Funny, I don't see any changes that have been made since 1978 in the section 1804 application required to make it easier for DOJ to prep an application. Have you ever seen what the FISA warrant application requires?
You haven't seen a change to the act because the relaxation was included in the Patriot act.
The Patriot Act included some provisions, supported by lawmakers of both parties, to make securing such warrants easier. But it did not fix the problem. In April 2004, when members of the September 11 Commission briefed the press on some of their preliminary findings, they reported that significant problems remained.
http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york200512191334.asp
Before the PATRIOT Act, law enforcement had the authority to conduct electronic surveillance - by petitioning a court for a wiretap order - when investigating many ordinary, non-terrorism crimes. Agents also could use wiretaps to investigate some, but not all, of the crimes that terrorists often commit.
The non-terrorism offenses for which wiretaps were available included: drug crimes, mail fraud, and passport fraud.
Section 201 (of the Patriot Act) enabled investigators to gather information when looking into the full range of terrorism-related crimes, including: chemical-weapons offenses, the use of weapons of mass destruction, killing Americans abroad, and terrorism financing.
Section 201 preserved all of the pre-existing standards in the wiretap statute. For example, law enforcement still must: (1) apply for and receive a court order; (2) establish probable cause that criminal activity is afoot; and (3) first have tried to use "normal investigative procedures."
http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/add_myths.htm#s201
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Funny, I don't see any changes that have been made since 1978 in the section 1804 application required to make it easier for DOJ to prep an application
I suspect that you haven't seen a FISA warrant either, but here is what Victoria Toensing (former dpty AG who participated in writing FISA) describes
"FISA still requires extensive time-consuming procedures. To prepare the two- to three-inch thick applications for nonemergency warrants takes months."
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110007848
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the REAL problem ISN'T with getting a warrant that takes minutes to fill out and fewer to get. According to your citation, that "the FBI bureaucracy involved in applying for a FISA warrant was stifling."
The bureaucracy was responding to the pressure being applied by who????... The FISA court (According to the New York Times)
In addition, recent interviews of intelligence officials by The New York Times suggest that the bureau had a reason for growing cautious about applying to a secret national security court for special search warrants that might have supplied critical information. The FBI, the officials said, had become wary after a well-regarded supervisor was disciplined because the court complained that he had submitted improper information on applications.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/692148/posts
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Under Patriot, the FBI doesn't have to know that the target of the roving FISA wiretap is using the phone being tapped. The FBI could simply tap a neighborhood exchange where a suspect is spotted and hope a terrorist uses a phone there. And the FBI can now get a warrant to wiretap a phone or computer without specifying either the suspect under surveillance or the phones or computers to be tapped
I think you've fallen for some hype..
http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/add_myths.htm#s201
Myth: "These wiretaps pose a greater challenge to privacy because they are authorized secretly without a showing of probable cause of crime. This Section represents a broad expansion of power without building in a necessary privacy protection." [ACLU, Oct. 23, 2001]
Reality:
For years, law enforcement has been able to use "roving wiretaps" - in which a wiretap authorization attaches to a particular suspect, rather than a particular communications device - to investigate ordinary crimes, including drug offenses and racketeering. The authority to use roving wiretaps in drug cases has existed since 1986.
Section 206 authorized the same techniques in national-security investigations. This provision has enhanced the government's authority to monitor sophisticated international terrorists and intelligence officers, who are trained to thwart surveillance, such as by rapidly changing cell phones, just before important meetings or communications.
A wiretap under section 206 can be ordered only after the FISA court makes a finding that the actions of the target of the application may have the effect of thwarting the surveillance.
A number of federal courts - including the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits - have squarely ruled that roving wiretaps are perfectly consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
Whether the Department has used section 206 is classified. Details about its use were provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on May 29, 2003, in response to a request by the House Committee on the Judiciary.
This provision will sunset on December 31, 2005.
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"We think that SOMEONE may use A phone or computer to commit a terrorist act, but we don't know who, and we don't know which phone or computer, and we swear we'll only use that power for national security purposes. Can we get a blank warrant, now, judge? Love, Hillary."
"Hello Aksheesh, this is Muhammed. I am coming to America to strike for jihad. I want to ask a question of you for your great help. Should I bring my European cell phone or should I buy one after I arrive in America because the cursed NSA cannot spy on domestic cell phones. Will the dirty Jew sell me twenty one time without suspicion? After I arrive I will want to arrange a bomb-- I mean special celebration for jews and infidels. Can you help me get a cell phone or some special chemicals I will list in another email?"
As I recall, you are denying that "FISA was established to give the government the easiest possible way to get a rubber stamp warrant to tap phones. Even after the fact." That everything above is true does not change this. The 1804 procedures are all that last sentence is describing. It is not suddenly more difficult to get a FISA warrant against a domestic target. It is even easier than before.
"I suspect that you haven't seen a FISA warrant either, but here is what Victoria Toensing (former dpty AG who participated in writing FISA) describes[:] "FISA still requires extensive time-consuming procedures. To prepare the two- to three-inch thick applications for nonemergency warrants takes months."
Let's see...I said, "Funny, I don't see any changes that have been made since 1978 in the section 1804 application required to make it easier for DOJ to prep an application." and you responded with a statement that a former prosecutor found it hard to fill out applications. I still don't see any way that responding to the questions posted above would result in two to three inches of application for a warrant--NONEMERGENCY or otherwise. Warrant applications aren't that thick. And to respond to your aside, I doubt you've seen an application for a FISA warrant, or any other warrant for that matter, either.
"The bureaucracy was responding to the pressure being applied by who????... The FISA court (According to the New York Times) In addition, recent interviews of intelligence officials by The New York Times suggest that the bureau had a reason for growing cautious about applying to a secret national security court for special search warrants that might have supplied critical information. The FBI, the officials said, had become wary after a well-regarded supervisor was disciplined because the court complained that he had submitted improper information on applications."
That just shows you the bureaucracy was protecting its own. He was breaking the law in submitting IMPROPER info, not in submitting "two-to-three inches" of info.
"I think you've fallen for some hype...For years, law enforcement has been able to use "roving wiretaps" - in which a wiretap authorization attaches to a particular suspect, rather than a particular communications device - to investigate ordinary crimes, including drug offenses and racketeering. The authority to use roving wiretaps in drug cases has existed since 1986. Section 206 authorized the same techniques in national-security investigations. This provision has enhanced the government's authority to monitor sophisticated international terrorists and intelligence officers, who are trained to thwart surveillance, such as by rapidly changing cell phones, just before important meetings or communications. A wiretap under section 206 can be ordered only after the FISA court makes a finding that the actions of the target of the application may have the effect of thwarting the surveillance. A number of federal courts - including the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits - have squarely ruled that roving wiretaps are perfectly consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Whether the Department has used section 206 is classified. Details about its use were provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on May 29, 2003, in response to a request by the House Committee on the Judiciary."
Lessee, I said "Under Patriot, the FBI doesn't have to know that the target of the roving FISA wiretap is using the phone being tapped. The FBI could simply tap a neighborhood exchange where a suspect is spotted and hope a terrorist uses a phone there. And the FBI can now get a warrant to wiretap a phone or computer without specifying either the suspect under surveillance or the phones or computers to be tapped." I fail to see how this canned response addresses either concern. That roving wiretaps have been allowed for a long time with normal warrants is not the same as giving wide permission for such wiretaps against domestic targets under FISA's minimal requirements.
"Hello Aksheesh, this is Muhammed. I am coming to America to strike for jihad. I want to ask a question of you for your great help. Should I bring my European cell phone or should I buy one after I arrive in America because the cursed NSA cannot spy on domestic cell phones. Will the dirty Jew sell me twenty one time without suspicion? After I arrive I will want to arrange a bomb-- I mean special celebration for jews and infidels. Can you help me get a cell phone or some special chemicals I will list in another email?"
Here's the difference between your hypo and mine. In YOUR hypo, the person calling would be calling/emailing from OUT OF THE COUNTRY. They would be liable to be tapped regardless, scot-free, no warrant required. They would then be busted regardless of what cell phone they were carrying. And of course, you're making the assertion that "the cursed NSA cannot spy on domestic cell phones" under American law--it can spy on foreigners all it wants, since they're ostensibly spying for purposes of foreign intelligence, but it can't spy against Americans without a warrant and probable cause.
In my hypo, the warrant could be issued against ANYONE, regardless of whether they were calling in or out of the country. Let's see it again:
"We think that SOMEONE may use A phone or computer to commit a terrorist act, but we don't know who, and we don't know which phone or computer, and we swear we'll only use that power for national security purposes. Can we get a blank warrant, now, judge? Love, Hillary."
Your hypo doesn't scare me because we both know it'd be perfectly acceptable under prior and current law to tap the phone call without a warrant. My hypo doesn't scare you for...hell, I can't figure out why it doesn't scare you.