Preparing for Bird Flu

Makers of Tamiflu asked to stockpile the bird flu drug

May 27, 2006

Following the deaths of six family members on the island of Sumatra in Indonesia who died of the deadly H5N1 Avian Flu (Bird Flu) virus from human to human transmission, the World Health Organization (WHO), for the first time, has asked the makers of Tamiflu, Roche Holding AG, to be on high alert to stockpile the drug for global distribution in the event a pandemic were to occur.

"Whenever there is a cluster, we contact Roche just to let them know that if we need to send the stockpile that they should be ready to do so," said a spokeswoman for the WHO, Maria Cheng.

"We were quite keen to inform Roche quite timely, we knew Thursday would be a holiday in Europe and wanted to make sure Roche warehouses would be open," said the director of the WHO's rapid response and containment group based in Geneva, Jules Pieters.

Pieters also stated that at least 9,500 doses of Tamiflu were sent to Indonesia as a a precautionary measure along with protective gear on Friday.

However, Cheng says "we have not asked that anything be sent, and nothing from Roche has been sent."

The WHO also says that they have "no intention of shipping that stockpile" and that they consider this "a practice run," said spokesman for the WHO, Dick Thompson. The WHO also said that the virus has not mutated and so far has not shown any signs of human to human transmission outside the affected family members.

Roche Holding is expected to remain on high alert for at least two weeks.

This article is currently a brief. You can help Wikinews by expanding it.

Sources
"WHO puts Roche on Tamiflu alert for Indonesia". Reuters AlertNet, May 27, 2006
Margie Mason "Update 3: WHO Puts Tamiflu Maker on Bird Flu Alert". Forbes, May 27, 2006

This story originally ran at WikiNews.org

Lots of useful info on the subject can be found at pandemicflu.gov.

There's some well researched and documented info there on ways to protect yourself and your family from the very remote likelihood of this disease becoming an actual pandemic.

What isn't there is hysterical warnings from people who don't actually know anything or fear-mongering from producers of poorly written, poorly researched, poorly acted Movies Of The Week.

I hope everyone finds it useful.

L

As long as you are on this thread, there is no reason for any of the regular participants to be here. You have already started with insulting remarks.

Crackpot texpat checking in!

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1453571/posts?q=1&&page=1#1

Thanks for the link.

I'm sorry. I didn't realize you were a movie producer for ABC. I'll be more circumspect in the future.

L

Go ahead. Hijack the thread. Again.

Go ahead. Start calling names and breaking forum rules; again.

L

The thread is all yours. I'm gone.

I'm gone

Would that that were so....

Have a nice day.

L

What isn't there is hysterical warnings from people who don't actually know anything or fear-mongering from producers of poorly written, poorly researched, poorly acted Movies Of The Week.

Yes actually their predictions may be the scariest of all. !--

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Pandemic Planning Assumptions

1.1. Planning Assumptions

1.1.1. Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza virus will be universal.

1.1.2. Efficient and sustained person-to-person transmission signals an imminent pandemic.

1.1.3. The clinical disease attack rate will likely be 30% or higher in the overall population during the pandemic. Illness rates will be highest among school-aged children (about 40%) and decline with age. Among working adults, an average of 20% will become ill during a community outbreak.

1.1.3.1. Some persons will become infected but not develop clinically significant symptoms. Asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic individuals can transmit infection and develop immunity to subsequent infection.

1.1.4. Of those who become ill with influenza, 50% will seek outpatient medical care.

1.1.4.1. With the availability of effective antiviral drugs for treatment, this proportion may be higher in the next pandemic.

1.1.5. The number of hospitalizations and deaths will depend on the virulence of the pandemic virus. Estimates differ about 10-fold between more and less severe scenarios. Two scenarios are presented based on extrapolation of past pandemic experience (Table 1). Planning should include the more severe scenario.

1.1.5.1. Risk groups for severe and fatal infection cannot be predicted with certainty but are likely to include infants, the elderly, pregnant women, and persons with chronic medical conditions.

1.1.6. Rates of absenteeism will depend on the severity of the pandemic.

1.1.6.1. In a severe pandemic, absenteeism attributable to illness, the need to care for ill family members, and fear of infection may reach 40% during the peak weeks of a community outbreak, with lower rates of absenteeism during the weeks before and after the peak.

1.1.6.2. Certain public health measures (closing schools, quarantining household contacts of infected individuals, “snow days”) are likely to increase rates of absenteeism.

1.1.7. The typical incubation period (interval between infection and onset of symptoms) for influenza is approximately 2 days.

1.1.8. Persons who become ill may shed virus and can transmit infection for up to one day before the onset of illness. Viral shedding and the risk of transmission will be greatest during the first 2 days of illness. Children usually shed the greatest amount of virus and therefore are likely to post the greatest risk for transmission.

1.1.9. On average, infected persons will transmit infection to approximately two other people.

1.1.10. In an affected community, a pandemic outbreak will last about 6 to 8 weeks.

1.1.11. Multiple waves (periods during which community outbreaks occur across the country) of illness could occur with each wave lasting 2-3 months. Historically, the largest waves have occurred in the fall and winter, but the seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted with certainty.

Table 1. Number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, and Death Associated with Moderate and Severe Pandemic Influenza Scenarios*

Characteristic	Moderate (1958/68-like)	Severe (1918-like)
Illness	90 million (30%)	90 million (30%)
Outpatient medical care	45 million (50%)	45 million (50%)
Hospitalization	865,000	9,900,000
ICU care	128,750	1,485,000
Mechanical ventilation	64,875	745,500
Deaths	209,000	1,903,000

*Estimates based on extrapolation from past pandemics in the United States. Note that these estimates do not include the potential impact of interventions not available during the 20th century pandemics.

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Thank you

save

What isn't there is hysterical warnings from people who don't actually know anything or fear-mongering from producers of poorly written, poorly researched, poorly acted Movies Of The Week.

Good. Thanks for the link. We have been trying to maintain an atmosphere of reason here. Education, tracking this from various sources, and reasonable preparation--most of which is generic in nature and could apply to any cause of infrastructure disruption.

That disruption does not have to be a pandemic, it could be as mundane as a layoff, (extra groceries take some of the heat off that) or as nasty as Katrina.

Naturally, there will be 'worst-case-scenario pandemic' speculation, (you can't prepare for the worst until you identify it), but that has to be muted with rational risk assessment.

If someone wants to make a movie from one of the worst case scenarios, the acting and plot would really have to struggle to match Hollywood's worst lately. Imo, The Stand would be hard to beat for story, anyway, but all that is a different genre.

I have been offline for a day or so, and I really wish you two would bury the hatchet and not bicker.

You both have valid contributions to make to this topic and everyone would benefit by the absence of flames here.

Just my $.02

Enough of the 'crackpot' comments and the notion that 'people don't believe in Bird Flu'.

This is a serious issue, and whether it becomes a life threatening pandemic or not it remains a striking example of how quickly a disease like this can spread and the consequences it presents for the entire world.

Even if ZERO deaths ever occurred from Bird Flu, we need to take this example and learn from it, not belittle it. Perhaps the monitoring of this flu will help us in the future combating a serious threat.

To date, it does not appear to have a highly effective human to human transmission rate, and recent studies have shown it may need to infect in the deep lung tissue to be transmissable from human to human, which reduces the transmission rate substantially. That can change.

Still, it isn't something to ignore or chuckle about 'tin foil hat' territory.

Have you seen how quickly this has migrated from a few isolated areas in Asia to encompassing almost all of Europe, Asia, and is creeping into Africa? Do you really think the WHO has reported the previous human to human transmission accurately? Asking a company to produce a 'global' stockpile of Tamiflu isn't something that is done casually.

Just because the Bird Flu doesn't wear a turban and shout 'Alluhah Akbar' doesn't mean it is something to dismiss as harmless.

Maybe the 'group think' attitude will change next year when it hits North America.