Fedora,
For historical refrence see my post #1701 (re Vince C.)
April 23, 2006 -- THE best prop at the party for Sen. Ted Kennedy and his new book, "America, Back on Track," was a special clock historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. showed to former President Bill Clinton that counts down the days, hours and minutes until President Bush leaves office.
Clinton entertained a circle of Dems at the Parker Meridien Hotel by announcing there were about a thousand days "left to suffer." All three of Kennedy's sisters - Jean Kennedy Smith, Eunice Shriver and, in a wheelchair, ailing Patricia Lawford - made a rare appearance together and joined the cheering when Ted, who rushed in after taping Larry King and Jon Stewart, said, "I've been a senator for 44 years and will stay till I get the hang of it."
He said he was a "politician of hope, and the current Rove White House is all about the politics of fear, and it is all eventually catching up with them."
Caroline Kennedy Schlossberg and Kennedy's wife, Vicky, hosted such guests as former Treasury Secretary Bob Rubin, George Stevens, Joe Armstrong, Bob Schrum and Sen. John Kerry."
Part I: Iran/contra: The Underlying Facts
North requested Secord to travel to Europe to help arrange the necessary flight clearances. On Tuesday, November 19, North gave a letter to Secord on White House letterhead, signed by North for McFarlane. Secord arrived in Europe on Wednesday, November 20. North also discussed the situation with his friend Duane Clarridge, a senior CIA operations officer. Clarridge told North that the CIA could help gain overseas flight clearances. On the evening of November 19, North met with Clarridge and Vincent Cannistraro, a CIA operations officer temporarily assigned to the NSC, to discuss the flight clearances problem.
The only testimony linking the President to Casey's purported decision to install North as the action officer for the contras was the hearsay testimony of CIA official Vincent Cannistraro at the North trial. Testifying as a defense witness, Cannistraro described a series of meetings in the spring and summer of 1984 in which he said the ``hand off'' to North was effected. Cannistraro said in June 1984 in a meeting in Casey's office attended by Duane R. (Dewey) Clarridge, then head of the CIA's Latin American Operations Division; Joseph F. Fernandez, then an officer in the CIA's Central American Task Force; and contra leader Adolfo Calero, Casey had told Calero that "speaking on behalf of the President of the United States, [Casey] wanted to assure the freedom fighters [the contras] that the United States government would find a way to continue its support to the freedom fighters after the 30th of September, 1984, if the Boland Amendment became part of the operational restrictions against the involvement of the CIA."18. . . Independent Counsel was unable to corroborate Cannistraro's testimony.
The Cannistraro Question
In the spring and summer of 1986, Gates became involved in a debate over what role Vincent Cannistraro, a CIA officer detailed to the NSC, should play in the $100 million contra program that was expected to take effect in October 1986. There was concern that if Cannistraro replaced North, the CIA would be drawn into North's contra supply activities. Gates discussed Cannistraro's assignment with a number of CIA and NSC personnel, including Fiers, Clair E. George, and Poindexter. Gates met with Cannistraro himself in an attempt to resolve the situation. OIC's inquiry focused on whether Gates, in the course of these discussions, learned about North's role in contra operations.
By the time Gates became DDCI, Fiers was chief of the CIA's Central American Task Force (CATF). Fiers ran the CIA's support for the Nicaraguan contras and planned for the day when the CIA would again be allowed to provide lethal support to the insurgents. Fiers did not readily share information about his unit's operations in Nicaragua. This had led to complaints with the CIA's intelligence analysis directorate. 20
20 One of the protesters was Robert Vickers, the CIA's national intelligence officer for Latin America from July 1984 to November 1987. Vickers told Gates that Fiers was not keeping him informed about the contras. (Vickers, FBI 302, 4/28/87, p. 4; Kerr, FBI 302, 7/31/91, p. 6.) Vickers did not remember this meeting with Gates in his most recent interview. (Vickers, FBI 302, 5/15/91, p. 5.) Vickers also complained to Cannistraro about being cut out of the new interagency group on Nicaragua, and asked Cannistraro to assist him in getting into the group. Cannistraro brought up Vickers's concern with Gates in a meeting at Gates's office. Cannistraro told Gates that Vickers ``was very knowledgeable and was a real student of Central America,'' and he recommended that Vickers be included in meetings of the new interagency group. (Cannistraro, FBI 302, 7/24/91, p. 9.) A PROFs note from Cannistraro to Rodney McDaniel, Executive Secretary of the NSC, corroborates Cannistraro's efforts to get Vickers involved and Cannistraro's meeting with Gates. (PROFs Note from Cannistraro to McDaniel, 7/21/86, AKW 022235.)
According to both Fiers and Gates, Gates's role in the contra program increased significantly once he became DDCI. Fiers testified Gates became ``intricately involved'' in developing policy and coordinating interagency work on the contras. Fiers dealt with Gates on requests from the NSC and on structural discussions with other Executive Branch agencies about the contra program. Fiers kept Gates informed ``generally, on our state of planning and the nature of our operations.'' Fiers met with Gates regularly and weekly.21
21 Fiers, Grand Jury, 8/14/91, pp. 44-45; Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, pp. 12-14.
Fiers testified that he did not lay out to Gates his extensive knowledge about North's activities.22 From two events, however, Fiers concluded that Gates too was aware of North's operational role with the contras. The first incident involved Cannistraro, who had been Fiers's predecessor as chief of CATF.
22 Fiers's knowledge of North's contra-resupply activities is discussed more fully in the Fiers chapter.
Cannistraro, then detailed to the NSC, was nominally in charge of monitoring all U.S. covert-action programs. By June 1986, North's operational activities caused Cannistraro concern.23 In mid-1986, media reports repeated earlier assertions that North was linked to contra military aid. As an important House vote on renewed contra aid approached, on June 24, 1986, a resolution of inquiry was introduced in the House to inquire about North's activities. On June 25, after the House approved a $100 million military and humanitarian aid package, Representatives Lee Hamilton and Dante Fascell wrote the President for comment on the resolution of inquiry; that night, CBS News ran a program that expressly linked North to the private contra-aid network.
23 Cannistraro, FBI 302, 9/18/90, p. 2; Cannistraro, FBI 302, 7/24/91, p. 9.
On June 26, Cannistraro suggested in a computer note to Poindexter that the new contra-aid program should be a ``regularized C[overt] A[ction] program which would normally fall under my responsibility.'' Poindexter agreed in a computer note sent to NSC Executive Secretary Rodney McDaniel that same day:
Yes, I would like to regularize it. The Vince-Ollie relationship would be the same as between Vince and Howard [Teicher, another NSC staffer] on Afghanistan. Ollie will have mixed reactions. He has wanted CIA to get back on the management of the problem and we need to lower Ollie's visibility on the issue. Talk to him about it and I will follow up when I get back.24
24 Cannistraro, FBI 302, 9/18/90, p. 3; PROFs Note from Cannistraro to McDaniel, 6/26/86, AKW 019032; PROFs Note from Poindexter to McDaniel, 6/26/86, AKW 021436.
Fiers recalled Cannistraro's move to take the contra program away from North, as well as Poindexter's concerns about North's program. The question of who would run the anticipated contra-aid program was important to Fiers and the CIA. Fiers had been planning the CIA's program ``in earnest.'' According to Fiers, Gates was intimately involved in structuring the new program, both within the CIA and the Executive Branch as a whole. Gates admitted he was aware that Poindexter had been contemplating changes in who oversaw contra issues at the NSC.25
25 Fiers, Grand Jury, 8/14/91, pp. 53-57; Gates, FBI 302, 5/15/87, pp. 4-5; Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, pp. 103-04.
In the midst of the struggle over who would run the contra-aid program, Cannistraro visited Gates at his office. Cannistraro told Independent Counsel that he came to express his desire to return to the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO).26 Gates promised to urge the directorate to take Cannistraro back. But soon Cannistraro's future became an item on the agenda for one of Gates' weekly meetings with Poindexter. On July 10, 1986, Paul Kinsinger, an aide to Gates, sent Gates a memorandum that stated:
26 Cannistraro claimed that he had long-standing differences with DO chief Clair George, which is why Cannistraro went to Gates. (Cannistraro, FBI 302, 7/24/91, p. 6; see also Gates, FBI 302, 5/15/87, p. 4; Gates, Grand Jury, 5/1/91, pp. 83-84.)
Vince Cannistraro called to say that Poindexter wanted to discuss how we are going to coordinate the Nicaragua program. Attached is a short memo to you from the Director, you may recall, that lays out the Director's views.
Vince also said that Poindexter would want to know whether Ollie North should be involved. Peggy [Donnelly, a CIA officer assigned to the DCI-DDCI executive offices] checked with the DO and they say yes.27
27 Note for ADCI, Subject: Late Item for Poindexter Meeting, 7/10/86, ER 27199-206.
The DO officer mentioned in Kinsinger's memo was Fiers. Fiers recalled that he specifically talked about Cannistraro's duties with Gates. Fiers was concerned that having Cannistraro in the management of the new program would bring a CIA officer ``into the proximity of operations that I knew to go on, that were someplace we didn't want CIA officers to be.'' Fiers recalled voicing this concern not only to Gates, but to George and Casey as well.28
SNIP
On July 10, 1986, Gates raised the Cannistraro issue with Poindexter. Gates wrote after their meeting:
"I followed up on Vince Cannistraro's assignment. Poindexter clearly wants to keep Vince indefinitely and while I told him that Clair did not have to have a final answer before the end of August, his reaction strongly suggested to me that he will keep Vince there. I also repeated our concern that should Vince take over the Central American account, that he should have nothing to do as a CIA employee with the private sector people Ollie North had been dealing with in support of the Contras."
Cannistraro remained at the NSC,30 and was not transferred.
SNIP
Gates acknowledged that he might have raised the Cannistraro issue with Fiers, but he did not recall it. He did not recall any conversations with Fiers and he claimed not to recall any recommendation from Fiers one way or the other.32
SNIP
Given the accusations swirling about North's support of the contra rebels, and the prospect of a formal Congressional inquiry into North's actions, Gates must have been concerned about the nature of his activities as a threat to the planned resumption of support to the CIA. It was, however, also politically wise to keep Cannistraro away from any activities that resembled North's. Independent Counsel did not believe that provable evidence of Gates's awareness of North's operational activities would sustain a prosecution for his denials to the Select Committees or to OIC.
SNIP
The most direct evidence that North told Clarridge prior to November 24, 1985, that the shipment contained weapons is the testimony of CIA official Vincent Cannistraro. In November 1985, Cannistraro was a career CIA officer who had been detailed to the NSC where he served as director of intelligence programs.
SNIP
Cannistraro, Vincent -- 14, 203, 227-230, 253, 254, 276