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Obviously, any army can be defeated. I should think that would have been self-evident.

The discussion was about the prospects for success had George Patton been ordered (or as many here seem to think, if he'd been ALLOWED) to instigate a war against Russia after the defeat of Germany. It's generally assumed that Patton's mission would not be just kicking the Russians back into the Soviet Union, but a victory against the Russians in a way that would preclude the Cold War. This would have to entail an outright defeat of the Soviet Union (invasion and occupation of at least the majority of Western Soviet territory and resources). Of course, this is only possible with hindsight: in 1945 no one would have thought of "Cold War", the Berlin Wall, or Vietnam. I that regard, the scenario is not quite fair.

However, assuming that we could magically attribute what we know is hindsight as foresight to American military and political leaders of the day, Patton in 1945, with what he had to hand and with the difficulties he would have faced would have most likely (I say definitely) lost any conflict with the Soviet Union.

This assesment is not made on the basis of general quality of troops on a man-to-man level. Your American soldier of 1945 was just as tough and dedicated as his Russian counterpart. However, you have to take several other factors into consideration:

1. Relative numbers - In terms of manpower, Patton is vastly outnumbered by the Soviet Armies he will face. He has no Eurpoean ally capable of helping make up this gap in any signifgant way. The American armed forces at this time are still fighting the Japanese, and Patton cannot expect signifigant reinforcements from the Pacific Theatre. He does have several advantages: his troops generally have better support from artillery, armor and artillery (and he's outnumbered in these weapons as well), and his commanders have a freedom of action that their Soviet counterparts do not. However, you have to ask the basic question: is one American soldier, taking into consideration these advatanges equal to two Soviets? Three? Ten? It is generally recognized (I could give you the exact figures and sources, but I'm lazy at the moment, if you want them, I can get them within a couple of days) that the German Army registered a 15-to-1 kill ratio over the Soviet Army, and they were still outnumbered. And they still lost.

America in 1945 had 16 million troops in uniform (Army, AAF, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, Merchant Marines and a slew of Military/Civilian services), and was scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel as early as 1944. The United States had no more soldiers to send, not with the expected invasion of Japan expected to require upwards of 1.5 million troops.

None of this, of course, begins to discuss relative quality of weapons and equipment. Too long a discussion to get into here, but again, we have to ask: Is one P-51 equal to 5 MiGs? How many Shermans to a T-34? etc.

2- Logistics - Patton is dependant upon a supply line that begins in the Continental United States. This is a 4,000 mile long supply line. Soviet forces are, for all intents and purposes, enjoying interior lines of supply. It's a shorter distance Berlin-to-the-Urals than it is Boston-to-Berlin. While Patton's supply lines are secure (there is no Soviet Navy worth the name to interdict his SLOC's, he has a variety of relatively-convenient European ports to unload from, etc), they are extended and it will require just as many logistical resources to support the basic logistical effort, as it will his Armies. At some point, this pays diminishing returns (the campaign across France supplied by the Red Ball Express showed this in painful detail. The problem would have been roughly similar).

3. Geography - Assuming Patton solves these problems or can at least manage them, he has clear sailing right across Germany and the Eastern European plains until he begins hitting natural barriers: The first major ones are the Oder and Vistula Rivers in Eastern Germany and Poland, respectively. Pass these barriers and the Ukranian plains are wide open, until you reach the confluence of the Don and Volga rivers (the Pripet marshes), at least. This area is impassible to armor and mechanized forces (the Germans hated it with a passion). If you get past this natural barrier, you then run smack into the Ural mountains.

Now, something that is generally disregarded in discussions of the German campaigns in Western Russia is the vast area that needs to be secured. Once you get through the Ukraine, the Russian landmass opens,like a fan, from the Baltic States all the way to the Crimea. The Germans found they simply did not have enough grunts to hold enough of this territory to make it secure, so they relied on mobile "Flying Columns" to patrol large areas between strategic points. It didn't work all that well. The Russians were very good at exploiting the gaps presented by too small a force holding too large an area.

Conversely, the Russians could, if they were being beaten or outmanuevered, trade space for time, which is what they did against the Germans, sucking the German army deeper into the interior of Russia, extending the enemy's supply lines, causing him to use up readily-available supplies in simple movement from point to point, in skirmishes and holding actions, and not in the taking and holding of ground or in engaging major Soviet forces. Then, at a time and place of their own choosing, the Red Army would unleash an overwhelming counterattack from prepared positions, and on the exposed flanks of their enemy.

This, of course, does not take into account the weather (neither did the Germans). In the spring and fall (due to heavy rains and the spring thaw), the Ukranian and Russian plains become a sea of thick mud (known to the Russians as the Rasputitsa) that is virtually impassable. The Rasputitsa slows an enemy down (especially a mechanized enemy) and after the fall rains, the Russian Winter freezes him in place. For months.

If George S.Patton, as brilliant as he could have been could have overcome these problems he would be rightly hailed as the Greatest Military Commander of All-Time. Relaistically, though, it was a very tall order, almost impossible in the face of a foe who could fight just as well as we could and who had the means to do it with.

Even Patton could not do the impossible. Past commanders, most notably Alexander and Ghenghis Khan, took larger geographic areas with smaller forces, they also had several other factors in their favor that Patton would not enjoy: his enemy is expecting him, his enemy is not a foreign culture unfamiliar with the Western way of war, it's tactics, and it's effects, the enemy is not a disjointed, politically diverse coalition, it is a unified country with a common ideology and strategic goal. That'll do for a start.

Atomic bombs do not even begin to equal the score in this regard. We could have nuked the Russian cities and factories, but we would not have been able to physically conquer the Soviet Union, which is what it would require if the Cold War and it's consequences are to be avoided completely (our original war aim, remember?).

Had the situation been reversed, say with a Soviet Army having to fight in North America rather than Americans in Europe, they would have encountered the same problems and would probably have lost in just as severe a fashion.