I think a lot of folks are yet to understand the wider impact of the Indo-US deal.It's not exactly a bilateral agreement,but more of a multilateral one & that's why Bush has faced flak.Till this agreement,the US,along with China has opposed sale of N-tech & fuel to India,while France & Russia were in favour,with the Brits more or less neutral.So whenever Paris or Moscow made proposals for N-cooperation with Delhi,the US would armtwist them to back off.Now with this framework in place,everyone,inc. the US can get a piece of the Indian pie.
India: New Delhi Diversifies Its Geopolitical Options
March 15, 2006 23 44 GMT
Summary
Responding to U.S. concerns about a deal that has Russia supplying India with nuclear fuel, New Delhi says the move is in keeping with international regulations. The Indian government is demonstrating that it is not relying solely on Washington for its strategic needs. While it will be procuring the fuel from Russia, India also wants to see the recent U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear agreement ratified, all in an effort to diversify its geopolitical options.
Analysis
An Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesman said March 15 that Russia's proposal to supply 60 tons of nuclear fuel to the Tarapur atomic power station is entirely legitimate and does not violate the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rules. A U.S. State Department spokesman said Russia should not provide uranium to India until the latter has fulfilled its obligations to the United States under the countries' recent nuclear deal. An Indian daily The Hindu reports that the first shipment of nuclear fuel from Russia is expected to arrive in India "by the end of the month."
That this deal with the Russians comes on the heels of the U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear agreement, which has yet to receive U.S. congressional approval, indicates that New Delhi is trying to achieve two objectives. First, it is signaling the United States that it is not about to limit itself to strategic ties only with Washington. Second, by securing a deal with the Russians, the Indians are trying to get the Bush administration to get the Indo-U.S. agreement pushed through Congress; they that the U.S. president is losing support within his own party, which currently controls Congress. In other words, India wants to show that, just because it is pursuing a long-term strategic alliance with Washington, it will not become its puppet, and it will be open to receiving nuclear fuel from a variety of suppliers. India can use U.S. President George W. Bush's declining popularity as an opportunity to drive this point home.
During Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's trip to Moscow in December 2005, he received assurances from Russian President Vladimir Putin that Moscow would provide nuclear fuel for the Tarapur power plant. Russia waited until its March 2 agreement with India before it notified the NSG about the deal. India maintains that it is completely within its rights to receive this much-needed fuel while negotiations with the United States are still in progress. In the agreement the United States made with India, Washington said it would supply the Tarapur plant, but New Delhi is letting Washington know that it does not want a U.S. monopoly over India's nuclear industry.
The move also allows the Singh government to enhance its domestic standing. Engaging the United States, Russia and France regarding its nuclear needs, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government is countering political opposition at home that accused Singh of buckling under U.S. pressure regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Managing multiple and parallel agreements with a number of countries allows Singh to sustain support from the Indian left, which it needs to sustain its majority in parliament.
More important, India views a strategic relationship with the United States as a means of enhancing its own objective to become a major global player as opposed to being seen both at home and abroad as simply a major U.S. ally or, worse, a U.S. proxy. New Delhi realizes that Washington's engagement with India is also about containing the extent to which India can emerge on the world scene. Therefore, the Russian deal allows India to limit the leverage that the United States can have with India.
Russia also gains from this process, since it is engaged in trying to counter U.S. incursions into its traditional geopolitical sphere of influence. In fact, the deal with India comes at a time when Moscow is vigorously trying to enhance its ability to play a major role in the Middle East.
There is a downside to India's trying to cut deals with Russia. The move could complicate matters for the Bush administration as it tries to secure congressional approval for the deal that Bush signed with Singh earlier this month. This is especially so since the window of opportunity is small; U.S. midterm elections will take place in November, which could further tie the hands of the Bush administration and delay the deal. Uncertainty surrounding the deal with the United States is another reason why India is not waiting for the U.S. deal to be finalized.
It is not as if civilian nuclear cooperation with the United States is not important for India -- indeed, New Delhi views it as a key step in becoming a major world power. At the same time, New Delhi does not want such cooperation to become a liability in terms of its strategic objectives.
China? China sold nuclear fuel to India in 2000 I think.