I don't know of any military logistician who believed the USSR had the logistical power to wage war independent of the Allies during WWII. Additionally, the US did continue to fight, explicitly in the Pacific theater for another 2 years after Germany collapsed and was torn asunder.
The major US strategic objectives had been accomplished at the end of the two wars, and it was strongly believed that a free market and capitalism with overseas bases would dwarf totalitarianism at the end of WWII.
The new strategic and possibly operational weapons were nuclear and the US was leading all others in that category.
Only the US had the industrial might to continue a war effort. USSR did not, unless they had peace and with the case of Stalin, millions of forced laborers to rebuild their basic infrastructure, with millions perishing internally as a consequence of their own efforts.
In regards to 'mass-muder' of civilian populations, I'm a bit confused. How exactly were munition factories and armament product considered peaceful enterprises, void of any military value in Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
You appear to have studied some history. I recommend Isley & Crowl, History of Amphibious Warfare along with the US Army historical publications regarding the battles of the Pacific. The Pacific campaign is probably one of the best documented and most perfect ,ilitary campaigns throughout world history. From a nation that had been attacked as one of seven major surprise coordinated attacks that left Japan in charge of over 50 % of the world's surface, the Allied and US campaigns in the Pacific culminated in a defeat of an enemy that then became our ally and now significant competitor. Few battles, let alone wars have ever been waged which have left so few lingering animosities. Most warborne animosities linger over centuries and up to around five generations. WWII in the Pacific, generally ceased animosity within 25 years or one generation after its conclusion.
This rapid cessation of hostility was in no small part due to an overwhelming display of power in a surgical fashion, but with indubitable consequence.
The same may have also occurred in the USSR, had the peoples of the USSR been allowed to regain the freedom of a democratic republic, rather than being forced into totalitarianism, then socialism for another fifty years.
More important than the type of government, though, would have been the allowance of the Gospel to have been spread to many generations of believers in that region of the world by legitimate authority.
"I don't know of any military logistician who believed the USSR had the logistical power to wage war independent of the Allies during WWII. Additionally, the US did continue to fight, explicitly in the Pacific theater for another 2 years after Germany collapsed and was torn asunder."
In the period between the invasion of the Soviet Union and the end of the war, Stalin had managed to move the great majority of Russian war production over 1,000 miles east over the Ural Mountains, beyond the range of German airpower,and subsequently beyond the reach of the German Army.
Those factories were eventually turning out tanks, aircraft, artillery and small arms on a scale comparable to American factories, and in the case of Soviet tanks, with superior quality and quantiy than American factories. Prior to this, the major American contributions to the Russian war effort were (according the Zhukov himself, no less) the Studebaker 2 1/2-ton truck, 100 octane aviation fuel and waterproof telephone wire.
The Russians did take large numbers of American aircraft (most notably the P-39/400 and the P-40, which no one else relly wanted) early in the war because they were, for the most part, the only aircraft available. With the Russian aircraft industry in disarray after the invasion of the Soviet Union. When Russian industry later got back on it's feet, it produced some of the most fantastic and powerful aircraft of the war, including the Strurmovik (The Flying Tank) and the later-generation YAK and MiG fighters, that were of comparable performance to Allied and German aircraft.
They then somehow managed to ship these thousands of weapons, these thousands of tanks and aircraft to the multiple fronts (the Russian war was one of multiple fronts against the Germans, not one static easily-delineated line), and not only push them out of the Soviet Union, but back into Germany. And with the means to supply troops with everything from boots to bullets, no less.
You cannot do this without the "logistical power to wage war independant of the Allies". The distances involved by themselves bear this out. Once Stalin had a breathing space and his factories re-assembled in safer places, the Russian armaments industry went at it full bore.
I'd also like to point out that not only did the Russians defeat Germany, but with two months were able to supply, equip and transport an army of comparable size to overrun Korea and Manchuria, taking them from Japan. That's shifting equipment and men over 3,000 miles from Europe to Asia to fight. I think that speaks well of the Russian logistical system.
P.S. Russia took a great deal of German industrial plant, equipment and machinery,and (post-War) natural resource production as war reparations.
"The new strategic and possibly operational weapons were nuclear and the US was leading all others in that category."
Nuclear arms were not ready to be mass produced, or at least in numbers large enough to have any noticable effect in a confrontation with Russia c. 1945, to say, 1948/49. I'd have to look this up to be sure , but I believe the number of bombs we were capable of producing at that time was along the lines of perhaps 12 per year, possibly 18 at most.
There was no other delivery system for the weapons except the manned bomber, and in the face of enourmous numbers of good, effective Russian fighters and copious A/A defenses, this was tantamount to a suicide mission. The United States lost 60,000 men in the great bomber campaigns against Germany, alone, for very little obvious return.
"In regards to 'mass-muder' of civilian populations, I'm a bit confused. How exactly were munition factories and armament product considered peaceful enterprises, void of any military value in Hiroshima and Nagasaki?"
Both cities had been singled out for destruction by the atomic bomb when it became ready, and as such, had never been bombed before. If I recall, the only major military target in either city was the 2nd Army HQ in Nagasaki,m and this was mostly an administrative post with few actual combat troops.
As for munitions plants, industrial base, etc, the concept of "strategic bombing" had been around since the 1920's, and got it's first practical application in the Second World War. It fell far short of the promise it held (or rather the promises made by it's proponents), as articulated by people like Billy Mitchell and H.G. Wells. The fact of the matter was that the technology of the day could not provide the precision necessary to make the concept work. The very inprecision of the weapon itself guarenteed loss of innocentlife.
It took the Germans exactly 60 days during the Battle of Britain to realize this and had not one of their pilots made the mistake of bombing London instead of the nearby airfields, the switch to the bombing of civilian areas was all but a foregone conclusion, waiting only for the order from Goering. It took the RAF about 30 days to question the concept and then discard it altogether, especially for night-time raids. No one in WWII practiced "strategic bombing" both sides practiced terror bombing of civilian populations, justifying it with quaint notions like "every apartment block destroyed displaces 4 German workers with a resulting loss of productivity" (that's a direct quote from "Bomber" Harris, btw).
For the investment made in strategic bombing, the return was simply not worth the cost. Post-War bombing surveys concluded that had the Allies gone after the RIGHT targets (Germany's electrical generation and distribution network) they could have achieved the same effect with a fraction of the casualties and loss of aircraft.
Japanese industry by the middle of 1945 was finsihed. It no longer had the fuel or materials to continue producing anything, especially in a country that was starving. While Japanese industry was quite resourceful in making use of whatever stockpiles and domestic supplies they could lay hands to, it would never be enough to break the American naval and air blockade surrounding Japan.
Surrender was a foregone conclusion, in my opinion, given enough time. The bomb certainly made the decision as to when the war would end, it did not make a difference as to how. I say that because even if you believe the nonsense about "Unconditional Surrender" you'll note that Japan was able to negotiate quite a few conditions, unofficially.
"You appear to have studied some history"
I hold a MA in Western Civ and am currently completing my doctorate (I've been competing it for two years now! LOL. If I didn't have to work for a living I'd have it already!)
The HIstory of Warfare is one of my special interests, specially the Second World War. I'm fascinated by it. I also served in the United States Navy, and three generations of Wombat's were US Marines before that (one fought at Chateau Theirry, another went ashore at Tulagi and Peleliu and one fought at Khe Sahn). I know my wars.
"This rapid cessation of hostility was in no small part due to an overwhelming display of power in a surgical fashion, but with indubitable consequence."
The rapid cessation of hostility was due to both sides being almost totally exhausted by war. Interesting fact: 3/4 of the Japanese army remained unengaged by any allied force of consequence, mostly outside of Japan proper. Two million-plus men in China alone. In terms of manpower, Japan had the wherewithal to continue to fight, but did not have the means to resupply, transport or feed those troops. By 1945 the Allies (with the exception of the Russians) are scraping the bottom of the barrel for manpower.
"The same may have also occurred in the USSR, had the peoples of the USSR been allowed to regain the freedom of a democratic republic, rather than being forced into totalitarianism, then socialism for another fifty years."
You assume that the people of the Soviet Union then (as now) actually KNEW what freedom was, previously had it, or would know what to do with it when given it, let alone want it. You disregard Russian culture, which for 1,000 years was nothing but a cycle of serfdom and totalitarian rulers. Freedom (and the associated concepts of equality under law, private property and the "unwritten" societal laws attendent to a democratic society) is not a concept the Russian culture embraces or understands easily (just look at what's happened since 1991), because it never existed in any meaningful sense. Ever.
Democracy in Eastern Europe was also in it's infancy. Most of the pre-war "democratic nations" of Eastern Europe having not existed prior to 1918, with the exception of Poland (which alternated between existence and non-existance for a few hundred years). Almost all are the result of the breaking up of the great European empires (Austria-Hungary, Germany/Prussia, the Ottoman Empire)at the end of WWI, all of which (the Empires) were anything but democratic. Like Russia, there is very little democratic tradition in Eastern Europe or the Balkan States (except for Greece, of course!).
"More important than the type of government, though, would have been the allowance of the Gospel to have been spread to many generations of believers in that region of the world by legitimate authority."
The region we're talking about is, of course, the old stomping grounds of the Greek Orthodox church, creation of the Byzantine (late Roman) Empire. The place where Constantine teh Great (who put Christianity on the map) built his new Capital (Constantinople) and which for centuries made the Church of Rome seem like Florida Marlins to it's New York Yankees. The Byzantines and the Greek Orthodox church are responsible for Christianity taking root and surviving in Eastern Europe, Asia Minor, the Balkans and Russia; and that's in the face of invasions from everyone from Ghengis Khan, to the Ottomans to Napoleon to the Germans. That's over 1,500 years of Christian tradition, the glue of modern Eastern European culture, in many ways.
Even when Communism outlawed the church, the Soviet State did not cross the line and outright disband the church, even when declaring it outlaw. I don't believe there was a lack of Christian faith evident at all. Even Stalin allowed open prayer and worship in Russia's darkest days.