"The factories will remain in our brains," one unidentified participant told Saddam at a meeting, apparently in the early 1990s.
Posted on 03/21/2006 1:02:14 PM PST by libertarianPA
BAGHDAD, Iraq - Exasperated, besieged by global pressure, Saddam Hussein and top aides searched for ways in the 1990s to prove to the world they'd given up banned weapons.
"We don't have anything hidden!" the frustrated Iraqi president interjected at one meeting, transcripts show.
At another, in 1996, Saddam wondered whether U.N. inspectors would "roam Iraq for 50 years" in a pointless hunt for weapons of mass destruction. "When is this going to end?" he asked.
It ended in 2004, when U.S. experts, after an exhaustive investigation, confirmed what the men in those meetings were saying: that Iraq had eliminated its weapons of mass destruction long ago, a finding that discredited the Bush administration's stated rationale for invading Iraq in 2003 — to locate WMD.
The newly released documents are among U.S. government translations of audiotapes or Arabic-language transcripts from top-level Iraqi meetings — dating from about 1996-97 back to the period soon after the 1991 Gulf War, when the U.N. Security Council sent inspectors to disarm Iraq.
Even as the documents make clear Saddam's regime had given up banned weapons, they also attest to its continued secretiveness: A 1997 document from Iraqi intelligence instructed agencies to keep confidential files away from U.N. teams, and to remove "any forbidden equipment."
Since it's now acknowledged the Iraqis had ended the arms programs by then, the directive may have been aimed at securing stray pieces of equipment, and preserving some secrets from Iraq's 1980s work on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
Saddam's inner circle entertained notions of reviving the programs someday, the newly released documents show. "The factories will remain in our brains," one unidentified participant told Saddam at a meeting, apparently in the early 1990s.
At the same meeting, however, Saddam, who was deposed by the U.S. invasion in 2003 and is now on trial for crimes against humanity, led a discussion about converting chemical weapons factories to beneficial uses.
When a subordinate complained that U.N. inspectors had seized equipment at the plants useful for pharmaceutical and insecticide production, Saddam jumped in, saying they had "no right" to deny the Iraqis the equipment, since "they have ascertained that we have no intention to produce in this field (chemical weapons)."
Saddam's regime extensively videotaped and audiotaped meetings and other events, both public and confidential. The dozen transcribed discussions about weapons inspections largely dealt with Iraq's diplomatic strategies for getting the Security Council to confirm it had disarmed.
Scores of Iraqi documents, seized after the 2003 invasion, are being released at the request of the U.S. House Intelligence Committee chairman, Rep. Peter Hoekstra (news, bio, voting record), who has suggested that evidence might turn up that the Iraqis hid their weapons or sent them to neighboring Syria. No such evidence has emerged.
Repeatedly in the transcripts, Saddam and his lieutenants remind each other that Iraq destroyed its chemical and biological weapons in the early 1990s, and shut down those programs and the nuclear-bomb program, which had never produced a weapon.
"We played by the rules of the game," Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said at a session in the mid-1990s. "In 1991, our weapons were destroyed."
Amer Mohammed Rashid, a top weapons program official, told a 1996 presidential meeting he laid out the facts to the U.N. chief inspector.
"We don't have anything to hide, so we're giving you all the details," he said he told Rolf Ekeus.
In his final report in October 2004, Charles Duelfer, head of a post-invasion U.S. team of weapons hunters, concluded Iraq and the U.N. inspectors had, indeed, dismantled the nuclear program and destroyed the chemical and biological weapons stockpiles by 1992, and the Iraqis never resumed production.
Saddam's goal in the 1990s was to have the Security Council lift the economic sanctions strangling the Iraqi economy, by convincing council members Iraq had eliminated its WMD. But he was thwarted at every turn by what he and aides viewed as U.S. hard-liners blocking council action.
The inspectors "destroyed everything and said, `Iraq completed 95 percent of their commitment,'" Saddam said at one meeting. "We cooperated with the resolutions 100 percent and you all know that, and the 5 percent they claim we have not executed could take them 10 years to (verify).
"Don't think for a minute that we still have WMD," he told his deputies. "We have nothing."
They have so much mud to sling, they can't decide what to throw next.
Yep, that's it, thanx.
Talk about selective reporting.
They ignore all the tapes with evidence indicating he did have such weapons, but report on him ranting publicly that he didn't have them.
For example, three months before Operation Iraqi Freedom began, Israeli intelligence detected Iraq moving large amounts of military materiel into Syria, another Baathist dictatorship — materiel that could have included Saddam's WMD.
Last month, Moshe Yaalon, who was Israel's top general at the time, said Iraq transported WMD to Syria six weeks before Operation Iraqi Freedom began.
On Jan. 25, 2004, Nizar Nayouf, a Syrian journalist who recently defected to France, told the Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf that chemical and biological weapons were smuggled from Iraq into Syria when Saddam realized an American invasion was imminent.
Nayouf said he knew of at least three Syrian sites where Saddam's WMD were kept. One was in tunnels under the town of al-Baida near the city of Hama in northern Syria, part of an underground factory built by North Korea for producing a Syrian version of the Scud missile. Others were in the village of Tal Snan, adjacent to a Syrian air base, and in Sjinsjar, on the Syrian-Lebanese border.
Nayouf's claims were in effect confirmed two months earlier in a briefing to reporters on Oct. 20, 2003, by officials of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency in Washington. Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. James Clapper, head of NIMA when the Iraq War began, said satellite imagery showed a heavy flow of traffic from Iraq into Syria just before the American invasion.
Retired Marine Lt. Gen. Michael DeLong, who was deputy commander of Central Command during Operation Iraqi Freedom, told WABC radio in September 2004: "I do know for a fact that some of those weapons went into Syria, Lebanon and Iran."
In an interview with the London Telegraph in January 2004, David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), said he uncovered evidence that unspecified materials had been moved to Syria shortly before Operation Iraqi Freedom.
"We know from some of the interrogations of former Iraqi officials that a lot of material went to Syria before the war, including some components of Saddam's WMD program," Kay told the Telegraph. "Precisely what went to Syria, and what happened to it, is a major issue that needs to be resolved."
Charles Duelfer, Kay's successor as ISG head, testified at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Oct. 6, 2004, that "a lot of materials left Iraq and went to Syria." "There was certainly a lot of traffic across the border points," said Duelfer. "We've got a lot of data to support that, including people discussing it. But whether in fact in any of these trucks there was WMD-related materials, I cannot say."
Jordan's King Abdullah may have an opinion on that. In April 2004, his country foiled a plot that involved five vehicles carrying a combined total of 20 tons of chemical weapons laced with conventional explosives.
The weapons would have released a cloud of poison gas sufficient to kill 80,000 people and, in Abdullah's words, "would have decapitated the government." The trucks were intercepted 75 miles inside the Jordanian border. They were coming from — you guessed it — Syria.
See also for extensive links:
If that were true Dan Rather would've gotten away with his phony document nonsense. The fact that he didn't proves that people who are determined to see that the truth is revealed, especially when they have proof, can usurp MSM propaganda.
The AP only reporting half the story... imagine that...
I would think this would be more significant and would merit the headline and the lead, since it answers the question why the world didn't believe Saddam - because of his own actions to hide what he was up to.
But it was instead buried in the article. Classic MSM methodology.
It ended in 2004, when U.S. experts, after an exhaustive investigation, confirmed what the men in those meetings were saying: that Iraq had eliminated its weapons of mass destruction long ago, a finding that discredited the Bush administration's stated rationale for invading Iraq in 2003 — to locate WMD.
Interesting....Yep you're right, an obvious attempt. The MSM must have gotten to Hussein back in 1996....Well, back to 'spreading democracy'!!
Even as the documents make clear Saddam's regime had given up banned weapons, they also attest to its continued secretiveness: A 1997 document from Iraqi intelligence instructed agencies to keep confidential files away from U.N. teams, and to remove "any forbidden equipment."
Yeah, I thought that was going to be even bigger than the Abu Graib debacle. I'm puzzled why that one died down, was it perhaps fiction?
"The community of nations may see more and more of the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists. If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow." -- Bill Clinton in 1998
Same goes for John Kerry (from a letter to Bill Clinton in October 1998,which was also signed by several other democRAT Senators):
"[W]e urge you, after consulting with Congress, and consistent with the U.S. Constitution and laws, to take necessary actions (including, if appropriate, air and missile strikes on suspect Iraqi sites) to respond effectively to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs."
My basic question is...given that we know for certain that Sadaam had WMD in 1998 (as evidenced by the quotes above),what would motivate Sadaam to destroy these WMD after having tossed the inspectors out in that same year?
"The factories will remain in our brains," one unidentified participant told Saddam at a meeting, apparently in the early 1990s.
We here at Free Republic have a unique viewpoint. I don't believe the majority of Americans get their news from credible sources but rather from MSM propaganda machines. This constant exposure distorts the citizens perspective and results in the poll numbers we witness every week. Even considering the source of the polls, the trend is unmistakable even though underlying information is wrong. Perception is truth......
BTTT
Thanks for the ping!
bttt
Thanks. Had forgotten about that.
The leftist are so predictable. When I read those transcripts I knew they would use them this way. Note however that the above quote is from 1996. It is clear from the audio transcripts that in the early 1990's Saddam was working hard to lift UN sanctions. The audio transcripts the left is going to grab onto, need to be taken in context. Saddam's regime was trying hard early on to comply. In some of these meetings they were basically brainstorming and setting upgame plans in an attempt to comply and lift. In 1995/1996 their mood changed dramatically. They began to realize that they would never be able to comply. They also thought sanctions could go on for decades (above quote). That is why they began to go on the offensive (Arbil 1996). The left will only be able to cite quotes supporting them from before 1996, when Saddam wasrying to comply and lift. It was thier change in mood and their shocking offensive into Arbil in 1996, that changed the whole shell game.
You need to find transcripts where they are being 'open', 'frank' and not just brainstorming up ways to comply. For example see below. Note how someone actually apologizes to Saddam for speaking so 'clearly'.
DOCEX Saddam 030306
[Saddam]
Lieutenant General Husayn?
[Husayn]
Thanks, Sir. I did not want to speak so openly were it not for your Excellency's raising and explaining the issue, and the statement by Tariq that we produced biological weapons.
We did not explain all we have. They can raise against us now or after one year or two three issues on the subject of the missiles. One is the place. The second is our work, which they don't know, on the subject of the missiles. Sir, this is my job and I know it very well. I have been at it for some time and it is not easy. The issues are much more dangerous than what they know. And I will explain them to you now.
On the subject of the chemical file, which we believe they will raise, we think that the biological file is the only problem. No, Sir, I believe that they have full details on the rockets, as well, if they want to raise them, as I said, because we have not finished with it.
It is possible, Sir, they have a problem that is a great deal bigger than the biological file: The types of weapons, the materials we imported, the product which we told them about, and the degree of their use. All of that was not correct. And all of them do not know. We did not say that we used them against Iran and we did not say the amount of chemical weapons we produced. We also did not say anything about the type of chemical weapons and the important materials in reality.
Therefore, Sir, if they want to raise problems the biological field will not be an excuse. No, Sir, I differ and I must be frank to you, I differ completely on this subject. They want one section after another. At present, they have not pressured us and we did not announce it.
Sir, I will go back and say it is better for us to decide whether to announce or not to announce it. On the nuclear file, Sir, I mean on the biological file, we also differ with them, not only on the 17 tons; no, we have a well-known quantity. We have teams; a team working in the same direction while another does not know.
How could they not know, if they wanted? There are means for knowing that. We have materials that we imported from the United States and they know their quantity. We also have materials imported from Europe and they know their quantity also.
Therefore, Sir, if someone wants to create a problem, we have to be careful to find out: Does he want to make peace or create a new relationship quietly? No, Sir, I differ here.
On the nuclear file, Sir, we are saying that we disclosed everything? No, we have undeclared problems in the nuclear field, and I believe that they know them. Some teams work and no one knows some of them.
Sir, I am sorry for speaking so clearly. Everything is over. But, did they know? No, Sir, they did not know; not all the methods, not all the means, not all the scientists, and not all the places.
Frankly, yes some activities were discovered. Even when we are here and your Excellency is aware that the biological file is the same, no, Sir, the biological file is the least and I am sorry to say the most insignificant.
We must begin to talk with them, Sir, because the 17 tons are not the problem, but the thousands of tons here and the thousands of tons there and where did they go, how they were produced, and how they were used.
Really, Sir, we must be frank so that the resolution will be straightforward, and not biological in the afternoon, missiles the following morning, and nuclear the day after. What Mr Tariq said about the French is correct. But he also said other things, which were discussed by Ekeus. Ekeus is not a good man in the Security Council. You say, what made you think that the Iraqi Army did not do this or that?
The French Ambassador in the Security Council said that. Sir, we are not impressed that he made that statement. The French, Sir, are tricky, really tricky.
Sir, I would like to go back to this subject: Do we have to reveal everything. If we continued with the silence, and if the meeting took this line, I must say that it is in our interest not to reveal anything. It is not out of fear of revealing the scientific technology we have acquired only, or concealing it for some future action; no; but the game, Sir, has taken too much time. It is now clear to many officials in the states that deal compulsorily with the United States, that they support Iraq and say that Iraq has responded adequately; in other words, we have not concealed anything.
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