I was particularly heartened that the various levels of screening were alluded to and the fact that 100% of inbound cargo is screened at some level.
This is not widely known by the general public and the pols and pundits routinely can be heard saying "only 5% of cargo is checked".What a crock.
About 5% are opened and completely checked. To do 100% would probably be a physical impossibility and very expensive. Maybe we could charge a tariff for using out ports.
The chinks in any particular port or terminal operation can vary. But there is one constant point of vulnerability...the personnel selections by employers still matter.
And this is where they are constantly claiming that there will be few if any changes. This is something that needs further evaluation...because it is really the lynchipin issue...and such simple prior assurances can quickly go down the memory-hole once the deal is assured. This has happened previously with China, for example.
Based on testimony at the public hearings on C-SPAN, I suspect that the additional security 'assurances' beyond the freedom for us to open any particular container (which we already insist on) are three-fold:
(1) We get the container cargo manifests pre-dispatched to Customs already by electronic upload 24 hours before shipment. [ That is routine with almost everyone we permit to ship to us. ]
(2) We already have US Customs officers on site in Dubai. The scope and thoroughness of their operation is not public. Probably for good reason. This disclosure appeared to be new.
(3) We may be on the verge of going to 100% scanning...with far better devices than we currently have... for fissibles and human interlopers.
This would be a techno-solution to try and deal with the problem of questionable pedigrees on some employees...which clearly persists based on the Coast Guard reports. While some wonderful new technology is in the offing...it has to get deployed and operated by appropriately reliable personnel. And the role of the terminal operations employer in that personnel selection is still an open question. The new scanners also need to be funded and fielded by the terminal operators...who are and have been balking at having the cost shifted to them. The figure of $11 billion in capital equipment expenses are being bruted about.
Meanwhile, as ABC News little test showed just last year, a cargo of "spent uranium" successfully evaded detection, and got all the way through one of our ports. The reliability, or lack thereof, of the technology, the operational personnel, and management could combine or be exploited by an enemy in unforseen ways. There is a risk of shielding fissibles ...particularly if embedded, camouflaged, within something which may be obscurative of a neutron or gamma scanner...say as hydrogen-rich foods which scatter them, or block them such as a heavy diesel motor for example.
This article is extremely informative thereto:
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/mech-tech/mg18825225.800.html
Here are some good links for further study of these issues:
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/06/14/MNG9H75MJG1.DTL&type=printable
http://www.maritimesecurityexpo.com/whitepapersarticles/Combined%20Technology%20for%20Cargo%20Security-Maritime%20Security%200.pdf
Here is an 3-year-old, 2003 article in MSNBC which notes a number of related issues which contains still-newsworthy and pertinent facts:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3072951/
Some useful points therefrom:
"But with more than two billion metric tons of cargo entering U.S. ports each year, the Customs Service is only able to inspect about 2 percent of inbound containers. That’s why the agency has just instituted a rule requiring shippers in foreign ports to file a manifest, or list of cargo contents, 24 hours before steaming for the U.S..
“If the manifest description is insufficient,” said Adams, “we will send a ‘Do Not Load’ message to that carrier. If that carrier puts that container on board the ship anyway, and it sails over here, when it gets here, we will refuse to allow that container to get off in any U.S. port.”
Before the new 24-hour rule took effect, shipping firms could wait until days after their vessels set sail for the U.S. before declaring the contents of their cargo. The new rule calls for a precise description of what’s inside each container.
Now, shippers are relying on new software to manage detailed information about their cargo to comply with the closer scrutiny from customs. One of those systems is made by GT Nexus, based in Alameda, Calif.
“The GTN Portal allows people to input easily and conveniently all of that information (and) have that directly sent into the carrier’s legacy system for processing, ensuring that that information is available to be processed and filed with customs immediately,” said GT Nexus president John Urban.
Shipping lines are also starting to track individual containers with transmitters that beam their exact location to global positioning satellites.
“It’s installed permanently on the shipping container,” said Matthew Schor, president of Skybitz, a Dulles, Virginia company that makes the technology. “It has everything it needs: internal antennas, internal power, the batteries. It’s able to either on a set schedule, once a day or once an hour, send a transmission in and say where it is. Or it can respond to local alerts.”
But all this technology costs money. Securing the nation’s seaports against a potential terrorist attack could cost as much as $10 billion dollars, according to some estimates. And it will be paid by both the private and public sectors.
The hope is that new technology and new regulations will help change the old mindset on the nation’s waterfronts of “ship first, and ask questions later.”