Americans Must Maintain Resolve to Win Long War, General Says
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 20, 2006 – Extremists cannot hope to match the United States and its coalition allies in battle, but that might not matter at all. Al Qaeda and like terrorist groups understand that they only have to win the battle for American resolve to be successful, a top military strategy official said.
Americans are an impatient people, and that impatience will work against final victory in what many people are now calling "the Long War," Army Brig. Gen. Robert L. Caslen Jr. , the Joint Staff's director of strategy for the global war on terrorism, said in an interview.
The Long War is more than just the battle in Iraq or Afghanistan, and calling the struggle the Long War does not mean that U. S. troops will be in those nations for a long time. Rather, is the term refers to the overall struggle against the ideology of extremism, the general explained.
Defeating an ideology is tough and will require time and resources to win, Caslen said. Defeating the appeal of fascism took almost 25 years. The appeal of this "ism" began soon after World War I ended and was not defeated until the Allies defeated the Nazis in 1945. Defeating the ideology of communism took most of the 20th century and the long-term resolve of the Cold War.
The United States has proven it can maintain this resolve. The Cold War against an expansionist Soviet Union began soon after World War II ended and ran through the implosion of the nation in 1991. The temperature of the Cold War heated and cooled through the era -- hotter in Korea, Berlin and Vietnam -- but the core of the struggle remained, and it was the grandchildren of those who began the struggle who reaped its benefits.
It will be the same with extremism and terrorism, Caslen said. Americans must retain that resolve and commitment as the war on terrorism continues, he said.
The terrorists have a battle plan, just as Adolph Hitler did. And like Hitler did in "Mein Kampf," al Qaeda and affiliated groups have published their strategic goals, Caslen said.
Their first goal is to drive America from Iraq and establish Islamic authority in the country. This would give the extremists a base to operate from and would help in their second goal, which is to go after and defeat all neighboring "apostate" states -- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Turkey, Syria, Iran and Jordan. These countries, terrorist groups have claimed, have abandoned Islamic ideals.
The third step is to destroy Israel. The fourth step would be to establish a Caliphate -- a government under a supreme religious ruler -- stretching from Central Asia to the Atlantic.
"Could it happen?" Caslen asked. "Yes. If we lose our resolve. "
Studies have shown that it takes on average nine years to successfully put down an insurrection, the general said. Studies have also shown that the American peoples' support begins to wane after about three years, he said. Through American history the three-year mark seems to be important.
In 1864, after three years of battles and lengthening casualty lists in the U. S. Civil War, a large peace group blossomed throughout the North.
After three years of war in the 1950s, the United States pushed for an armistice to end fighting on the Korean Peninsula.
In 1968, three years after the first major U. S. combat units landed near Da Nang, South Vietnam, the peace movement in the United States significantly matured.
"So if it takes nine years to overcome an insurrection but the American people only have three years of patience, that leaves you a six-year gap," Caslen said.
Convincing Americans to maintain their resolve becomes a strategic necessity. "Americans would be much more patient with this struggle if they understood what the implications are," Caslen said.
Caslen wondered aloud what the effect on the West would be if extremists were to be successful in their goals. "How would life change? Could free and democratic societies survive? Even if they could, life would be completely different," he said.
Countries would have to curtail freedoms, Caslen said, because if such enemies got weapons of mass destruction they would threaten much of the world. "Osama bin Laden said that it is the religious duty of all Muslims to acquire weapons of mass destruction and use them against the 'infidel,'" Caslen said. "If (bin Laden) had the chance to use asymmetric threats and kill 3 million people instead of 3,000 (on Sept. 11, 2001,) he would have. "
A war of ideas exists within Islam between the small numbers of extremists and the vast moderate majority, Caslen said. American strategy, therefore, needs to concentrate on defeating not only extremists in arms, but stopping people from joining extremist organizations.
U. S. strategy has to be aimed at improving conditions around the world so the percentage of those who believe in such extremism shrinks. "Even if just one percent of Muslims worldwide believe in the extremist, terrorist interpretation of Islam, that's 12 million people," Caslen said.
Biography:
Brig. Gen. Robert L. Caslen Jr. , USA
News Archive
Tlatelolco Massacre - The Secret
Archives:
Courtesy of the U.S. National
Security Archive
Document 1
3/28/68
CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate
Security Conditions in Mexico
Secret
In preparation for a visit to Mexico City by Vice
President Hubert Humphrey, the CIA issues a
special assessment of security conditions in
Mexico. Written several months before the first
serious wave of student demonstrations began,
the document describes the country as a model of
stability, with President Diaz Ordaz firmly in
control and a ruling party which “virtually
monopolizes Mexican politics.”
Document 2
7/19/68
CIA Weekly Summary
Student Unrest Troubles Mexico
Secret
When students launch a series of country-wide
protests in July, initial U.S. reporting out of Mexico
alerts Washington to several issues that come up
again and again in subsequent documents: the
potential danger posed by the strikes to the
Olympic Games, their political significance, and
the role of the “international” left. This CIA
analysis discusses Cuban influence on a student
strike at the University of Veracruz. Demonstrators
seek to disrupt the Olympic games, although the
PRI electoral fraud in local and gubernatorial
elections also may serve as cause for further
unrest.
Document 3
7/31/68
White House memorandum
Student Disturbances in Mexico City (7/30/68 U.S.
Embassy cable attached, untitled)
Secret, Bowdler to LBJ
Mexican authorities claim to have "solid
evidence" that the Mexican Communist Party,
with Soviet complicity, engineered the July 26 riot.
The U.S. Embassy does not have corroborating
evidence, but suggests that Moscow may have
ordered riot to counteract impact of events in the
Czechoslovakia.
Document 4
8/2/68
CIA Weekly Summary
Students Stage Major Disorder in Mexico
Secret
The July 26 riot provides a classic example of
Communist agitation techniques. Document
questions Mexican claims of Soviet complicity,
however, as USSR does not want to undermine its
good relations with Mexico.
Document 5
c. 8/15/68
DIA Intelligence Information Report
Troops Used to Help Quell Mexico City Student Riots
Confidential
Report provides a chronological account of
Mexican military involvement in disbanding
student protests in Mexico City during the week of
July 29. While the report states that the military
performed "creditably,” it also notes some charges
of “over-reaction,” such as the alleged “hazing” of
students inside one school. The Mexican
Government denies reports that 4 students were
killed during the disturbances. Generals Mazon
and Ballasteros head a special military “Task
Force” to deal with the situation of unrest.
Document 6
8/23/68
CIA Weekly Review
Mexican Government in a Quandary Over Student Crisis
Top Secret
CIA says the Mexican Government may be
underestimating students’ ability to continue
large-scale, disciplined demonstrations. The
present impasse is due to the Government's belief
that a) giving in to students would invite further
demands and b) ignoring situation most likely will
lead to further disruption. Document claims that
Communist youths are involved in the crisis. CIA
says that further violent outbreaks can be
expected.
Document 7
8/29/68
White House message
Student Situation in Mexico (8/29/68 U.S. Embassy
cable attached, Student Situation)
Confidential, Rostow to LBJ
Rostow reports to President Johnson that the
Mexican Government's conciliatory strategy has
not quelled student disturbances, and a return to a
"get-tough, no-nonsense posture" is inevitable.
Rostow claims that while the violence is not likely
to affect Diaz Ordaz's administration, it will no
doubt affect the Olympics in a negative manner.
Document 8
8/30/68
CIA Intelligence Information Cable
Mexican Military Alert for Possible Cuban Infiltration of
Arms Destined for Student Use
[Classification excised]
CIA source claims that Cuba is prepared to
smuggle arms to students for September
demonstrations in Mexico. In response, Mexican
Navy and army troops along the coast are put on
high alert.
Document 9
9/6/68
CIA Weekly Summary
Mexican Government Stalls Student Movement
Secret
While the Mexican Government has made minor
concessions to protesting students, the approach
of the Olympics will most likely lead the Diaz
Ordaz administration to meet further
demonstrations with very tough measures.
Document 10
9/9/68
CIA Intelligence Information Cable
Situation Appraisal: Status of the Mexico City Student
Movement
[Classification excised]
Cable states that students are increasingly
organized, and able to exercise some influence on
national affairs. The Mexican Government has not
been unified in action against the protesters, and
President Diaz Ordaz continues to avoid becoming
personally involved. While no hard evidence exists
that Cubans or Soviets masterminded the student
demonstrations, the Mexican Government
continues to inspire such rumors. Cable concludes
that “the old order is passing” and the PRI has lost
control over public behavior.
Document 11
9/13/68
CIA Weekly Summary
Mexican Students Still Spar with Government
Secret
CIA refers to the Mexican Government's "behind
the scenes maneuvering to divide the students,"
including efforts by the officially-inspired
"committee of the authentic student body" to
quash future student strikes.
Document 12
9/19/68
White House message
Untitled
Confidential, Rostow to LBJ
Rostow alerts President Johnson to the military's
decision to occupy UNAM in response to the
student strike and take-over of university
buildings.
Document 13
9/24/68
DIA Intelligence Information Report
Army Intervenes on Additional Occasions in Mexico City
Student Situation
Confidential
Report states that Mexican Army troops were
again employed to disperse protesting students,
from 8/28 into the month of September. The
period marked the first known involvement of
troops from outside Mexico City, indicating the
increasing seriousness of the matter. The
September 18 occupation of UNAM also indicates
that the position of the Mexican Government is
hardening.
Document 14
9/26/68
FBI memorandum
Olympic Games, Mexico City, Mexico: October 12-27,
1968
Confidential, Sullivan to Wannall
FBI goes on alert for movement of “U.S.
subversive elements” into Mexico, which the
agency believes may try to disrupt Olympics and
participate in student uprisings.
Document 15
9/27/68
CIA Weekly Review
Violence Grows in Mexican Student Crisis
Top Secret
CIA reports “stresses” on and within the Mexican
political establishment stemming from student
unrest and the increasingly violent confrontations
between protesters and the Mexican security
forces.
Document 16
9/27/68
White House memorandum
Security Considerations in Mr. Nixon’s Planned Visit to
Mexico (9/26/68 CIA intelligence estimate attached,
with cover memo)
Secret, Rostow to LBJ
CIA expresses concerns about security conditions
in Mexico and suggests that Nixon cancel his plans
to visit Mexico during the Olympics. If he does go,
the CIA document warns, Mexican security forces
would have hard time protecting him, and
"anti-U.S. extremists" would cause "some nasty
incidents."
Document 17
c. 10/1/68
FBI letter
Olympic Games, Mexico City, Mexico - October 12-27,
1968
Confidential
Document discusses potential threats to the
Olympic games. These include individual US
citizens with histories of subversive activity and
anti-Castro Cubans, who are expected to try and
harass Cuban athletes during the games. The FBI
urges that information about potential subversives
be provided to the U.S. and Mexican
Governments.
Document 18
10/4/68
CIA Weekly Summary
A Renewed Violence in Mexico
Secret
New violence (Tlatelolco) puts Government of
Mexico’s ability to safeguard Olympics in jeopardy.
All military zone commanders have been granted
the authority to "move against disorderly
students."
Document 19
10/5/68
White House memorandum
Mexican Riots - Extent of Communist Involvement
(10/5/68 CIA memorandum and 10/5/68 FBI cable
attached)
Secret, Rostow to LBJ
CIA concludes that recent student unrest was
sparked by domestic conditions. Cuban and Soviet
involvement was limited to moral and some
financial support. The FBI reports
Communist/Trotskyist groups formed the
Olympia Brigade, a "shock group" which allegedly
initiated the shooting at Tlatelolco on 10/2.
Document 20
10/8/68
FBI cable
Olympic Games, Mexico City, Mexico, October Twelve -
Twenty Seven, Nineteen Sixty Eight
Confidential, Director FBI to LEGAT Mexico City
To protect U.S. athletes during the Olympics, the
FBI must establish a liaison in the U.S. Embassy
for channeling information to U.S. Olympic team
officials regarding safety concerns. Cable
emphasizes the necessity of concealing the FBI's
role to avoid jeopardizing ongoing FBI operations
in Mexico.
Document 21
c. 10/8/68
CIA report
Answers to Questions Raised by White House
Concerning Student Disturbances in Mexico (10/9/68
White House cover memorandum attached)
Secret, Lewis to Rostow
CIA addresses issues raised by FBI sources and
concludes a) no evidence exists of significant
foreign influence in riots, b) external influences
included moral support and some financial
support, but not the supply of weapons, and c) the
Trotskyist “Brigada Olympia” was developed with
the intentions of interfering with the Olympic
games.
Document 22
10/12/68
Department of State telegram
Untitled [Mexico Riots] (10/14/68 White House cover
memorandum attached)
Confidential
The U.S. Embassy states that, contrary to official
Mexican reports, direct foreign involvement in the
student uprisings has been "essentially negligible."
Rather, newer and more extreme student
elements are responsible for the continued unrest
and riots such as that which occurred at Tlatelolco
on 10/2. The Mexican Government has increased
military pressure with the intention of seizing the
leaders of the extremist student groups.
Document states that the foreign influence
argument has been used by the Mexican
Government to divert attention away from deep
local problems.
Document 23
10/18/68
DIA Intelligence Information Report
Army Participation in Student Situation, Mexico City
Confidential
Report provides a chronological account of the
Army's role in controlling student uprisings from
9/24 through 10/18. With regards to Tlatelolco,
report states that on 9/30, troops withdrew from
the UNAM campus, which they had occupied since
9/18. Also on 9/30, the Mexican Defense Minister
instructed military zone commanders throughout
the country to move against student disturbances
"without waiting for instructions." Report provides
a key overview of the events of 10/2 at Tlatelolco
and the days immediately following.
Document 24
10/22/68
DIA Intelligence Information Report
Mexican Army Preparations to Cope with Future Student
Disturbances in Mexico City
Confidential
Following the close of the Olympic games and the
expected return of students to classes, the
Mexican military expects a resurgence in student
protest activity. To counter possible future
violence, the military is training two special
1,500-man units, one of which carries the name
"Brigada Olympia."
Document 25
10/23/68 DIA Intelligence Information Report
Status of Brig. Gen. Jose Hernandez Toledo
Confidential
Gen. José Hernández Toledo, wounded at
Tlatelolco, is recovering at a Mexican military
hospital. A source tells the DIA that the Mexican
Army “had taken good care” of the 18 foreigners
(including some Cubans) involved in the events at
Tlatelolco. When asked to clarify, the source said
"good care" meant detention.
Document 26
11/1/68 CIA Weekly Summary
Mexican Government Readies for More Student Trouble
Secret
Although it is unclear whether students will
continue the strike, this document suggests that
the "new left" (extremists) within the student
movement seek to prolong the unrest and
continue their provocations against the Mexican
Government. Mexican officials are preparing for
future violence.
Document 27
c. 11/15/68
INR Working Draft (extract)
Student Violence and Attitudes in Latin America
Confidential
According to this draft analysis of student unrest in
Latin America, the disorders in Mexico are the
worst in the hemisphere. The continued violence
demonstrates a deep and widespread
dissatisfaction with the Government of Mexico, and
has severely damaged Mexico’s reputation as
being the "most stable and progressive country in
Latin America."
Document 28
12/6/68
CIA Weekly Summary
Mexican Student Strike Apparently Waning Secret
Document states that despite intermittent attacks
by extremist groups, the student strike in Mexico
is nearly over. In the wake of a student vote to
end the strike, class attendance is rising.
Document 29
1/17/69
CIA Weekly Summary Special Report
Challenges to Mexico’s Single-Party Rule
Secret
As students return to classes, the "authentic
context" to student strikes is becoming clear: the
demonstrations of 1968 represent a strong
warning to the Government of Mexico. Although
Mexican officials claimed "outside agitation" was
the basis of the unrest, document states that most
reports linking the student movement to
subversion remain unsubstantiated. Finally,
document states that the events at Tlatelolco
caused severe political damage to the Mexican
Government.
Document 30
c. 3/24/69
DIA Intelligence Information Report
General Officers in Disfavor with Secretary of Defense
Confidential
Generals Ballesteros Prieto and Luis Gutierrez
Oropeza are both out of favor with the Minister of
Defense because they ignored his orders to keep
troops out of Tlatelolco. According to source,
soldiers were merely supposed to surround
students and observe with the intention of
confining the demonstrators to that part of the
city.