Mitigates, yes. Absolves, no. You're operating under the mistaken assumption that, if the lawyer was at all negligent, it releases Cheney from liability.
In the old days (perhaps Marlowe took the bar under this system?), if the victim's own negligence contributed to his harm, he could not recover for the negligence of the defendant. Today, the plaintiff's award is simply reduced by the amount his negligence contributed to his harms.
In more simple terms, if the lawyer was 25% to blame, and Cheney 75% (numbers which I would consider reasonable), then the civil award would be 75% of the lawyer's damages.
Jude, it's like football.
The tackle jumps offside before the snap. He is personally and totally responsible. If the q-back uncharacteristically changes the rhythm of his signal calling, then the q-back bears some responsibility for the offside.
The lawyer was offside and got shot for his mistake. In the absence of evidence showing that Cheney participated in the man's mistake, or that Cheney operated other than according to the rules of team hunting, then Cheney is off he hook entirely in my military view of this.
Someone earlier suggested that res ipsa loquitur would apply, and in a criminal prosecution no less. That is so wrong on so many levels, I wouldn't know where to start. It's a really just another way of trying to warp negligence into strict liability.
Due to the lesser standard of proof, I believe Cheney might be found liable in a civil proceeding for negligently inflicting injury. With a vigorous defense he might beat it, too.
I stand by my earlier assertion that Cheney would not be convicted of negligent manslaughter if Whittington were to die. The higher standard of proof coupled with the fact that the evidence would be heard by a Texas jury persuades me that it would be a quick acquittal, based on the evidence I have been made aware of.
Anyone interested in judicial legislation and judicial activism needs to read Li V. Yellow Cab. For 104 years California Civil Code section 1714 established contributory negligence as a bar to recovery. Many other states had passed laws which allowed recovery on a contributory basis, but California was dragging its feet and not following the trend. So, instead of waiting for the legislature to act, the California Supreme Court legislated from the bench a law that allowed the negligent party to recover on a contributory basis, a basis which was completely foreign to all legal principles at the time the legislature enacted Civil Code section 1714.
This decision, like Roe v. Wade politicized the judiciary by making it a super legislature. It was a boon to the legal profession, but then what should you expect from a legislature comprised solely of lawyers?
Read it and weep.