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Regarding your last statement, how would a court judge religious truth if it were not allowed to examine religion?

No, you did not restate my question satisfactorily. Your restatement is an entirely different question.

My question was how courts could enforce the religion clauses if they are restricted from making any inquiry that even touches on the subject of religion. I said nothing about the judgement of a "religious truth." I think that you know there is a difference, and I think you are just trying to bait me rather than have a genuine conversation. So, I'm done.

You were done with your first post. A democratic country should rely first on it's democratic processes. This particular problem did not call for court intervention. In any case, the judge's inquiries were unconstitutional.

There continues to be confusion on the part of some as to whether the judge was acting correctly when he inquired into the religious motivation of the school board. Again, I urge that you read the opinion: Kitzmiller et al. v Dover Area School District et al..

You will learn that the defendant school board agreed that the court should make the inquiries that it did:

The parties are in agreement that an applicable test in the case sub judice to ascertain whether the challenged ID Policy is unconstitutional under the First Amendment is that of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), (hereinafter "the Lemon test"). See Edwards, 482 U.S. 578 (applying Lemon test to strike down Louisiana's "Creationism Act"); see also Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (considering the purpose and the primary effect of an Arkansas statute forbidding the teaching of evolution in public schools).