Granted, but they really don't have any choice about cooperating. It's not like they can refuse Customs access to containers.
While US Customs clearly has primary responsibility for container and general cargo inspection, that responsibility can realistically be carried out only on a spot-check basis (at present, physical inspections cover about 10% of total cargo).
Okay....that's an argument to increase the number of inspections, but has nothing to do with a terminal operator.
Compliance by trustworthy operators with container content, verification, seal, and re-seal reporting is crucial, and constitutes a kind of "first-line" defense that customs must necessarily rely upon.
Wait a minute. Are you saying that terminal operators at the receiving terminal open all containers, verify the contents, and then re-seal them after they've been received?
The CSVR regime (which is modeled on, and supplements the CIS program) will necessarily involve operator cooperation, reporting, content inspection, and seal and re-seal responsibilities. As described:
1. Obligation To Seal: The party that physically performs the stuffing of the container is responsible for sealing the container immediately upon the conclusion of a secure stuffing process. Each seal has a unique number, which must be provided to the carrier by the shipper.2. Seal Standards: All seals should meet the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard for high security seals. The government should establish a specific date by which all containerized shipments must be affixed with such seals by the party that physically performs the stuffing of the container.
3. Recording Seal Changes: When persons having custody of a container, including U.S., state and local government officials, break the seal, they must immediately affix a new seal meeting the ISO standard, and provide the carrier (e.g., trucker, railroad, ocean carrier) or terminal operator in possession of the container with written or electronic confirmation of the event. The carrier or terminal operator must record the new seal number on the relevant shipping documents.
4. Modal Changes: Ideally, at each modal interchange in custody, the party receiving the container (e.g., trucker, railroad) must verify and record4 the seal, its number and its condition upon its receipt. If there is a seal discrepancy or anomaly, the receiving party shall inform the shipper, the party tendering the container, and the party to whom it delivers the container of such discrepancy or anomaly, and shall note it on the shipping documents.
As a further example of operator involvement in security, TWIC is a uniform personal credential procedure, and will vet the identity and background of individuals with access to cargo and to secure areas of a marine cargo handling facility. It is to be implemented by the operator pursuant to explicit operator duties under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. The duties under the 2002 Act include requirements that marine cargo handling facility operators submit facility security plans designating "secure" areas of the facility for control of access by vessels, vehicles and individuals.
These procedures (PIP, CIS, CSVR, TWIC) are designed with the intention of operator participation, and include essential site security procedures and mandates directly imposed on the operator. And the role of the operator in properly vetted personnel at domestic facilities, secure rail and land connections with terminals, container content verifications, etc. cannot, in my view, be lightly dismissed.