Flag day bump!
1)Ken Mehlman, Chairman, RNC 310 First Street, SE Washington, DC 20003 (202) 863-8500 E-mail: Info@GOP.com
2) Rush Limbaugh Rush@eibnet.com 1-800-282-2882 (Perhaps 24/7 subscribers can reach him more easily than the rest of us)
3) Hugh Hewitt I have no idea how to reach him
4) Laura Ingraham 1-800-876-4123 E-Mail: http://www.lauraingraham.com/asklaura;jsessionid=4E8ECD3B25E22CA9876319D43F33C1AD
5)Karl Rove: I have no e-mail or phone number Send information by hard mail to the WH?
6) Tony Snow: I have no e-mail or phone number Send information by hard mail to the WH (A few freepers have told me they keep in touch with Tony Snow and perhaps they can help with this)
7) There used to be a blast link where we could enter our zip code and easily send e-mails to our Congressman. Does anyone have that? Do you think e-mails, phone calls or hard letters are more effective?
Other suggestions gratefully accepted.
The links posted below can be cut and pasted in an e-mail or hard copy letter for those folks who are interested in helping with this endeavor.
Thank you for any and all help and suggestions.
I'm with you, and will e-mail as many as I can. If anyone comes up with a "template letter" I'd be very interested in using it.
Thanks for all you do Peach.
Yellow Roses
I suspect there is little political benefit in arguing if we should have liberated Iraq now. The media and the rats think they can win points with it, but the administration clearly thinks the rats are shooting themselves in the foot. Perhaps the administration thinks a vigorous defense of policy is better timed closer to the elections.
I would have hestitated to support the sending in of ground troops if Bush had said that he knew Saddam already had them. Al Qaeda connection trumps WMD
Mark for later.
Great job, Peach! Alot of ammo here.
The left have discredit Laurie Mylroie.
If I use Mylroie's articles to back up my point...they call her a crazy lady.
"She's apart of the neo-cons who wanted to go to war with Iraq."
But the lady makes alot of sense.
Didn't she work with Judith Miller on a book?
Didn't the 911 Families sue the Iraqi Intelligence and al Queda? What happen to that case?
All of these articles and sources need to be sent out to Representatives and Senators of blue and red stripes. Inform the media that they need to show the correct side not just the biased liberal anti-American side. Keep the pressure up!
ping for future reference
as soon as I saw this topic, I clicked on it to see if it was your thread; it was and THANK YOU!
Two things. Enough Dems in high places re: Clinton, Kerry, Gore, KNOW these things. But, they've chosen to smear and lie to gain power. Disgusting. Thank you for all that you have down these past few years and for all that you continue to do!
After Kurdish forces took control of Iraq's three northern provinces following the government's withdrawal in October 1991, numerous opposition groups operated in the region. Islamist political forces in Iraqi Kurdistan, which are exclusively Sunni Muslim, were represented in the Islamic Movement in Kurdistan (IMK), established in 1987. The IMK brought together several factions, some of whose members had fought in Afghanistan during the 1980s. By the mid-1990s the IMK was considered the third most significant political and military force in the Kurdish region, after the KDP and the PUK. After unsuccessfully contesting the 1992 parliamentary elections, the IMK operated largely outside the framework of the joint Kurdish administration, focusing instead on developing and strengthening a separate administrative, political and military infrastructure in areas under its control, notably in Hawraman and Sharazur, which bordered the region controlled by the PUK. In December 1993 tensions between the IMK and the PUK peaked in armed clashes in parts of Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk provinces. The IMK was forced to retreat to areas close to the border with Iran. The leadership left the eastern region altogether and for some months remained under KDP protection in Salahuddin. When increasing tensions between the KDP and the PUK deteriorated into armed clashes in May 1994, IMK forces fought alongside the KDP against the PUK. Eventually, the IMK leadership was able to return to its strongholds in Hawraman and Sharazur, and to establish its headquarters in the city of Halabja.
The IMK splintered over power struggles as well as policy differences. In May 2001 'Ali Bapir, a long-time IMK military commander, announced the formation of the Islamic Group in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Several smaller factions within the IMK, which espoused a more puritanical and ultra-orthodox Islamic ideology, also broke away from the movement at different times. Some opposed any form of cooperation with "secular" political parties and disagreed with the IMK's 1997 decision to participate in the PUK regional government. They also called for stricter application of the shari'a (Islamic law) in IMK-held areas.
Of these factions, the most important militarily was a group known as the Soran Forces. It consisted of several hundred armed fighters (said to include non-Iraqi Arabs), some of who had fought in Afghanistan. A second faction was the Islamic Unification Movement (IUM, or al-Tawhid), said to be the most extremist of the splinter groups. Composed of some thirty or forty individuals, the IUM based itself for a time in Balek, in the Qandil mountains near Haj Omran and close to the Iran border. A third group, Hamas, also opposed the IMK's decision to participate in the PUK regional government. Among its stated aims was to launch attacks on secular institutions in Iraqi Kurdistan, including Western humanitarian and relief organizations.
The emergence of Ansar al-Islam
These smaller breakaway factions themselves gradually merged. In July 2001, al-Tawhid joined with Hamas to form the Islamic Unity Front (IUF), which the Soran Forces also joined the following month. On September 1, 2001, the IUF was dissolved and its three component groups announced the formation of Jund al-Islam. The group promptly declared jihad (holy war) against secular and other political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan deemed to have deviated from the "true path of Islam". Following armed clashes in which the PUK defeated Jund al-Islam, the group was dissolved in December 2001 and renamed Ansar al-Islam. A long-time member of the IMK, Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad, known as Mala Fateh Krekar, became its amir (leader).
Ansar al Islam, which operates in northeastern Iraq, has close links to and support from al-Qaida. Al-Qaida and Usama Bin Laden participated in the formation and funding of the group, which has provided safehaven to al-Qaida in northeastern Iraq.
The group's fighters are also believed to have trained with al-Qaida and U.S. officials suspect it of helping hide al-Qaida members fleeing Afghanistan.
Video about Trainings of Ansar al Islam in Northern Iraq before American Invasion:
http://www.archive.org/details/filmqademminafghanistan
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ansar_al_islam.htm
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/ansarbk020503.htm
http://www.markeichenlaub.blogspot.com is dedicated solely to exposing Saddam's ties to terrorism.
Bookmark
the thing that bothers me the most about this is the Administration's lack of efforts to expose this
Faxes and phone calls are best.
BTT
The White House needs to be out in front on this issue. I've had it with the media, and I don't trust the GOP Congress to carry the White House water.
From 911 Commission Book.
page 66. "...there's no credible evidence of any cooperation between OBL and Saddam.
then to page 128,
They dropped "understanding" from the indictment to what?
"On November 4, 1998, the US Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York unsealed its indictment of Bin Laden, charging him with conpiracy to attack US defense installations. The indictment also charged that al Qaeda had allied itself with Sudan, Iran, and Hezbollah. The orginal sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had "reached an uderstanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq." 109
This passage led Clarke, who for years had read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons, to speculate to Berger that a large Iraqi presence at chemical facilities in Khartoum was "probably a direct result of the Iraq-Al Qida agreement." Clarke added that VX precursor traces found near al Shifa were the "exact formula used by Iraq." 110
This language about al Qaeda's "understanding" with Iraq had been dropped, however, when a superseding indictment was filed in November 1998." 111
References:
#109: Indictment, United States v. Usama Bin Laden, No. 98Cr. (S.D.N.Y. unsealed November 4, 1998), page 3. For the reports concerning Derunta, see NSC membo. Clarke to Berger, Roadmap, Nov 3, 1998.
#110: NSC email, Clarke to Berger, Nove, 1998, Evidence on Iraqi ties to al Qaeda is summarized in Chapter 2.
#111
Patrick Fitzgerald testimony, June 16, 2004
"...One of the hazy questions that surrounds Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda is really its relationship, if any, with Iraq and with Saddam Hussein.
We've often heard that Osama bin Laden would not have been a natural ally, for religious reasons, for the composition and nature of Saddam Hussein's regime. And our staff report, as you just heard, basically says there's no credible evidence of any cooperation between the two. However, there seems to be some indicia that there may have been.
And, Mr. Fitzgerald, I'm delighted you're here, because this first question really I wanted to ask specifically to you, because it relates to the indictment of Osama bin Laden in the spring of 1998.
FIELDING: This is before the U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa and the administration indicted Osama bin Laden. And the indictment, which was unsealed a few months later, reads, "al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government, and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the government of Iraq."
So my question to you is what evidence was that indictment based upon and what was this understanding that's referenced in it?
FITZGERALD: And the question of relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda is an interesting one. I don't have information post-2001 when I got involved in a trial, and I don't have information post-September 11th. I can tell you what led to that inclusion in that sealed indictment in May and then when we superseded, which meant we broadened the charges in the Fall, we dropped that language.
We understood there was a very, very intimate relationship between al Qaeda and the Sudan. They worked hand in hand. We understood there was a working relationship with Iran and Hezbollah, and they shared training. We also understood that there had been antipathy between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein because Saddam Hussein was not viewed as being religious.
We did understand from people, including al-Fadl -- and my recollection is that he would have described this most likely in public at the trial that we had, but I can't tell you that for sure; that was a few years ago -- that at a certain point they decided that they wouldn't work against each other and that we believed a fellow in al Qaeda named Mondu Saleem (ph), Abu Harzai (ph) the Iraqi, tried to reach a, sort of, understanding where they wouldn't work against each other. Sort of, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
And that there were indications that within Sudan when al Qaeda was there -- which al Qaeda left in the summer of '96 or spring '96 -- there were efforts to work on joint -- you know, acquiring weapons.
FITZGERALD: Clearly, al Qaeda worked with the Sudan in getting those weapons in the national defense force there and the intelligence service. There were indications that al-Fadl had heard from others that Iran was involved. And they also had heard that Iraq was involved.
The clearest account from al-Fadl as a Sudanese was that he had dealt directly with the Sudanese intelligence service, so we had first-hand knowledge of that.
We corroborated the relationship with Iran to a lesser extent but to a solid extent. And then we had information from al-Fadl, who we believe was truthful, learning from others that there were also was efforts to try to work with Iraq. That was the basis for what we put in that indictment. Clearly, we put Sudan in the first order at that time as being the partner of al Qaeda.
We understood the relationship with Iran but Iraq, we understood, went from a position where they were working against each other to a standing down against each other. And we understood they were going to explore the possibility of working on weapons together.
That's my piece of what I know. I don't represent to know everything else, so I can't tell you, well, what we've learned since then. But there was that relationship that went from opposing each other to not opposing each other to possibly working with each other.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A46525-2004Jun16?language=printer