to the U.N.
8. Set up East and West Germany as separate states in spite of
Khrushchev's promise in 1955 to settle the German question by free
elections under supervision of the U.N.
9. Prolong the conferences to ban atomic tests because the United
States has agreed to suspend tests as long as negotiations are in
progress.
10. Allow all Soviet satellites individual representation in the U.N.
11. Promote the U.N. as the only hope for mankind. If its charter is
rewritten, demand that it be set up as a one-world government with
its own independent armed forces. (Some Communist leaders
believe the world can be taken over as easily by the U.N. as by
Moscow. Sometimes these two centers compete with each other as
they are now doing in the Congo.)
12. Resist any attempt to outlaw the Communist Party.
13. Do away with all loyalty oaths.
14. Continue giving Russia access to the U.S. Patent Office.
15. Capture one or both of the political parties in the United States.
16. Use technical decisions of the courts to weaken basic American
institutions by claiming their activities violate civil rights.
17. Get control of the schools. Use them as transmission belts for
socialism and current Communist propaganda. Soften the curriculum.
Get control of teachers' associations. Put the party line in textbooks.
18. Gain control of all student newspapers.
19. Use student riots to foment public protests against programs or
organizations which are under Communist attack.
20. Infiltrate the press. Get control of book-review assignments,
editorial writing, policymaking positions.
21. Gain control of key positions in radio, TV, and motion pictures.
22. Continue discrediting American culture by degrading all forms of
artistic expression. An American Communist cell was told to
"eliminate all good sculpture from parks and buildings, substitute
shapeless, awkward and meaningless forms."
23. Control art critics and directors of art museums. "Our plan is to
promote ugliness, repulsive, meaningless art."
24. Eliminate all laws governing obscenity by calling them
"censorship" and a violation of free speech and free press.
25. Break down cultural standards of morality by promoting
pornography and obscenity in books, magazines, motion pictures,
radio, and TV.
26. Present homosexuality, degeneracy and promiscuity as "normal,
natural, healthy."
27. Infiltrate the churches and replace revealed religion with "social"
religion. Discredit the Bible and emphasize the need for intellectual
maturity which does not need a "religious crutch."
28. Eliminate prayer or any phase of religious expression in the
schools on the ground that it violates the principle of "separation of
church and state."
29. Discredit the American Constitution by calling it inadequate,
old-fashioned, out of step with modern needs, a hindrance to
cooperation between nations on a worldwide basis.
30. Discredit the American Founding Fathers. Present them as selfish
aristocrats who had no concern for the "common man."
31. Belittle all forms of American culture and discourage the teaching
of American history on the ground that it was only a minor part of the
"big picture." Give more emphasis to Russian history since the
Communists took over.
32. Support any socialist movement to give centralized control over
any part of the culture--education, social agencies, welfare programs,
mental health clinics, etc.
33. Eliminate all laws or procedures which interfere with the operation
of the Communist apparatus.
34. Eliminate the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
35. Discredit and eventually dismantle the FBI.
36. Infiltrate and gain control of more unions.
37. Infiltrate and gain control of big business.
38. Transfer some of the powers of arrest from the police to social
agencies. Treat all behavioral problems as psychiatric disorders which
no one but psychiatrists can understand [or treat].
39. Dominate the psychiatric profession and use mental health laws as
a means of gaining coercive control over those who oppose
Communist goals.
40. Discredit the family as an institution. Encourage promiscuity and
easy divorce.
41. Emphasize the need to raise children away from the negative
influence of parents. Attribute prejudices, mental blocks and retarding
of children to suppressive influence of parents.
42. Create the impression that violence and insurrection are
legitimate aspects of the American tradition; that students and
special-interest groups should rise up and use ["]united force["] to
solve economic, political or social problems.
43. Overthrow all colonial governments before native populations are
ready for self-government.
44. Internationalize the Panama Canal.
45. Repeal the Connally reservation so the United States cannot
prevent the World Court from seizing jurisdiction [over domestic
problems. Give the World Court jurisdiction] over nations and
individuals alike.
3 posted on 04/01/2006 5:05:29 PM PST by DAVEY CROCKETT (Words fail me.)
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 2 | View Replies | Report Abuse ]
In short, Islamic imperialism, in Karsh’s view, illustrates three transcendent political truths: the Nietzschean drive to power, Michels’ iron law of oligarchy, and Marx’s economic motor of history. Religious feeling, on this reading, is but an epiphenomenon, a mask for what is really going on. <<<
The above, I find interesting, it fits in with what is being said about the liberals and it fits with the world today, not only the muslims.
LOL and still allows for the feeling of a joining of the communists and the muslim agendas.............
The whole bunch are mentally ill and expect to be the winner in the end. Speaking of the liberals, I am.
June 16, PM 2006 Anti-Terrorism News
Coalition Forces Battle Extremists in Afghanistan - DOD press release -
See Bill Roggio's June 16 post
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2006/20060616_5442.html
New tape says Zarqawi death 'great loss' - Al-Jazeera said voice on
tape was Abu Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, head of Mujahedeen Shura Council
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060617/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_insurgent_tape;_ylt=A86.I0o9ZJNEmlIBugqs0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTA2Z2szazkxBHNlYwN0bQ--
Israeli strike kills Palestinian militant
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060616/ap_on_re_mi_ea/israel_palestinians;_ylt=Aj1_XAnLd6yzodBAT39odfas0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTA3b3JuZGZhBHNlYwM3MjE-
U.S.: Coalition soldier killed, 2 missing
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060617/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_soldier_killed;_ylt=A86.I0o9ZJNEmlIBuQqs0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTA2Z2szazkxBHNlYwN0bQ--
(US & Thailand) Regulators' report disciplines BBL - US regulators
ordered Bangkok Bank's New York office to halt wire transfers pending
improved BSA compliance
http://www.bangkokpost.com/Business/17Jun2006_biz28.php
Jordanian Islamist MPs & Others on Arab TV: Al-Zarqawi is a Martyr -
MEMRI transcript
http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD118706
Missing Pakistani journalist found dead - Pakistani journalist who
reported US airstrike that killed al-Qaeda operative found dead six months
after vanishing
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3263738,00.html
Thailand: Indonesian Militant Arrested Over Bomb Attacks
http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Terrorism&loid=8.0.311726211&par=0
Kidnap victim in Jolo freed by Abu Sayyaf
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2006/june/17/yehey/prov/20060617pro1.html
US withdraws terror threat warning in China
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-06-16T065802Z_01_PEK361617_RTRUKOC_0_US-SECURITY-CHINA-USA.xml&archived=False
(Bangladesh) A blemish on Muslim image - Former ambassador of
Bangladesh to Canada writes on impact of Canadian case
http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/06/17/d606171503159.htm
(UK) Algerian terror suspect deported - Algerian man suspected of
terrorism involvement deported from Britain
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5088490.stm
Taliban commander surrenders to Afghanistan reconciliation drive
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060616/wl_sthasia_afp/afghanistanattacks_060616180609;_ylt=AjaPLXMZsJhti2LkIC4X_ums0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTA3b2NibDltBHNlYwM3MTY-
DHS: States, cities not ready for catastrophes, government says
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/06/16/disaster.plans.ap/index.html
Abducted Pakistani journalist found dead - kidnapped because he
reported that US missile killed an Al Qaeda leader
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/subcontinent/2006/June/subcontinent_June575.xml§ion=subcontinent
Al-Ahram Weekly 15 - 21 June 2006 Issue No. 799
Two to go
Gihan Shahine delves into the controversy surrounding the suspension of
two US non-governmental organisations in Egypt
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/799/eg22.htm
The Egyptian Foreign Ministry recently ordered two US non- governmental
organisations -- the International Republican Institute (IRI) and its
twin, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)
-- to halt their activities in Egypt until they are licensed. The
US-based institutes, which are propagated as advancing democracy and
monitoring political systems in 60 countries, said they had applied for
licences and were waiting to finish the paperwork. The Foreign
Ministry,
however, denied such claims, saying the two centres never actually
applied for licences.
Although a legitimate reason why the institutes should have their
activities stopped, the lack of a licence appears to be no more than a
minor knot in the sudden tug of war. The institutes had already been
engaged in monitoring parliamentary elections and the government --
although not cooperative -- did not try to stop them.
"The decision to halt the activities of the two institutes has to do
with the regime's new agenda to curb public dissent and is not in any
way linked to press claims that they are threatening national
security,"
argued Bahieddin Hassan, director of the Cairo Institute for Human
Rights Studies (CIHRS).
The opposition had accused the institutes of being involved in
"espionage" and of "posing a threat to national security". The
independent daily Nahdet Misr, which spearheaded the campaign, has
called for the halt of the "illicit activities" of the two centres and
accused them of having "a hidden agenda meant to incite sectarian
strife" in Egypt. According to the same paper, the IRI had been
liaising
with other NGOs and preparing data for an international UN conference
that will reportedly be held in cooperation with the International
Coptic Federation and the US-Jewish Council to discuss what it terms
"spreading tolerance towards minorities in the Middle East".
MP Mustafa Bakri, who is also the chief editor of the weekly Al-Osbou,
has requested an immediate investigation into the activities of the two
institutes which he feared was "a hazardous tear in the Egyptian social
fabric".
The institutes are the financial affiliates of the National Endowment
for Democracy (NED) established by Congress in 1983. They are
propagated
as "uniquely qualified to provide technical assistance to aspiring
democrats worldwide" and "advancing democracy". Press reports, however,
lambasted the NED as a guise for the CIA claiming it was involved in
inciting sectarian strife and supporting the powers that would serve US
plans in the region. Al-Osbou published reports that the NDI allegedly
spent "50 per cent of its budget on financing the US-led war on Iraq"
and "is notorious for rigging and financially supporting US political
alliances and tilting election results in favour of the powers that
most
serve US interests".
Bakri, however, said the government "did not halt the activities of the
two institutes for any security concerns but rather because they were
critical of the reform process in Egypt."
The rift seems to have erupted when local IRI head Gina London said in
a
recent interview with Nahdet Misr that political reform in Egypt had
not
been achieved in the past 25 years and that the institute would work to
speed up political reform in the country. A statement by the Egyptian
Foreign Ministry immediately slammed the comments as blatant
interference in the country's internal affairs and ordered the
institutes to halt their activities until they obtained licences.
"The message is clear here," Hassan commented. "The state can no longer
tolerate any criticism from local or foreign sides." He said the
limited
margin of freedom the state allowed for almost two years has led to
unprecedented political dissent which, albeit not massive enough to
pose
a direct threat to the state's legislative infrastructure, was "likely
to widen rifts among major political powers within the regime over who
should take the future rule of Egypt -- a military personality or the
president's son." Today, the regime has decided it can no longer take
that risk," Hassan said.
Hassan added that the current cordial US-Egyptian relationship had
further empowered the state to take a firm stance towards official and
non-official criticism from outside. He said the government manipulated
the results of last year's parliamentary elections, where the outlawed
Muslim Brotherhood won one-fifth of all seats, in order to bridge gaps
with the US over issues of democratisation.
"The state showed that the rise of the Brotherhood would be a threat in
case of democratisation, and the two sides [Egypt and the US] seem to
have reached a consensus on how the Egyptian government should manage
its local portfolio and curb public dissent," Hassan added.
For Hassan, the suspension of the two institutes is thus no more than a
storm in a teacup and a "friendly reproach between the two lovers".
Hafez Abu Seada, secretary-general of the Egyptian Organisation for
Human Rights (EOHR), would similarly perceive the recent government
attitude towards the two American centres in the context of Egyptian-US
relations.
"The recent halt is no doubt a political decision," Abu Seada told
Al-Ahram Weekly. But, contrary to Hassan's argument, Abu Seada would
see
the recent move as symptomatic of "some tension in US-Egyptian
relations
after Egypt obviously stepped back from its reform plans. The number of
those supporting the reduction of US aid to Egypt increased to almost
equal those who opposed it."
Both Abu Seada and Hassan, however, would refute claims that the two
institutes are posing any threat to national security. "Those who
attacked the two institutes and rose in defence of national security
were actually incited by the government to do so since they
paradoxically remained silent on Egypt's support for the US on key
Middle East issues which were publicly declared during the
congressional
debates on US aid to Egypt," Hassan said.
Abu Seada similarly argued that, "boosting programmes that allow for
better electoral systems does not represent any interference in local
affairs."
However, he conceded that the IRI and the NDI had failed in fulfilling
that role so far. "They have worked directly with the public, creating
sensitivities and failing in their primary role of providing technical
assistance to NGOs working in the field," Abu Seada told the Weekly.
No change expected
Iraqis are not fooled by the hype as the brutality of the occupation grinds on regardless of Zarqawi, writes Nermeen Al-Mufti from Baghdad
The death of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi has not alleviated tensions in Iraq. US and Iraqi troops still patrol main city roads as well as various highways. The roads linking Baghdad to Diali, the province in which Zarqawi was killed, and Al-Ramadi, a city still under attack, are being heavily patrolled. Al-Fallujah, Al-Ratba and Al-Qaem, all to the west of Baghdad, have been under siege for weeks. The only good news in the war-torn country is that the Shia militia in Basra have declared a cease-fire until the World Cup is over.
Iraqis have been in two minds about the death of Zarwaqi. Iraqi resistance brigades described him as a "brother" in Islam and jihad, but when a phone-in radio programme in Baghdad invited response from the public several callers voiced joy at the death of "the terrorist" while others voiced sympathy.
Reprisals were not long in coming. Fifty college students have been shot dead within a week. "Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers," the group once led by Zarqawi, is thought to be behind the killing. Among the dead were 20 Turkoman Shias and students whose clothes violated the dress code Al-Qaeda is trying to enforce. Iraqis may have grown used to their countrymen getting killed by booby-trapped cars and "friendly" US fire, but the killing of students was received with a mixture of shock and alarm.
Political analyst Raad Al-Hodeithi was not optimistic. "Zarqawi's death might give President Bush a chance to boost his fortunes ahead of the half-term elections in November, but it will not increase his popularity. The Americans started a wide-scale attack against Ramadi on 10 June, following a siege in which the city's roads to Baghdad and other towns were cut off. This suggests that the White House intends to destroy Iraq and undermine the political process."
President Jalal Al-Talabani has told the nation that an agreement between the government and the resistance was expected soon and that acts of violence would subside by the end of the year. But Abu Ali, who is close to the Islamic Army, is doubtful: "The factions that have opened dialogue with the Iraqi government are not the same ones resisting the occupation. These are factions that search for political posts and perhaps financial interests. The factions of the true resistance have not started and will not start a dialogue unless US forces declare a timetable for withdrawal. We said were weren't going to talk to the government, because we don't recognise it."
Abdel-Aziz Al-Hakim, leader of the Iraqi Alliance, has once again called for a federal system in the south and centre of the country. Speaking in Al-Najaf to a gathering of Shia parties, Al-Hakim pledged to "work through all means to achieve this objective and complete the journey we've started". The gathering was attended by members of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Iraq's Hizbullah. Al-Sadr supporters didn't attend the meeting.
This was not the first time Al-Hakim has called for federalism. In a speech delivered in Al-Suleimaniya late last year, Al-Hakim proffered that, "Federalism is the right choice for the Kurdistan of Iraq. It is also the right choice in the centre and south of Iraq, as well as in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities."
It is noteworthy that a substantial proportion of Iraqis object to Kurdish-style federalism because they don't want to see a regional government having defence and foreign ministers and talking to foreign powers independently from the central government. Many Iraqis see such federalism as a first step towards the partition of Iraq.
As political uncertainty continued, the Association of Muslim Scholars said that various militia and unidentified death squads were still murdering Sunni individuals, including clerics. Meanwhile, the Islamic Party, which takes part in the current political process, expressed satisfaction that Prime Minister Nour Al-Maliki's government freed dozens of Iraqi detainees.
Concerning the political process, the Arab League has postponed a national dialogue conference slated earlier for 22 June without setting a new date for its convocation. Several Iraqi politicians had said that they wouldn't attend the conference if it were held in the Green Zone, calling for the gathering to be held outside the country for security reasons. Masoud Al-Barzani has called for the conference to be held in Arbil, a venue unacceptable to many.
As chaos and mayhem continued unabated, Friday preachers advised relatives of the dead not to claim their remains from the morgue. The reason: four individuals have been abducted and killed when they went to claim the body of a relative.
© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/799/re6.htm
[Read this and keep it in mind as you listen to the left on the radio and tv this week.......not a word of difference and it makes me ask "Who wrote the script?" granny]
What next Iraq?
The killing of Zarqawi is a smokescreen designed to conceal the calamity of the US-led occupation, Iraqi analysts tell Omayma Abdel-Latif
Shortly after hearing the news of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's death, Sheikh Muhammud Al-Somaidai of the Muslim Scholars Association commented: "Managing the news about his death the way the media did was another US-made scenario to convince the world that good news was finally coming from Iraq, and to declare the end of Zarqawi's era."
Khalaf Al-Oliyan of the Iraqi Accord Front -- the main Sunni bloc in the National Assembly -- echoed the same view. For him, Zarqawi was no more than "a US-made myth to plant the seeds of sectarianism."
Such views reflect a common understanding among Iraqis that Zarqawi's role was much inflated by Washington over the past three years to cover-up atrocities committed by US-led occupation forces in Iraq. "Zarqawi was only a pawn," says Iraqi academic Sawsan Assaf. "Violence is not likely to go away so long as the US-led occupation persists and continues its atrocities against civilians. Iraq's problem is and remains a brutal occupation. Zarqawi, who was not a very important man, is only a by-product of that occupation." Assaf added.
Almost one week after his death, Zarqawi continued to dominate Western press coverage with news reports suggesting that he was alive when found and was beaten to death by US forces. Already the US military, according to The Times of London, is speaking of "a treasure trove" of documents found in the house that could offer leads into future terrorist operations in Europe. The sticky question is how those alleged documents survived a 500-ton bomb that razed the house to the ground.
Along with this question, there are others whose answers Zarqawi's death only obscures. "Who planted Zarqawi in Iraq in the first place?" asks Iraqi commentator Dhafer Al-Ani. "Who financed his activities and secured the money, the weapons and the recruits; who provided him with protection and what role did those forces that are said to have penetrated his ranks play in pushing him to carry out the atrocities he did or to undermine the Iraqi nationalist resistance?"
According to Al-Ani, "Perhaps the greatest mystery about Zarqawi was the fact that the bulk of his victims were Iraqis, not Americans." Al-Ani concludes: "None of these questions are likely to be investigated by the Americans nor the Iraqi government. It is such a strange coincidence that his agenda to divide Iraq has been similar to that of the invaders."
"Even if Zarqawi did not exist," says Iraqi novelist Haifa Zangana, "they -- the US occupation -- would create one, and if he died they would make another Zarqawi to keep Iraq under their control."
Iraqi analysts read US President George W Bush's statements that Zarqawi's death "will not end violence" in Iraq as prophecy of forthcoming raids on residential areas and the killing of civilians justified in part in the name of uprooting Zarqawi's "network" and followers.
The Iraqi Islamic Party issued a statement Sunday signalling its opposition to any possible military operations in Anbar province under the pretext of "fighting terrorism". Eyewitnesses say that residents in Ramadi have already begun evacuating their homes for fear of expected US-led military strikes. "The military option is no longer acceptable, regardless of the justifications for it," the statement said.
On Saturday, 20 people were killed, including the representative of the Iraqi Islamic Party, in Alexandria province with 32 wounded. In Baghdad, nine Iraqis were killed and 14 wounded. In another incident, a roadside bomb that struck a busy market in a predominantly Shia area of the capital killed three.
Who will take the blame for such killings in a post-Zarqawi era? Zarqawi, argues Zangana, was not solely responsible for the violence in Iraq. He was a good tool, presented as the face of the resistance and thus undermining it. "The primary responsibility for the death, the slaughtering and the violence taking place in Iraq, lies with US occupying forces whose presence in the country, with a web of mercenaries and foreign fighters, is causing the bloodshed," said Zangana.
Zangana noted that when US marines were suffering injuries or killings by the Iraqi resistance, such killings or injuries would be avenged on the same day or the day after. "They would plant a car bomb in a crowded market and specifically near a mosque or a husynia targeting again a Shia - populated area so they can claim that the Sunnis are coming to kill the Shias ."
The "Salvador option", said one analyst, is clearly being implemented in Iraq. "They are training special commando forces to do these attacks. It is exactly like what happened in Latin America during the 1980s. All the slaughter and torture is the same. It is obvious that mercenaries and foreign fighters are paid to do the job," said Hana Al-Bayaty of The Brussells Tribunal.
These mercenaries, Albayaty added, have a free hand in Iraq since they are immune under Iraqi civil and criminal law. One recent study carried out by Hassan Obeid Eissa on mercenaries in Iraq suggests there exist at least 50,000 of them, representing "the biggest army of mercenaries in history". This army enjoys legal immunity secured by decrees issued by former US Civil Administrator Paul Bremer. One decree issued 18 June 2003 stipulates that, "No Iraqi court has legal authority over any member of the coalition regarding any issue, be it civil or punitive."
What impact will Zarqawi's death have on the popular national resistance to occupation? Iraqi analysts point out that from the beginning the Iraqi resistance distanced itself from what Zarqawi did. "In their statements, the Iraqi resistance movement detached themselves from Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda activities because their goal was clear from the beginning, and that was to target the occupiers and the military bases. Therefore, there is no Iraqi blood on their hands," Assaf states.
Zarqawi, nonetheless, became a burden on the national resistance, his profile heavily manipulated by the US occupation to justify to Americans atrocities committed against Iraqi civilians in its war on terror. Assaf -- who is originally from Ramadi, a hotspot of the Iraqi resistance, and has had numerous discussions with leaders of Sunni tribes -- confirms the tribal leaders did not provide Zarqawi with support, and that when Zarqawi's followers bombed Ramadi's police station, Ramadi residents protested.
"Anbar residents shunned Zarqawi and things turned soar when shortly before his death he issued an order to assassinate the tribal leaders of Al-Dulaimi tribe." It was, therefore, not surprising that Essam Al-Rawi of the Muslim Scholars Associations, described Zarqawi's absence from the Iraqi scene as a "positive step" for the national resistance. It will give it a "boost," he said.
One of the places where resistance will continue is Fallujah. According to Assaf, Fallujah has been selected as a location for one of the 14 US military bases to be built in Iraq. The people of Fallujah, which is home to many former Iraqi military leaders, will not sit idle. "This is an occupied country and the basic history lesson tells us that people will resist the occupation. They do this in Iraq each in his own way because many Iraqis believe that in the resistance is the continuity of Iraq," Assaf concluded.
C a p t i o n : Iraqi primiere Nur Al-Maliki aided by US President George Bush as they prepare for the press conference. Bush was in Iraq in a surprise visit to voice support for the Iraqi government. His visit coincided with a carnage in Kirkuk which claimed the lives of 17 Iraqis
© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/799/re4.htm
Message to the people
The conflict over Iran's nuclear file may have brought Ali Larijani, Tehran's chief nuclear negotiator, to Cairo, but there are few signs that his visit will break the 27-year-old diplomatic freeze between the two countries, writes Amira Howeidy
It may have been unexpected, and the first of its kind for three decades, yet the visit of Ali Larijani, Tehran's chief nuclear negotiator and head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, to Cairo on 10 and 11 June was surprisingly low key.
Following an hour and a half long meeting with President Hosni Mubarak the Iranian official kept mum while the presidential spokesman explained only that they had discussed "bilateral" ties, developments in Iran's nuclear file and the Iraqi and Palestinian tracks.
Later, at a joint press conference with Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, Egyptians finally got a chance to see and hear Larijani, the highest ranking Iranian official to visit Egypt since Tehran cut diplomatic ties after Cairo signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1979 and provided asylum for the deposed Iranian Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi. Relations further deteriorated when Egypt backed Iraq during the 1980-1988 Gulf War.
There were no signs that the visit -- an initiative on Tehran's side according to the Iranian Embassy in Cairo -- had mended any of these fences.
Asked if his presence in Cairo would lead to improved Egyptian-Iranian relations, Larijani offered a diplomatic reply.
"My being here is proof of our respect for Egypt's role and this respect is mutual," he said. While avoiding any mention of his meeting with Mubarak, Larijani praised the "conscious and strong Egyptian people".
"We hope," he added, "that these issues [stalled relations] are solved in due time."
Larijani's surprise appearance in Cairo came less than a week after European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana handed Iran a new package of "incentives" approved by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council -- China, Russia, Britain, France and the United States, plus Germany -- in exchange for Tehran's suspension of uranium enrichment activities.
On Sunday Larijani offered assurances to Arab governments, insisting Iran's nuclear activities constitute no threat to Arab and Islamic countries and that its nuclear programme is exclusively civilian. "The strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to always side with Arab and Islamic countries," he added.
After three years of inspections, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) failed to prove that Iran's nuclear activity is -- the US claims -- designed for nuclear weapons.
Following his meetings at the Arab League Larijani held a press conference of his own at a Cairo hotel, where he sought to "clarify" to the media "floating misconceptions" regarding the incentive package presented to Iran. He denied that Iran was given a time limit to respond, or that the package contained preconditions.
"We wouldn't accept negotiations with prerequisites. We do not negotiate under pressure. There was no mention of sanctions either, otherwise we wouldn't have agreed to talk."
The package, explained Larijani, contains proposals that envision a "solution for both sides and that will serve the interests of both".
He added that the proposals, which have yet to be made public, contained "some positive and some weak, ambiguous points".
On the positive side, said Larijani, are guarantees to provide Iran with nuclear facilities and "consult with Tehran over security arrangements in the region". The ambiguities tended to focus on uranium enrichment, "a matter we need to have clarified".
But Larijani's most significant statements during his Cairo visit, say commentators, concern the right of Islamic countries to develop nuclear programmes.
"Islamic countries," he argued, "have every right to nuclear energy, as guaranteed by the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. It is a right that should be used."
He also said that Iran is "prepared to cooperate" with any Islamic country in this respect.
Gamil Matar, political analyst and director of the Arab Centre for Futuristic Studies, interprets Larijani's words as an invitation "to Arab and Islamic countries to follow in Iran's path". And in issuing the invitation, believes Matar, Larijani "turned the tables around... After all, who can say no to peaceful nuclear energy?"
While Iranian diplomacy, argues Matar, himself a former diplomat, "seems to address governments and their publics simultaneously, when Larijani urges Arabs and Muslims to follow suit he is actually addressing the people and what he says appeals to them. He knows that Arab governments will not pursue nuclear energy programmes."
He has nothing but admiration for Tehran's recent diplomatic conduct. "They have managed the nuclear crisis brilliantly over the past six months... Iran forced a super power like the US to backtrack on its threats against Tehran."
But what does Tehran want from Cairo?
"This," Matar believes, "is another example of Iranian genius. They have risen above all traditional sensitivities [between Egypt and Iran] and are working on all tracks, and with anyone, to advance their case. They are behaving like a major regional power."
Larijani left for Algiers following his Cairo trip. Meanwhile, on Monday, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister arrived in Tehran to discuss the US- European package with his Iranian counterpart.
Egypt has called for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis while stressing that the international community should also address the issue of Israel's nuclear arsenal.
Caption: Mubarak and Larijani during talks on Sunday
C a p t i o n 2: Mubarak and Larijani during talks on Sunday
© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/799/eg21.htm
Paying the ultimate price
Relief that victims of the Al-Salam 98 ferry tragedy would be getting one of the highest compensations in history was mixed with anger over the perceived lack of justice in the entire affair, writes Mohamed El-Sayed
Gamal El-Sadat sat on a bench at the back of the room. His eyes appeared distant, unable to focus on anything in particular. Along with dozens of other equally lost souls, El-Sadat was waiting to receive his compensation check at an office on the eighth floor of the Ministry of Justice in Mounira.
He couldn't help but think back to that horrific February night when Al-Salam 98 sank into the deep waters of the Red Sea. Remembering being tossed around by the cold waves in pitch darkness, swimming for over 20 hours amidst hundreds of dead bodies, and the sounds of other passengers drowning, tears welled up in his eyes. El-Sadat was one of the very few who lived through the ordeal.
Although about to receive LE50,000 in compensation, El-Sadat said he had actually lost some LE200,000 in savings on that doomed trip. He had been employed for the past two decades at a Kuwaiti fishing company; that fateful trip on the Al-Salam 98 was finally taking him home. Instead, he lost everything -- the money, all of his luggage, and most importantly, his best friend.
After months of dealing with the tragedy while trying to rebuild his life, El-Sadat headed for Cairo from his small village in Damietta in the wee hours of last Sunday morning. Like many others, he was responding to news that a deal had been struck between Prosecutor Gaber Rihan and the Al-Salam 98's owner to up the compensation figures for the tragedy's victims and their families.
According to the deal, ferry owner Mamdouh Ismail, who furtively fled to London in the aftermath of the tragedy, had agreed to pay LE300,000 to families of the dead or missing, and LE50,000 to each survivor. Consequently, Rihan revoked an earlier decision to freeze Ismail and his family's assets, and ban them from leaving the country.
The mid-sized room at the Justice Ministry was packed with victims' families; they were mostly women who, every few minutes, would burst out in sobs, crying out to God to protect the souls of their dead husbands. At one point, Intisar Abdel-Wahab, whose husband had been a truck driver in Kuwait, wailed something about "no amount of money will make up for my husband." Bitterly, Abdel-Wahab told Al-Ahram Weekly that her "pain would not go away until the ferry owner was brought to justice and sentenced to death."
She has had no income since her husband's death. "He was our only breadwinner," she said, "and the compensation money is not enough to feed, educate, or help my six orphaned children get married." More importantly, "this money will never compensate them for the loss of their father."
A lawyer, who maintained that Ismail "would be the only winner in this case", escorted the mother of six to the ministry. The lawyer, who preferred to remain anonymous, claimed that Ismail might receive up to LE900 million from a European insurance company. If the lawyer's assumption is correct, and Ismail hands out some LE300 million in compensation money to the victims, "this means he will pocket LE600 million," the lawyer calculated.
Two reports released by parliament's fact-finding commission and the prosecutor-general noted Ismail's gross negligence. The reports said Ismail was responsible for operating the ferry without the necessary maritime safety precautions and equipment. The reports also accused the ferry owner of overloading the boat with too many passengers. A third report -- prepared by the cabinet -- softened the blow, however, blaming the accident on a variety of factors, including "fate".
Abdel-Wahab's lawyer noted that the provisions of the brokered deal do not allow those who cash in to sue Ismail, thus absolving the owner of any legal responsibilities to the victims. "Eventually, Ismail will return to Egypt without ever being brought to justice," the lawyer said. "It's a ploy by the government and the owner." (Even if -- by accepting the compensation money -- the victims forfeit their right to a civil case against Ismail, the ferry owner will still have to face the government's case against him. He and six others have already been charged with a relatively light misdemeanor -- gross negligence).
According to the lawyer, the government added insult to injury by making survivors and families of victims -- who mostly come from remote villages -- travel all the way to Cairo to collect their compensation money. "Most of those who came today are helpless, and know that they would not receive proper compensation if they sued the ferry owner," he said. "They had to accept this fact, and submissively take the meagre compensation."
The payout does, however, signify one of the largest such compensation schemes in the nation's history. The major difference is that this time, a private citizen -- rather than the government -- is making the payment.
Meanwhile, the prosecutor-general has drafted amendments to the maritime law, which aim to prevent such tragedies in the future. The amendments, which will soon be referred to the People's Assembly, force ferry owners to insure the lives of passengers, and apply international maritime safety regulations to all ferries sailing in Egyptian waters.
The move to amend the law was hailed by many, but victims' families still feel the government has dealt with them unjustly. An old woman sitting on the eighth floor raised her hand in prayer: "I invoke God against all of them, the government and Ismail. Only He will do us justice." Several other widows sitting beside her echoed, "amen".
Caption: Families of the victims await justice
C a p t i o n 2: Families of the victims await justice
© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/799/eg23.htm
[Odd thoughts, the first mexican parades were with mexican flags, and America got the message.....Now, we have the muslims, giving advise on flags at mosques...granny]
Mosques with foreign flags
Muqtedar Khan* reflects on the differences between Islam in America and Germany
We entered the mosque through a large iron gate closely watched by a score of Turkish men. Unlike most architecturally-interesting buildings in Berlin, which are open and easily accessible, this majestic and grand mosque is surrounded by a high wall and is accessible only through iron gates. I was in Berlin for a conference organised by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, and one of their scholars and a Berlin Parliamentarian kindly volunteered to show me around the city.
As we approached the grand mosque, the Berlin Parliamentarian remarked, "notice the Turkish flag on the mosque; do you see a German flag anywhere?"
The day-long conference in Berlin was about comparing the experiences of Germany and the United States in integrating their Muslim minorities. Throughout the day, scholars from both sides of the Atlantic struggled with political and philosophical issues involved in the absorption of large numbers of minorities whose political and cultural values may be at odds with those of the host nations.
While Muslim scholars argued for more openness, more religious and racial tolerance, and equal treatment of all religious communities, others called for more assimilation and insisted that immigrants must make the effort to learn local languages and adapt to the mainstream political and cultural norms.
As I looked at the mosque with its Turkish flag flying proudly, the high walls, the iron gates and the stoic faces, I suddenly realised that this was not a mosque but instead a sort of embassy, a foreign enclave, an extension of Turkish sovereignty in the heart of Germany. In the US one may occasionally find a US flag on a mosque, but never that of a foreign country. The only mosque that has foreign flags is the Islamic Center in Washington DC which was established by diplomats from Muslim countries.
I sympathised with the Berlin Parliamentarian's obvious displeasure concerning the Turkish flag. Several years ago I ran into a large contingent of Turks in the holiest of Muslim mosques in Mecca while circling the Kaaba. They were wearing tiny Turkish flags on their shirt collars. I found this display of nationalism in the House of God deeply offensive. Islam is a strictly monotheistic religion and nationalism in its extreme form begins to subvert the very idea of one God. Perhaps these Turks did not know that God is blind to nationality, ethnicity and race.
With Islamophobia on the rise in most Western countries, grand displays of Islamic religiosity combined with overt, in-your-face displays of allegiance to foreign nations can only be described as spectacularly stupid.
Both Muslims and non-Muslims are actively demanding the elimination of barriers between Western mainstream and Muslim Diaspora. While Muslims are insisting that host societies accommodate, recognise and respect all the differences that they bring, non-Muslims -- usually the dominant white Judeo-Christians -- are demanding that Muslims moderate these differences. In Germany the challenge is mainly that of Muslims learning the German language and of incorporating Islam as a German institution. In the US the challenges are more related to the real or perceived sympathy of American Muslims for anti-Americanism in the Middle East.
Muslim immigrants bring three significant challenges to Western societies: cultural differences, religious differences and political differences. In the US the first two challenges are easily manageable. Most Americans believe in the United States as a multi- cultural society and deeply value religious pluralism. Unlike Europe where the elite preach secularism yet go against it in practice, America actually practices a separation of Church and State.
In the US the government is neither involved nor interested in how Islam is institutionalised or managed by Muslims, whereas in Germany the state not only teaches religion in school but also has religious clergy on government payroll. This becomes particularly problematic since Germany finances both Christian and Jewish institutions but does not even recognise Islam.
In the US most people respect and even value cultural differences, jealously guard religious freedom, and consequently practice religious pluralism at all levels of society. Since most Americans are originally from a foreign country, the fact that Muslims also have foreign origins is of little issue.
American identity is open, flexible and continuously evolving. American citizenship is also easily acquired and hence becoming American in law and spirit faces less cultural and political barriers. Additionally, the "American dream" is a powerful positive that all immigrants aspire towards and often achieve. When travelling overseas, I frequently testify that coming to America for me was like joining the marines -- in America one can "be all you can be".
At present the key barrier to the mainstreaming of Islam in America is the relations between the US and the Islamic world.
Germany has a long way to go. Even though it does not have foreign policy problems like the US, it has several domestic policy issues. First, Germany must recognise Islam. Germany has been for decades a multi-ethnic society but very few Germans imagine Germany as a multi-cultural society. German intellectuals brag about being secular, but such a claim will remain false as long as Christian and Jewish institutions are on the national budget.
German identity is rooted in the past and is culturally tied to race, and ethnicity. Becoming German is very difficult, even for those who are born in Germany and speak perfect German but happen to look like me rather than Boris Becker.
German intellectuals must begin to imagine Germany as a political community that is a composite of values, rather than a nation-state based on a specific ethnicity. In the age of globalisation, narrowly defined identities are untenable. Germany, as an integral part of the emerging global society, must define itself in terms of global values that are sensitive to cultural, racial and religious differences. It must become a role model for other European nations like Ireland and Portugal that will soon face similar problems.
Muslims who live as minorities in the West or anywhere else must understand that their demand for tolerance of religious and cultural differences is a just cause. But they must align their political and economic interests with those of their neighbours, whose acceptance they seek, and not with those who live in foreign lands.
There is room for Islam in America and Germany. We can and we will build bigger and more spectacular mosques in the West, but there is no place for Saudi flags, or Turkish or Pakistani flags in Western mosques. They have their embassies and that is enough. They should not be allowed to use our mosques.
* The writer teaches Islam and Global Affairs at the University of Delaware. He is a Non-resident Fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author of Islamic Democratic Discourse [2006].
© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/799/op13.htm
[Odd it has only been a couple of days since I was at the kavkaz center site, now it is not possible to connect.
Could it be that they have shut it down again?
This article, I find interesting.
granny]
Chechen Warlord Sets Bounty for Official
By MIKE ECKEL
The Associated Press
Thursday, June 15, 2006; 3:59 PM
MOSCOW -- A Chechen warlord who is wanted for some of Russia's worst terrorist attacks has set a $25,000 bounty for the killing of a government leader in the troubled North Caucasus region, according to a posting Thursday on a Web site sympathetic to rebels.
The Kavkaz Center Web site also posted what appeared to be a new video of Shamil Basayev, the warlord who has claimed responsibility for seizing some 800 hostages in a Moscow theater in 2002 and the 2004 school siege in Beslan that killed 331.
Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev speaks to the media in Grozny, in this Oct. 28, 1999 file photo. Basayev who is wanted for some of Russia's worst terrorist attacks has announced a US$25,000 bounty for the killing of a powerful government official in the troubled North Caucasus region, according to information posted Thursday on the Kavkaz Center Web site sympathetic to rebels. According to the Web site, Basayev also repeated his claim of responsibility for the 2004 bomb attack that killed Chechnya's Moscow-backed president, Akhmad Kadyrov, saying he paid US$50,000 to those who carried out the assassination. (AP Photo/Ruslan Musayev, File)
Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev speaks to the media in Grozny, in this Oct. 28, 1999 file photo. Basayev who is wanted for some of Russia's worst terrorist attacks has announced a US$25,000 bounty for the killing of a powerful government official in the troubled North Caucasus region, according to information posted Thursday on the Kavkaz Center Web site sympathetic to rebels. According to the Web site, Basayev also repeated his claim of responsibility for the 2004 bomb attack that killed Chechnya's Moscow-backed president, Akhmad Kadyrov, saying he paid US$50,000 to those who carried out the assassination. (AP Photo/Ruslan Musayev, File) (Ruslan Musayev - AP)
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According to the site, Basayev also repeated his claim of responsibility for the 2004 bombing that killed Chechnya's Moscow-backed president, Akhmad Kadyrov, saying he paid $50,000 to those who carried out the assassination.
The warlord said he had put a $25,000 bounty on the head of Kadyrov's son, Ramzan _ a flamboyant prime minister in the Kremlin-backed regional government who heads widely feared paramilitary forces accused of abducting civilians and other violence.
continued at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/15/AR2006061501186.html
From this search:
http://news.google.com/news?q=Kavkaz%20Center&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=wn
This is where I started, with an alert.........
Google Alert - mujahideen
Invaders claim death of CRI president Sadulayev
Kavkaz Center - Istanbul,Turkey
Ringleaders of puppet formations have declared that the murdering of
Sadulayev
is "exclusively a big success" which "will deal a severe blow" to the
Mujahideen ...
http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2006/06/17/4801.shtml
bookmark for later
Kavkaz has a reward for the capture of Putin, 20 million.
Issued in 2004.
Found here:
http://groups.google.com/group/sfnet.keskustelu.laki/browse_thread/thread/70cb0f76ad6320db/ec45e3e2a29a5be2?lnk=st&q=Kavkaz+Center&rnum=1#ec45e3e2a29a5be2
From here:
http://groups.google.com/groups?q=Kavkaz+Center&start=0&scoring=d&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&
Cash or credit? Who put up the money?
[Remember the poisoned Kids in Chechen? found this report from March 2006 and another in google groups....]
LOCALS BELIEVE RUSSIAN MILITARY IS POISONING CHECHEN CHILDREN
By Andrei Smirnov
Thursday, March 2, 2006
Chechen girls suffering mystery illness
Last December 7, Taisa Minkailova, a 13-year-old Chechen girl from the village of Starogladkovskaya in the Shelkovskoy District of Northern Chechnya, complained of health problems. She was gasping for air, experiencing convulsions and headaches, and her limbs became numb. Her parents brought her to a hospital in neighboring Dagestan, but local doctors could not help the girl (Novaya gazeta, January 12).
On December 9 two more Chechen girls from the same village were taken to a hospital in Grozny, the Chechen capital, with the same symptoms. A week later 19 more children and three adults were admitted to the Central Hospital of Shelkovskoy District. All of these patients were females from three settlements: Kobi, Shelkozavodskaya, and Shelkovskaya (Newsru.com, February 21). "All victims had the temporary diagnosis of poisoning by an unknown toxin," Sultan Alimkhadzhiev, chief of the Chechen Republican Children's Hospital, told the Strana.ru news agency (kavkaz.strana.ru, December 20, 2005). Alimkhadzhiev said that doctors did not know how the poison had entered the children's bodies. They needed expert examination in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan.
Despite Alimkhadzhiev's cautious statements, almost everyone in Chechnya was convinced that the Russian military could be responsible for the poisoning. Just two months earlier, several students from Staroshedrinskaya, a village in Shelkovskoy District, had reported the same symptoms. However, the authorities had managed to hush up the incident (Novaya gazeta, January 16). According to the Kavkazcenter rebel website, a group of unidentified Russians had come to the school in Staroshedrinskaya after the first attacks and taken away a strange item, forbidding school personnel from discussing their visit (Kavkazcenter.com, December 19).
But the number of poisoned children in Shelkovskoy District was so huge (at least 100 victims by the end of December, according to different sources) that it was impossible to conceal. Popular anger became so loud that Ramzan Kadyrov, acting prime minister and the leader of the pro-Russian forces in Chechnya, had to appeal to General Alexander Baranov, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, to send a special delegation from the Russian Chemical Corporation to investigate (lenta.ru, December 21, 2005). Captain S.N. Efimov, a senior specialist doctor at a mobile military laboratory, headed the Commission of the North Caucasus Military District that was incorporated into the Chechen government's investigation.
On December 17, the Commission went to Shelkovskoy. Novaya gazeta published Efimov's report from the trip, which said, "The examination of the victims revealed the following pattern of the poisoning progression. The source of the poisoning is located in the main building of the school (because being in [the school] is the only thing that this group of victims has in common) presumably on the second floor. The poisoning may have been through breathing, but body contact is also possible. The toxic substance was either liquid or solid releasing toxic vapors." Efimov's report said that it was impossible to determine the nature of the poisonous gas without special equipment and chemicals (Novaya gazeta, January 12).
The first reports of mass poisoning had swept through Chechnya until almost no one doubted that the victims had been really poisoned. The only question was by whom. While the Chechens suspected Russian troops, official propaganda pointed to international terrorism. On January 20, the kavkaz.strana.ru website, known for its close ties with the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the military, published an article that said, "Between 1997 and 1999 there was a secret ‘Al-Risal' camp in Chechnya where instructors of Arabic origin used to work with poisons and means of mass destruction. The camp was located in the center of Grozny and it was sponsored with Islamist extremist funds linked to Al-Qaeda" (kavkaz.strana.ru, December 20, 2005).
Blood samples from the poisoned girls were sent to the republican Forensic Investigation Bureau in Makhachkala. On December 22, Bureau experts told the press that "radioactive elements were found in the blood of some children" (Agenstvo natsionalnikh novostei, December 22, 2005). One day later, the Bureau declared that the children had been poisoned by ethylene glycol, the main ingredient in anti-freeze (Kavkazsky uzel, December 23). The North Caucasus Military District chemical laboratory made no comment.
Then, suddenly, all talk of poisoning disappeared. Elbrus Porsukov, director of the Forensic Investigation Bureau, retracted his colleagues' statement that radioactive elements had been found in the children's blood. Musa Delsaev, head doctor of the Drug Control Service in Chechnya, said that there had been no poisoning; the children had a disease called "nervous exhaustion" (Kavkazky Uzel, December 23, 2005). Zurab Kikalidze, deputy director of the notorious Serbsky Forensic Psychiatry Institute, said that the cause of the disease was "psycho-emotional tension" typical of residents of the Chechen Republic (Kavkazky Uzel, December 23, 2005).
Although nobody in Chechnya actually believed this nonsense, the parents of some sick children agreed to send them to a medical institute in Stavropol for further treatment for this "nervous disease." However, this "treatment" only worsened the attacks; now the children's noses would bleed in addition to convulsions and choking four or five times a day (newsru.com, February 21).
Today parents in Shelkovskoy do not let their children go to school and insist that the buildings be decontaminated, but the officials, who insist now that there was no poisoning, refuse. Chechen hospitals are full of sick children and nobody knows how to treat them. Almost all victims are female, either students or teachers, and Novaya gazeta assumes that the source of the poisoning could be hidden in the girls' lavatories (Novaya gazeta, January 16). The source of the poisoning could be the item that the Russians took away from the school in the village of Staroshedrinskaya last fall, as Kavkazcenter reported.
Clearly the Russian authorities are hiding the truth about the poisoning. Their explanations that the children's convulsions were the result of nervous exhaustion are patently absurd. "If the problem is nerves then the whole population in Grozny and Vedeno district, areas of the most intensive hostilities in Chechnya, should lie in convulsions," says Khusein Nataev, head of the Shelkovskoy district administration (Novye izvestiya, December 25).
The question is what the officials are hiding and the answer is the deliberate poisoning of the Chechen young women by security officials. The reason is also clear, but at the same time it is too shocking to believe – the genocide of the Chechen nation.
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Volume 4, Issue 12 (June 15, 2006) | Download PDF Version
Al-Qaeda's Recruitment Operations in the Balkans
By Anes Alic
The recent arrest and pending trial in Bosnia of three young men believed to have been plotting terrorist attacks on Western targets in the capital of Sarajevo has sparked fears that al-Qaeda is recruiting "white Muslims" in the country. Bosnia's porous borders and weak law enforcement institutions, coupled with the presence of hundreds of Islamic fighters who arrived from Arab countries during the 1992-1995 war, make this small war-torn country an easy meeting point for al-Qaeda networks.
During the pre-trial hearing on May 3 of Bosnia's first-ever terrorism case, three men—Mirsad Bektasevic, Cesur Abulkadir and Bajro Ikanovic—pleaded not guilty to charges of plotting a terrorist attack either in Bosnia or elsewhere. Two others—Senad Husanovic and Amir Bajric—who were charged with possession of explosives and believed to be heading up the alleged network's logistics, also pleaded not guilty and were released on bail.
The five men, four of whom are teenagers, were arrested in October and December last year in the Sarajevo suburbs of Butmir and Hadzici. Bektasevic and Abdulkadir were arrested in late October in Butmir's apartment owned by Bektasevic's cousin. They also rented two apartments in Sarajevo center, an anonymous high-ranking Bosnian police source told The Jamestown Foundation. While Bektasevic is a Bosnian Muslim national with Swedish and Serbian citizenship, and Ikanovic is a Turkish national with Danish residency, the remaining suspects were all Bosnians.
On October 20, 2005, agents found some 30 kilograms of explosives and dozens of guns in raids on three apartments used by the suspects. They also said that they found a suicide vest. Yet, the most significant piece of evidence discovered was a videotape showing the two men asking God for forgiveness for the sacrifice they were about to make. Two of the suspects—Bektasevic and Abdulkadir—were wearing face masks and had videotaped themselves making bombs, the police source said.
Nevertheless, the first months of the investigation failed to turn up enough concrete evidence that the alleged network was plotting a terrorist attack in Bosnia, so the local authorities turned to Scotland Yard and the FBI for forensic assistance. FBI forensic tests on the face masks determined that they had been worn by Bektasevic and Abdulkadir, while Scotland Yard confirmed that the voice on the videotape belonged to Bektasevic.
Faced with the new evidence, the two main suspects changed their original statements where they had denied plotting terrorist attacks, saying instead that they had intended to "warn" Bosnian and Western European authorities about Muslims suffering in Iraq and Afghanistan. They also said they were plotting to "warn" the Bosnian government to withdraw its soldiers from Iraq. Bosnia recently sent some 30 soldiers there as part of a de-mining unit, the source said. He also said the alleged network was most likely plotting an attack on the European Forces (EUFOR) base in Sarajevo, located just 100 meters from the house where the two main suspects were arrested.
The investigation, however, has extended well beyond Bosnia, indicating the possibility of a "white al-Qaeda" network operating from Western to Southeastern Europe. Bektasevic operated under the code name Maximus and kept in touch with a group of at least three men in Britain, all of whom were arrested by British police in early November. The British police have not revealed details on the arrests. Days after the Sarajevo arrests, police in Copenhagen detained seven men and one woman, most of them Danish converts to Islam, on suspicion that they were planning suicide bombings somewhere in Europe. Four of the suspects arrested in Denmark have been released due to lack of evidence against them, while the other three have been released on bail. Evidence linked those arrested in Denmark to those arrested in Sarajevo (Slobodna Bosna, April 22).
In the meantime, however, the trial in Bosnia has been postponed for at least three months while prosecutors and investigators attempt to collect more solid evidence against the five. Some experts say that the Bosnian authorities moved too quickly to arrest the five, preventing authorities from learning the intended target of the alleged terrorist plot and revealing the extent of a wider "white Muslim" network in Europe. Bosnian security agencies allegedly discussed the repercussions of making the arrests too soon, but chose to move to thwart a possible terrorist attack before it was too late (Vecernji List, April 26).
While there is largely agreement that al-Qaeda is attempting to recruit white Muslims in Bosnia, there is some disagreement on the extent of these efforts. EUFOR says that it has no evidence that Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Balkans represent a bigger terrorist threat than any other country in Europe (Fena.ba, April 26). "We cannot exclude the existence of the threat in any country and that goes for BiH as well," EUFOR Commander Gian Marco Chiarini said. "However, at this moment EUFOR has no data that would lead us to the conclusion that the threat of terrorism and terrorist attacks is larger in BiH than elsewhere" (Dnevni Avaz, April 25).
The U.S. State Department's 2005 report on terrorism, however, warned that while Bosnian authorities had been highly cooperative in the war on terrorism, Bosnia could be an attractive locale for terrorists because of its weak state comprised of semi-autonomous power centers. Additionally, while secular Bosnia is no friend to Islamic extremism, several hundred Arab mujahideen warriors who arrived in Bosnia to fight on the Bosnian Muslim side during the war are likely to be sympathetic to al-Qaeda. According to the Bosnian Foreign Ministry, it is believed that as many as 6,000 Arab volunteers arrived during the war. After the war, up to 400 of them acquired local citizenship, many of them marrying local women. They came from a variety of locations in the Middle East and North Africa, but largely from Saudi Arabia, Syria and Algeria.
Perhaps most significantly, the pending terrorism trial has ignited a fierce debate about these naturalized citizens, prompting fears of a backlash. Bosnia-Herzegovina security agencies are actively investigating individuals and groups, including Al Hussein Imad, also known as Abu Hamza, the informal leader of naturalized Bosnian citizens, who recently warned that revoking citizenship from these Arab fighters could result in protests, blockades and other forms of unrest (Radio B92, May 26).
Anonymous EUFOR sources told The Jamestown Foundation that Abu Hamza was believed to have recently formed an organization called "Ansarija" to provide legal assistance to former mujahideen threatened with deportation to their home countries. Abu Hamza told Bosnian FTV's 60 Minutes political talk show on April 18 that those being targeted for deportation could not be legally expelled as they faced charges in their countries of origin. The Syrian-born Abu Hamza is among those who are facing deportation. He arrived in Bosnia in the early 1990s as a student. Investigators say he lied on his citizenship application.
Bosnian authorities have stepped up their investigation into how hundreds of Arabs obtained Bosnian citizenship. According to a high-ranking police source speaking to The Jamestown Foundation, 104 naturalized citizens are in the process of having their citizenship revoked. Yet, the whereabouts of 64 of those being targeted remain unknown. The Bosnian government believes that these people present a potential security threat, and Western intelligence agencies agree. Western agencies are cooperating with Bosnian authorities in the terrorism investigation and pressuring local officials to locate and conduct checks on the 64 naturalized citizens who remain unaccounted for—some of whom authorities believe may have been in touch with Bektasevic and the other suspects (Nezavisne Novine, May 25).
Most of these naturalized citizens are believed to live in Sarajevo and the central Bosnian towns of Zenica, Tuzla and Travnik. Since late last year, police have conducted several raids in the mountains surrounding those towns, suspecting that militants have training camps there and caches of weapons and explosives. Thus far, however, nothing has turned up.
Without a significant amount of technical and other assistance from Western intelligence and security forces, Bosnia is ill-equipped to prevent terrorist infiltration. Recent police reforms—including one significant reform that created a state-level police agency replacing the two separate Bosniak-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska agencies—are only embryonic and untested, as is cooperation between the present three agencies.
Although Islamic extremism is not nearly as prevalent in Bosnia as it is in many Western European countries, the threat must also be measured against its security forces' counter-terrorism capabilities, which in this case are starting from ground zero. Furthermore, while secular Bosnia is far from being a sympathetic haven for Islamic extremist activities, its institutional weaknesses and its wartime history of having been "saved" in part by Arab mujahideen could make it an easy and symbolic meeting and recruitment point for a new, white al-Qaeda network.
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Volume 4, Issue 11 (June 2, 2006) | Download PDF Version
Islamic Radicalism in Mexico: The Threat from South of the Border
By Chris Zambelis
The ongoing controversy surrounding the debate over illegal immigration and border security issues in the United States, specifically as it applies to the porous U.S.-Mexico frontier and the status of millions of undocumented workers and other migrants that enter the country each year from Mexico, continues to dominate headlines. Although the overwhelming majority of those entering the United States from Mexico each day are in search of opportunity, many observers worry that it is only a matter of time before al-Qaeda exploits this vulnerability for its own ends.
In assessing this threat, Muslim communities in Mexico have come under increasing scrutiny by U.S., Mexican and international security officials both as potential enablers for terrorist infiltration and as ideological sympathizers for the brand of radicalism characteristic of al-Qaeda. Muslim conversion trends in Mexico and Latin America have also raised concerns, especially given al-Qaeda's successes in luring some Muslim converts to its cause. To date, however, these assessments have been way off the mark and in many respects divert attention away from the far more pressing threats at hand. A closer look at the nature of Islam and the outlook of Mexican Muslims may explain why.
Islam in Mexico
Compared to other countries in Latin America that are home to sizeable Muslim communities with longstanding ties to the region, Mexico's Muslim minority is tiny. At the same time, it is one of the most diverse and dynamic in the region. Despite varying figures and scant data, only a couple thousand Muslims are believed to live in the overwhelmingly Roman Catholic country. Nearly all are Sunni Muslims. Of this group, approximately half trace their origins to what is modern-day Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine, mostly the descendants of traders and peasants who emigrated from the Middle East in the latter part of Ottoman rule. Mexico's Arab Muslim community is assimilated in major urban centers such as Mexico City. Significantly, Mexico is also home to a much larger Arab Christian community, also originating from the Levant, which numbers in the tens of thousands. Both communities share close ties and feel a shared sense of pride for their common Arab heritage [1].
Mexican Converts
The other segment of Mexico's small Muslim community is made up of Mexicans who converted to Islam in recent years. Islam is one of the fastest growing religions in the world, partially as a result of intermarriage and religious conversion. This trend is also evident elsewhere in Latin America, despite the longstanding influence of the Roman Catholic Church. In fact, widespread and growing disenchantment with the Catholic Church is leading many Mexicans and others in the region to find spiritual solace elsewhere, including Islam.
One of Mexico's longest running and most influential Muslim organizations is the Centro Cultural Islamico de Mexico (CCIM). Founded in 1995, the CCIM is a Sunni Muslim organization based in Mexico City. It is led by Omar Weston, a British Muslim convert who was born Mark Weston. It runs two mosques and an array of social welfare and education programs that include Arabic language training and a dawa (call) for conversion. It also has links with Muslim communities elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean (http://www.islam.com.mx). Despite some vague and unsubstantiated reports, there is no evidence implicating Weston and the CCIM to radicalism or terrorism.
Mexico is also home to a number of small Sufi orders led by two women, Sheikha Fariha and Sheikha Amina, the most prominent being the Nur Ashki Jerrahi order, a branch of the Halveti-Jerrahi Tariqat community of dervishes based in the Masjid al-Farah in New York City and other major U.S. cities. The group has branches in Mexico City, Curernavaca and Oaxaca (http://www.nurashkijerrahi.org). The group has been described as adhering to an unconventional blend of traditional Sufi mysticism and New Age ideologies [2]. There is no evidence implicating these groups to radicalism or terrorism.
The Murabitun (the Almoravids, after the African Muslim dynasty that ruled North Africa and Spain in the 11th and 12th century) also has a presence in Mexico (http://www.cislamica.org). The group is a well-funded international Sufi order based in Granada, Spain that claims thousands of followers across the globe, including many European converts. It is also regarded as one of the most aggressive missionary movements in Latin America and a major rival of Omar Weston's CCIM. It was founded in the 1970s by Sheikh Abdel Qader as-Sufi al-Murabit, a Scottish Muslim convert born Ian Dallas who was formerly a playwright and actor. Dallas is a controversial figure who, among other things, is a vocal critic of international capitalism and modern forms of finance. Although there is no evidence linking him or his organization to violence or terrorism, he has been accused of harboring pro-Nazi leanings and other radical ideologies. Othman Abu-Sahnun, an Italian Muslim convert and former ranking member of the Murabitun who had a falling out with the group, dedicates an entire website accusing his former leader of extremism, corruption and being party to alleged sinister conspiracies involving Freemasonry (http://www.murabitun.cyberummah.org).
Chiapas
In recent years, Mexico's volatile and impoverished southern state of Chiapas, which is home to a predominately indigenous population that traces its ethnic and cultural lineage to the Mayans, has been the target of Muslim missionaries. The indigenous peoples of Chiapas are underserved and face severe discrimination in Mexican society. In fact, these circumstances are one of the main reasons why Evangelical and other Protestant Christian sects target them in search of new adherents, an ongoing trend in Chiapas and elsewhere in Latin America. In an effort to win over converts, Christian missionary organizations have been running social welfare and humanitarian programs for decades targeting Mexico's indigenous communities. In doing so, they emphasize what they describe as the failure of the Roman Catholic establishment to cater to the spiritual and material needs of the people in the region, often with great success [3].
Muslim missionary groups, especially the Murabitun, which is led by Aurelino Perez in the region, and Omar Weston's CCIM, use similar tactics in an effort to win over adherents in Chiapas. In addition to providing much needed social welfare and humanitarian aid, the Murabitun argue that Catholicism represents a vestige of European imperialism that is directly responsible for the destruction of Mayan culture. Likewise, Catholicism is seen as a tool of the state that is to blame for the poverty and plight of the indigenous peoples. The anti-capitalist message of the Murabitun in particular also resonates with some of the impoverished locals. Murabitun discourse even emphasizes what it describes as the close cultural and ethnic links between the indigenous peoples of the region and the Muslim Moors who once ruled Spain. Therefore, conversion to Islam represents a reversion to their original identity, essentially an assertion of cultural and ethnic identity long suppressed by European colonialism. The Murabitun went as far as to engage Subcommandante Marcos and his Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), following the group's armed rebellion in Chiapas in 1994, in an effort to gain support (http://www.ezln.org.mx).
The number of indigenous peoples who have converted to Islam is believed to number in the hundreds. Significantly, the majority of indigenous peoples converting to Islam are among those who previously converted to Protestantism and other sects. Although religious affiliation in Chiapas tends to be more pluralistic relative to the rest of Mexico due to the influence of indigenous beliefs and customs, Mayans who turn away from the Catholic Church often face discrimination and violence. Many have even been expelled from their homes by violent gangs and are now known locally as the expulsados (the expelled). For example, many of the Muslims of Chiapas trace their lineage to the Tzotzil Mayan village of San Juan Chamula. A large segment of this community was expelled decades ago for adopting Evangelical Christianity. They now reside in Nueva Esperanza, an impoverished section of San Cristobal [4].
In addition to the Murabitun, Muslim missionary activity in San Cristobal has been attributed to the efforts of a group known as the Mission for Dawa in Mexico, represented locally by Esteban Lopez Moreno, a Muslim convert from Spain who is also linked to the Murabitun [5]. Organizations such as the Murabitun and other Muslim groups line up alongside Pentecostals, Jehova's Witnesses, Mormons and other proselytizers in the hunt for new adherents. Under these circumstances, impoverished locals will often convert to a new faith based on which congregation could provide the most benefits. Many, however, take their newfound faith seriously. With the financial support of local and international groups, Mayan Muslims made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 2005, the first group from Chiapas to do so [6].
Reports pointing to possible terrorist links with Muslim missionaries in Chiapas have surfaced in the Mexican and Spanish media. Spanish authorities have raised suspicions about possible links between Spanish members of the Murabitun living in Chiapas and radical Islamists in Spain. Other reports have even linked the group with Basque separatist movements such as ETA. Othman Abu-Sahnun is a proponent of this theory (http://www.murabitun.cyberummah.org). Mexican authorities have also investigated the activities of the Murabitun due to reports of alleged immigration and visa abuses involving the group's European members and possible radical links, including to al-Qaeda [7]. Despite these allegations and extensive media hype in Mexico and other Spanish-language press, no concrete evidence has surfaced to date substantiating such claims.
Conclusion
U.S. policymakers and security officials should continue to worry about border security and the potential for al-Qaeda infiltration into Mexico. Given the evidence to date, however, any potential inroads by al-Qaeda into Mexico is not likely to come through ties with Mexico's Muslim community—and this includes local converts or otherwise. Washington would be better served by concentrating its resources to confront Mexico's weak institutions, corruption, the influence of drug and other criminal gangs and poverty that may be exploited by al-Qaeda as a means to a greater end, as they have all too often in other parts of the world.
Notes
1. Luz Maria Martinez Montiel, "The Lebanese Community in Mexico: its Meaning, Importance and the History of its Communities," The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993).
2. Natascha Garvin, "Conversion and Conflict: Muslims in Mexico," International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World Review [Netherlands], Spring 2005).
3. Thelma Gomez Duran, "Muslalmanes en Chiapas," WebIslam: Islam en Latinoamerica, No. 132, July 20, 2001.
4. Bill Weinberg, "Islamic Sect Targets Chiapas Indians," Native Americas Journal, August 28, 2003.
5. "Los musulmanes del sureste mexicano," Univison, October 4, 2004.
6. Dawn, January 28, 2005.
7. Natascha Garvin, "Conversion and Conflict: Muslims in Mexico."
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Volume 4, Issue 10 (May 18, 2006) | Download PDF Version
Al-Qaeda in Azerbaijan: Myths and Realities
By Anar Valiyev
After the events of September 11 and the subsequent war on terrorism, Azerbaijan became one of the active members of the anti-terrorism coalition. Besides providing a small contingent of troops for peace operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Azerbaijani government actively cooperates with the United States and other members of the coalition to fight against al-Qaeda. For a short period of time following the September 11 attacks, Azerbaijani special services arrested 23 international terrorists and extradited them to Middle Eastern countries (Arif Yunusov, Islam in Azerbaijan, 2004). Late President Heydar Aliyev claimed that state security agents had arrested "big figures" from the al-Qaeda network. Supposedly, Aliyev was speaking about two members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad who were apprehended in Azerbaijan in 2002 with the assistance of the CIA. They were handed over to Egypt. Later in 2004, both local and foreign newspapers reported that al-Qaeda might implement large-scale attacks against some countries, including Azerbaijan, that have handed al-Qaeda members to the Egyptian government.
In most of the cases, the majority of arrested terrorists and radicals were foreign citizens, usually from Arab countries, in addition to Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan. For the last couple of years, however, ethnic Azerbaijanis have become involved in the activities of radical terrorist organizations. In March 2005, for example, an Azerbaijani court imprisoned a group of six people. The gang, headed by Amiraslan Iskenderov, who allegedly fought in Afghanistan from 1999-2003, was planning terrorist attacks against public and governmental buildings, strategic facilities and residences of foreign citizens. The terrorist group also planned to implement mass-scale chemical attacks in some regions of Azerbaijan. The group prepared a statement on behalf of al-Qaeda in the Caucasus, threatening the Azerbaijani government to carry out bombings in Baku. According to the Ministry of National Security, the terrorists' main aim was to force the Azerbaijani government to change its secular and democratic regime, as well as to quit the anti-terrorism coalition (Day.az, March 17, 2005). In June 2005, another group consisting of foreign and local citizens was indicted. The group received special instructions from the Abu Hafs, the coordinator of al-Qaeda in the Caucasus, and was planning to commit terrorist acts, bombings and arson to cause political instability (Today.az, July 6, 2005).
Later in March 2006, Eldar Mahmudov, the Azerbaijani minister of national security, warned the public on activities of religious-extremist groups in the country. Mahmudov claimed that before September 11, Azerbaijan was only a transit country for terrorists. After becoming a member of the anti-terrorism coalition, however, terrorists began to target Azerbaijan as well (Echo Newspaper, March 18).
Independent analysis would doubt the existence or even the interest of al-Qaeda in Azerbaijan. After September 11, it became fashionable among some autocratic regimes in Central Asia to "neutralize" al-Qaeda cells in their respective countries and to show their importance to the anti-terrorism coalition. Azerbaijan was no exception. Officials, special services and the media actively circulate a variety of myths, stressing the importance of Azerbaijan as well as the potential danger from al-Qaeda. Some of these myths are below.
Myth I: Al-Qaeda is planning attacks on Azerbaijan for its participation in the international anti-terrorism coalition.
One of the most circulated myths that can be found in the local Azerbaijani media implies al-Qaeda's plans to launch attacks in Azerbaijan as a punishment for participating in the anti-terrorism coalition and to force the Azerbaijani government to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan was one of the first countries that answered the call of U.S. President George W. Bush to wage a war against terrorism, it is unlikely that al-Qaeda would target Azerbaijan. As previous actions of al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations have shown, the leaders of these groups are rational actors who do not generally attack merely for the sake of terrorism. Al-Qaeda prefers to attack cities where a terrorism strike would lead to both high casualties as well as a huge resonance. Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, is not of great global importance. Attacking Baku would offer little benefit to al-Qaeda.
Secondly, Azerbaijan does not offer many attractive targets. The only possible targets might be the U.S., British or the Israeli embassies, or the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. After September 11, there were several reports claiming al-Qaeda was planning to attack the U.S. Embassy in Baku. Those reports, however, were not independently confirmed.
Myth II: Al-Qaeda might attack the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and disrupt oil supplies to the West.
In 2004, the Azerbaijani government stated that the country's special services had obtained information that members of al-Qaeda were planning acts of sabotage designed to derail the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline—a $3 billion project intended to transport oil from the Caspian Sea region to the world markets. The news caught the eye of many security experts and government officials. In the wake of the Limburg bombing—the French-flagged oil tanker—and al-Qaeda's adoption of the new tactic to disrupt oil supplies from the Middle East to the West, government officials called for tighter security measures for the pipeline. Thorough analysis, however, can explain that al-Qaeda is not very interested in the destruction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline
First of all, the pipeline transports approximately one million barrels per day, supplying only 1.2 percent of all world oil consumption. A disruption of the pipeline can hardly hit global oil supplies. Second, the pipeline and its infrastructure can be easily reconstructed within weeks or even days. Third, an attack on oil installations in the Middle East region, especially in the Gulf countries, which give al-Qaeda more attention than the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which has more regional and less global significance. It is worth mentioning, however, that disruption of the pipeline would lead to anxiety or even panic in the world market and affect prices. The attack on the pipeline would show that al-Qaeda is targeting, and capable of attacking, oil facilities outside the Middle East. Meanwhile, a terrorist attack on a pipeline could become a mini-catastrophe for the country. Azerbaijan could lose its attractiveness to investors due to elevated financial risks.
Myth III: Al-Qaeda recruits Azerbaijanis for terrorist attacks.
In March 2006, Minister of National Security Mahmudov shocked the public with the information that an al-Qaeda Caucasus terrorist cell was planning to recruit Azerbaijani women for suicide missions. The minister maintained that although the country has extensive experience with fighting extremism, the information "was the worst discovery for us over the past years" (Echo Newspaper, March 18).
The real situation in Azerbaijan, however, is different. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan is a Muslim country, a majority of the population consider themselves secular. It should be mentioned that while most Azerbaijanis consider Islam part of their national identity, any mixing of religion with the political sphere is discouraged by a vast majority. Critical to understanding this issue is the fact that the Azerbaijani view of Islam is one of a common national characteristic, inseparable from its Azerbaijani ethnic identity, which no single group can monopolize. Compared to other Muslim countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, al-Qaeda will have a hard time influencing and recruiting local Azerbaijanis for suicide terrorist missions. Furthermore, up to 75-80 percent of the population is Shiite, to which the ideology of al-Qaeda is hostile. Finally, a majority of the mosques, where al-Qaeda usually recruits its followers, are under tight surveillance by the Azerbaijani government.
The Reality
It cannot be denied, however, that members of other radical organizations are active in Azerbaijan. During the last couple of years, members of terrorist organizations such as the Caucasian Islamic Army, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jeyshullah, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Jamaat al-Muvahidun have been neutralized.
On April 18, a group of Azerbaijani citizens calling itself Jamaat al-Muvahidun were sentenced to terms in prison. According to the Ministry of National Security, the group planned to bomb the U.S., Israeli and Russian embassies. In addition, they were planning the assassination of members of governmental and law-enforcement bodies for cooperation in the anti-terrorism coalition. The group was also planning to blow up buildings of State Oil Company, National Bank and other strategic facilities. It was revealed that the young people were ready to get military training in the camps of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey in order to fight "infidel countries" (Turan News Agency, April 18). On April 19, the Azerbaijani court sentenced an international group consisting of 16 people to terms in prison. The group, mostly comprised of citizens of Azerbaijan—although there were citizens of Russia, Turkey and Yemen among them—were supposedly members of al-Qaeda, trained in the Pankisi gorge in Georgia (Terrorism Focus, April 25). The gang members were accused of terrorism, illegally obtaining arms and murdering a police officer in Baku in July 2005. Group members, meanwhile, were recruiting young Azerbaijanis to fight in Chechnya against Russian troops. For the last year, over 100 people were sentenced to various jail terms for the participation in the war in Chechnya—or for preparing to do so (Turan News Agency, April 19).
Recent trends show that local radical organizations pose more of a danger to Azerbaijan than does al-Qaeda. Yet, the Azerbaijani government is trying to connect the surge of local radicalism with the influence of al-Qaeda. There are several reasons for that. First, the country's regime is trying to show the United States its loyalty concerning the war on terrorism. Thus, the sentencing of al-Qaeda "members" was done in order to demonstrate the activity of Azerbaijan's special services. Secondly, by exaggerating the danger from al-Qaeda, the Azerbaijani government is trying to portray itself as the one and only pro-democratic force in a region dominated by anti-Western religious extremists. For many years, the current regime in Azerbaijan successfully sold this propaganda, often depicting outbreaks of social unrest as the work of Islamic extremists.
The most important aspect, however, is that the government of Azerbaijan, as well as in many countries in the Middle East, falsely interpret the issue of religious extremism. They believe that terrorist attacks occurring in their countries as well as the establishment of cells of radical Islamic organizations are attributable to some "nerve" center headed by bin Laden's al-Qaeda. It is easier for the Azerbaijani government to connect jihadi phenomena in the country with al-Qaeda rather than to look at the real factors leading to the emergence of such organizations. The core of these radical extremist organizations is usually a low income group of religious young men, who are mostly unemployed and dissatisfied with the autocratic regime of their country. They tend to see a theocratic state as the only alternative for a highly corrupt and debauched government. One might conclude that the government's preoccupation with al-Qaeda targeting Azerbaijan is a deliberate attempt to divert popular attention from daily problems by creating a substitute enemy.
Historical experience shows that cracking down radical cells in the country will hardly bring long-term benefits. Instead, it could further alienate religious minority groups and lead them into the trap of jihadi organizations. For the Azerbaijani government, it is time to address important issues such as corruption, poverty and democratic development. Otherwise the country will be bogged down in eternal conflict with the growing influence of radical organizations.
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Volume 4, Issue 9 (May 4, 2006) | Download PDF Version
Al-Qaeda and the Threat to Mass Surface Transportation
By Andrew Holt The March 2004 attack on commuter trains in Madrid and the three simultaneous bombings on the London underground in July 2005, which collectively killed 243 people, dramatically underscored the acute terrorist threat to mass surface transportation (MST) in the contemporary era. According to the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) in San Jose, California, MST was the target of more than 195 terrorist attacks from 1997 through 2000. Of the 84 incidents resulting in fatalities, nearly a quarter involved ten or more deaths. Similarly revealing are statistics provided by the Brookings Institution in Washington DC, which show that between 1991 and 2001 a full 42 percent of terrorist strikes worldwide were directed against mass transit. The high incidence of attacks against MST reflect both its inherent attractiveness as a "soft" target of opportunity and the problematic nature of safeguarding this particular mode of transportation—both of which are likely to have particular salience to the organizational and operational dynamics of jihadis.
MST and Terrorism
The attractiveness of MST as a terrorist target essentially stems from four factors. First, mass transit systems, by definition, cater for high volumes of passengers who are typically crammed into narrow, confined spaces. Such venues provide a civilian-centric setting of the sort that might yield a substantial body count if decisively struck. Second, MST is designed to move large numbers of people quickly and efficiently, which necessarily means that protective measures must minimize the disruptive impact of security on people who use this mode of transport. This openness, while allowing for passenger convenience, also means that mass transit remains exceptionally susceptible to covert penetration as security officials are largely unable to enact a definitive regimen of entry/exit surveillance (author interviews, security officials, Canberra, Australia, February). Third, because train and subway cars are enclosed, they necessarily serve to amplify resulting shock waves emanating from explosions. Stated differently, bombing these targets does not require the enormous payload—and associated logistical deployment problems—that is typically used to destroy buildings or more open spaces (author interview, Explosive Ordinance Response Team (EORT), Brisbane, Australia, February). Finally, attacks against MST have the potential to affect wider components of a country's critical infrastructure system as in many cases underground urban transit links are also employed to house major power and communication cables. While this is convenient and cost-effective—in the sense that there is no need to dig a lattice of multiple tunnels—such co-location necessarily exacerbates the probability that a single strike will impact across several networks that are vital to a city's overall functioning (Clive Williams, presentation made before the Australian Urban Transit Security Conference, Melbourne, November 14, 2005).
Exacerbating the vulnerability of MST is the problematic nature of instituting concerted safety measures for this particular mode of transport. Three in particular stand out:
∙ The culture of mass transportation, which frequently works against effective crisis management to mitigate casualties. This is particularly true in terms of issuing an order to shut down the operations of a system, which even in instances when a terrorist attack is not confirmed may be the safest thing to do (comments made by Brian Jenkins during the National Transportation Security Summit, Washington DC, October 30, 2001).
∙ Direct and indirect financial considerations:
a) On a direct level, installing security improvements for mass transit is likely to prove quite expensive. One agency in the U.S., for instance, estimated that introducing intrusion alarms and passive infra-red night-imaging sensors would cost a quarter billion dollars. A General Accounting Office (GAO) survey of transit agencies in 2002 similarly found that identified security improvements would exceed $711 million (General Accounting Office Report GAO-02-1075T, September 18, 2002). Unlike aviation transportation, these costs cannot be offset through add-ons to standing fares (which could amount to between $2 and $4 dollars per ticket) without putting it beyond the range of the paying public.
b) Indirectly, problems arise out of the competitive nature of MST, which as noted above, resides in its accessibility and convenience. To retain this comparative advantage and minimize the associated risk of people choosing to travel by alternative means (such as cars), transit authorities must therefore offer an efficient and quality service. Security measures that limit accessibility and create delays obviously do not satisfy this requirement (author interviews, transit and security officials, Canberra, Australia, February).
∙ Streamlining collaboration between the numerous agencies and departments tasked with safeguarding MST from terrorism and other crimes. Depending on the state concerned, these parties could include police and intelligence authorities, transportation and government officials, owner-operators and contract security companies.
Frequently, these various actors transcend national/federal, state and local jurisdictions creating a mosaic of stakeholders with their own interests, priorities and concerns. Effective coordination is, thus, often a major problem, particularly in terms of information dissemination, early response and overall consequence management.
MST and the Evolving Nature of the al-Qaeda Network
In the years since 9/11, al-Qaeda's functional latitude to emphasize assaults against hard targets has progressively atrophied due to setbacks it has suffered in the context of the global war on terrorism. More specifically, because the group is no longer able to exert clear command and control over international attacks, it has necessarily been required to switch prioritization away from centrally-controlled strategic assaults executed by an inner core of jihadist activists toward more tactically-oriented strikes undertaken by affiliated cells (and sometimes individuals) as and when opportunities arise. This forced organizational devolution has been mirrored in an operational pattern that gives overwhelming precedence to attacks that are cheap, easy to execute, offer a high probability of success and whose consequences can be accurately predicted. The focus has, therefore, tended to be on soft, civilian-centric venues that can be hit recurrently with minimal outside support and logistical assistance but that still retain a realistic potential to result in a large number of casualties and accompanying social disruption.
Surface transportation represents an ideal venue for these types of attacks. As noted, trains, buses and metro systems, simply by virtue of their openness and large user-base, are soft targets in the full sense of the term, offering terrorists a high degree of anonymity, few obstacles to movement and a highly visible victim set that can be decisively struck with minimal resources. In short, MST makes for a good "killing field," inflicting the type of collective punishment that can be readily levered to build morale, mobilize additional recruits and supporters and positively sway "fence sitters." Moreover, because of their greater ease of management, strikes against surface transportation fit well with the operational capabilities of local affiliates—as was demonstrated so graphically in Madrid and London.
Mitigation Measures
How can MST be safeguarded from terrorist attacks? In the short term, there are several pragmatic, cost-effective measures that could be taken, including:
∙ Removing all luggage lockers and trash cans from stations;
∙ Augmenting and randomizing police and security patrols;
∙ Regulating vehicular access to potentially sensitive areas (such as loading docks that may be co-located within station perimeters);
∙ Conducting regular table top exercises and "real-life" simulations to develop, test and refine emergency drill procedures;
∙ Paying greater attention to security at suburban stations, which often represent highly vulnerable "jump-off" points for covert entry into MST systems and perpetrating attacks further "down the line";
∙ Retrofitting trains to help dissipate bomb blasts;
∙ Ensuring that an effective inter-agency crisis communication structure is not only in place but is also well understood and institutionalized by all parties concerned;
∙ Emphasizing the need for passengers to be aware of their surroundings and attuned to the critical importance of quickly reporting anything out of the ordinary.
Over the longer term, new generation inspection devices might be considered such as fused, multi-threat people screening portals, integrated baggage checks and "smart" video surveillance systems that are capable of facial recognition. Investments in these types of technologies, however, must always be considered in light of what can be reasonably achieved in terms of safeguarding MST and at what expense. Attempting to institute 100 percent security is neither possible nor feasible given the nature and purpose of mass surface transport and the highly open environment in which it operates. Rather, the objective should be the development of a set of counter-terrorist tools to manage risks within acceptable boundaries—measured in relation to both passenger convenience and overall running costs.
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