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A little over one year later, and after MUCH finagling in the Military Commissions themselves (Military Judge said he lacked the ability to make the "illegal enemy combatant" determination and was overruled by a higher (new) Military Court, etc.), a ruling came down yesterday, from the Military Commission, that Hamdan is an illegal enemy combatant.

I think this is a significant success story, with the biggest blot being the long delay in getting to this point.

H/T HowAppealing, Hamdan has been found to be an unlawful enemy combatant, not a POW. I have to laugh a bit inside, at epithets aimed at Military Judge Allred, for entertaining an argument, and ruling one way or the other, that Hamdan was a POW.

Text of Judge Allred's order (OCR conversion of PDF file)

After pre-trial maneuvering, including a rejected request to be tried in DC District Court in light of the Supreme Court's Boumediene decision, Hamdan has been convicted on a charge of violation of 10 USC 925v(b)(25) - Providing Material Support for Terrorism; and has been acquitted on a charge of Conspiracy.

See Hamdan Convicted in Split Verdict at SCOTUSblog, and Hamdan found guilty by Guantanamo military commission jury at JURIST for more.

A July 25, 2008 LA Times story, Hamdan case is built on his own words, reports that Hamdan's boss (the head of Bin Laden's bodyguards) and an Al Qaeda errand boy arrested along with Hamdan were both captured and released by the US. I'm wondering why Hamdan's testimony wasn't good enough to convict at least the head of bin Laden's bodyguards, for providing material support.

The Hamdan case will go on through appeal, resulting in firming up the rules and parameters for trials under military commissions.

10 USC 950v - Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, which was approved Oct. 17, 2006.

One of the arguments Hamdan made in order to get his case into an Article III Court was that the law is ex post facto, or not properly a military commission matter. Those arguments are certain to be litigated further.

10 USC 950p recites:

(a) Purpose.â€” The provisions of this subchapter codify offenses that have traditionally been triable by military commissions. This chapter does not establish new crimes that did not exist before its enactment, but rather codifies those crimes for trial by military commission.
(b) Effect.â€” Because the provisions of this subchapter (including provisions that incorporate definitions in other provisions of law) are declarative of existing law, they do not preclude trial for crimes that occurred before the date of the enactment of this chapter.

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, SCOTUS did not accept that conspiracy was a crime traditionally triable by military commission. No matter for Hamdan, his was acquitted of the Conspiracy charge.

The Material Support charge is arguably on even weaker ground (as being properly under the aegis of a military commission) than the Conspiracy charge.

Just a point of comparison, David Hicks was returned to Australia after he pled guilty to a charge of material support. His sentence was nine months imprisonment, served in Australia, and a yearlong â€œgagâ€ order.