Let's take this one step at a time. Does your post now mean that you admit that the Militia Act of 1795 was in effect, and that your earlier wisecracks about "referrals to repealed laws" was an error? And that Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 is indeed the operative clause, not your incorrect referral to Article IV, Section 4?
The militia act of 1795, section 2, deals with assistance to federal marshalls.
Are you now admitting that there were powers for the President present in Section 2, that Section 2 was part of the Militia Act of 1795, and that it was the law of the land? Because if you are now, at long last, admitting the error of your ways in your prior posts then we can proceed with your current errors. Assuming that you agree, I'll proceed.
Section 2 states: "And be it further enacted, That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed or the execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by this act, the same being notified to the President of the United States, by an associate justice or the district judge, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia of such state to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed."
Let's look at it again, highlighting the operative clause: "And be it further enacted, That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed or the execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by this act, the same being notified to the President of the United States, by an associate justice or the district judge..." It seems to me that it makes a distinction between the first condition and the second. If the combinations are too powerful to suppress by powers vested in the marshals of the act, as mentioned in the second clause, then their recourse is to go to the district court, who takes it to an associate justice (probably the justice responsible for that particular federal circuit) and then the president is informed. Makes perfect sense. But what if the district judge is part of those powers opposing the laws of the United States? Is the president not able to act for want of a local judge? I think not, which is why the first clause talks about "...combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings..." When the southern states began their armed rebellion by firing on Sumter then it became clear to Lincoln, and the rest of the world, that the forces aligned against the government and the rule of law were too powerful to suppress through normal judicial proceedings. And that the justification for calling out the militia was met. And the rule of law followed.
[Non, saving the day] Insurrections and repel Invasions. Congress gave the President the power to call up the militia to suppress rebellion if Congress is not in session, first in the Militia Act of 1792, renewed in 1795.
Thanks, Non, for playing Whiskeypapa in our little skit.
The militia act of 1792 was not renewed in 1795. It was repealed in 1795, as I have made clear to you dozens of times, most recently in 1316:
Sec. 10. And be it further enacted, That the act, intitled "Act to provide for calling forth the militia, to execute the laws of Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," passed the second day of May one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two, shall be, and the same is hereby repealed.
Does your post now mean that you admit that the Militia Act of 1795 was in effect, and that your earlier wisecracks about "referrals to repealed laws" was an error?
As outlined above, it does not. Your referral to the 1972 act was very Whiskeypapa in nature, being that you knew it was not in effect. The act of 1795 was in effect, and to do what King Lincoln did, it specifically reuqires petition from the state legislature, or the governor in cases where the legislature cannot be convened.
Are you now admitting that there were powers for the President present in Section 2, that Section 2 was part of the Militia Act of 1795, and that it was the law of the land? Because if you are now, at long last, admitting the error of your ways in your prior posts then we can proceed with your current errors. Assuming that you agree, I'll proceed.
I'll agree that section 2 empowers the president to aid the marshalls. I'll also make the observation that if you had a leg to stand on, you could just answer the questions I've asked and not attempt to back into something that doesn't exist using a power that's totally unrelated, but that just wouldn't be Non.
If the combinations are too powerful to suppress by powers vested in the marshals of the act, as mentioned in the second clause, then their recourse is to go to the district court, who takes it to an associate justice (probably the justice responsible for that particular federal circuit) and then the president is informed. Makes perfect sense.
Apparently, made perfect sense to a lot of people. That's why it was the law.
But what if the district judge is part of those powers opposing the laws of the United States? Is the president not able to act for want of a local judge?
According to the law that YOU are using to justify his actions, NO, HE IS NOT. That is why you need to look elsewhere if you want to justify the actions of King Lincoln, and that is exactly why I said that Tired whiskeypapa references to defunct laws will not help you. The fact that I said it to someone else doesn't mean that it could not be true for you.
I think not, which is why the first clause talks about...
And this is at the heart of your argument. You think not, but nobody gives a flyin' hoot. What you think was not useable law in 1860. What Farber thinks was not useable law in 1787.
By the way, I'm heading fishing for a few days... Have a good weekend & we'll chit-chat some more on Monday.