A North American Community Approach to Security

I know this is old but IMO people need to be reminded of what the powers that be have planned for them.

This explains the lack of will to enforce our border

This also explains the creeping socialisim that is taking hold no matter what party is in power

transnational power grab ping

"And 75 percent of people in the United States and Canada, and two-thirds of Mexicans, support the development of a North American security perimeter."

Really? Who knew? I don't remember the globalists asking me. We're being scammed and I'm sure the bots will be along presently to tell us why this is good.

"The time has come for us to define a true North American Community. Our security and prosperity depend on it."

Our has nothing to do with the common serfs

The other branch of CFR

http://www.trilateral.org/AnnMtgs/TRIALOG/TRLGTXTS/T56/pdf_folder/governance.pdf

In reference to borders, I've been finding that somehow, the NGOs are also funding immigration.

I posted this thread on where I found the NGO monies coming from:

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/1578025/posts
Earth Charter and the Ark of Hope - New World Order

And I have this thread that shows how some of the CFRs for grant monies work:

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1563271/posts
Healthy People 2010

NGOs and immigration. Funds full name is: National Immigration Forum and Cato Institute. In the below list, see National Immigration Forum.

Immigrants

Center for Immigration Studies
The Center for Immigration Studies is a non-partisan, non-profit organization founded in 1985. It is the nation's only think tank devoted exclusively to research and policy analysis of the economic, social, demographic, fiscal, and other impacts of immigration on the United States.
http://www.cis.org/

National Immigration Forum
The purpose of the National Immigration Forum is to embrace and uphold America's tradition as a nation of immigrants. The Forum advocates and builds public support for public policies that welcome immigrants and refugees and that are fair and supportive to newcomers in our country.
http://www.immigrationforum.org/

National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights
NNIRR member organizations and activists utilize the network as a tool to enhance collaboration, build and develop strategy, and push thinking and analysis "outside the box" of service provision or "quick-fix" legislation. The program aims to involve, support, and empower immigrant communities to address the critical issues in their neighborhoods and workplaces.
http://www.nnirr.org/

About NGOs:

Non-governmental organization - A non-governmental organization (NGO) is an organization that is not part of a government and was not founded by states. NGOs are therefore typically independent of governments. Although the definition can technically include for-profit corporations, the term is generally restricted to social, cultural, legal, and environmental advocacy groups having goals that are primarily noncommercial. NGOs are usually non-profit organizations that gain at least a portion of their funding from private sources. Current usage of the term is generally associated with the United Nations and authentic NGOs are those that are so designated by the UN.

I would really welcome someone to post on these threads that can explain these NGOs and monies.

How did the NGOs partner with our governmental offices? Are we no longer a sovereign nation? How come we didn't get a say in this?

Since the CFRs lend ownership to anything the monies touch, have we been eminent domained?

Is this why our current administration can't undue this?

Is this why our current administration can't or hasn't stopped illegal immigration? Is it because of these NGOs?

Its all there in black and white but you can't make the sheep read and realize what cometh

http://www.clintonglobalinitiative.org/home.nsf/pt_our_mission

Page 1

Global Governance

Page 2

Page 3

GLOBAL

GOVERNANCE

Enhancing

Trilateral Cooperation

The Trilateral Commission Seoul Plenary Meeting 2003

Page 4

ISBN 0-930503-83-x

The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 by private citizens of Europe, Japan

and North America to foster closer cooperation among these three democratic in-

dustrialized regions on common problems. It seeks to improve public understanding

of such problems, to support proposals for handling them jointly, and to nurture

habits and practices of working together, The European group has widened with the

ongoing enlargement of the European union. The Japanese group has widened into a

Pacific Asia group. The North American group now includes members from Canada,

Mexico and the United States.

See our website for more information:

http://www.trilateral.org

North American Chairman

Thomas S. Foley

European Chairman

Peter D. Sutherland

Pacific Asia Chairman

Yotaro Kobayashi

North American Office

1156 15

th

St., N.W.

Suite 505, Washington, D. C. 20005

European Office

5, Rue de Téhéran

F-75008 Paris, France

Pacific Asia Office

C/O Japan Center for International Exchange

4-9-17 Minami Azabu

Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-0047

Japan

Page 5

Contents

Introductory Note

vii

Executive Summary

1

I. Towards a New Pacific Asia Regional Order

1. The Sociopolitical and Economic Agenda of South Korea

9

Roh Moo-hyun

Hong Seok Hyun

SaKong Il

Summary of Discussion

2. The Rise of China and Its Global Implications

26

Wang Jisi

Heinrich Weiss

Wendy K. Dobson

Summary of Discussion

3. Japan’s Domestic and International Agenda

39

Keizo Takemi

Yasuhisa Shiozaki

Summary of Discussion

4. Prospects for Pacific Asian Integration

49

Jesus P. Estanislao

Wang Gungwu

Summary of Discussion

Page 6

II. Rebuilding Trilateral Cooperation

5. Building Consensus for the Doha Round

61

Carla A. Hills

6.Relations between the European Union and the

66

United States

Peter Sutherland

7.New Security Challenges in East Asia

71

Han Sung-Joo

Stephen W. Bosworth

Summary of Discussion

8.Restructuring the International Order after the

86

War in Iraq

Jacques Andréani

Thomas S. Foley

Akihiko Tanaka

Summary of Discussion

9.Addressing the New International Terrorism:

105

Prevention, Intervention and Multilateral Cooperation

Excerpts from the Task Force Report

Program

113

Page 7

Introductory Note

The 34th annual plenary conference of the Trilateral Commission was

convened on April 11–14, 2003, at the Shilla Hotel, Seoul, Korea. It was

the first plenary conference that was held in a non-Japanese Asian city

since the inception of the Commission in 1973. Fears of SARS deprived

this historic plenary of, in the end, some 45 of 175 committed members

and guests, including some of the designated panelists. Nevertheless, we

were able to have a very successful meeting characterized by intimate and

lively discussions throughout the sessions. It was fortunate that we were

able to visit the Blue House on April 12 and hear directly from President

Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea about his view on Korea’s agenda

and the objectives of his government.

The Seoul Plenary Conference showed three distinctive features that

are quite different from any of the previous plenaries.First,it was a heavily

Asia Pacific oriented conference with five of the eight sessions devoted to

discussions related to this region. From the forenoon of April 12 through

lunch on April 13, we had sessions on “the Socio-Political and Economic

Agenda of South Korea,”“Prospect for Pacific Asian Integration,”“Japan’s

Domestic and International Agenda,”“The Rise of China and Its Global

Implications,” and “New Security Challenges in East Asia.” While it has

been a tradition of the Commission to devote an earlier session to discus-

sion of the domestic and international agendas of the host country, the

fact that the Seoul Plenary had such a heavy concentration on the region

should be interpreted as a reflection of the increased importance of Asia

Pacific for the trilateral world.

Second, the Seoul Plenary will be remembered as a forum of intensive

discussions of reflections on the fundamental changes in the international

system and international relations since September 11, 2001, through the

Iraq war in 2003. In the session on “Addressing the New International

Terrorism: Prevention, Intervention and Multilateral Cooperation,” the

task force of Joseph Nye, Yukio Satoh, and Paul Wilkinson presented its

Page 8

discussion draft, on which Ali Alatas, former foreign minister of Indone-

sia, the world’s largest Islam country, commented. Full report of this task

force has already been published as Addressing the New International Ter-

rorism, whose introduction and conclusion are included in this volume.

On the realization that the process which ended up in the war against

Iraq included such fundamental issues as the new unilateralism on the

part of the United States and the powerlessness of the multilateral frame-

work, notably the United Nations, a session was organized around the

theme of “Restructuring of the International Order After the War in Iraq.”

Lively discussion took place in search of the way to reconstruct interna-

tional order after the war in Iraq.

Finally, the plenary witnessed a chain of outstanding presentations,

comments, and interventions from all the participants as usual, but, this

time, it was particularly rich because of contributions from our Pacific

Asian friends. One may say that they strongly impressed members from

the other two regions both in quality as well as in numbers. This goes to

show that the newly enlarged Pacific Asia group has proved itself to be a

viable third leg of the Trilateral Commission along with the North Ameri-

can and European groups.

What follows is the record of vivid discussions which took place during

the Seoul Plenary Conference. Presentations by panelists were condensed

by the Commission’s secretariat, which is also responsible for the sum-

mary of discussions following the presentations.

In retrospect, the Seoul Plenary Conference was convened against one

of the most uncongenial international backdrops in the history of the

Commission, e.g., imminent threats from SARS in Asia and the war in

Iraq, whose conclusion was uncertain at the time of the conference. These

were only two examples of the global problems. The Trilateral Commis-

sion is all the more grateful for the utmost efforts made by the Korean

members and supporting staff, particularly Profs. Han Sung-Joo, Pacific

Asia deputy chairman, who was appointed to be the Korean ambassador

to Washington, D.C., and Lee Hong-Koo, chairman of the Commission’s

Korean group.

viii

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Global Governance

Page 9

Global Governance

Page 10

Page 11

Executive Summary

The 2003 annual meeting of the Trilateral Commission opened in Seoul,

Korea, at one of the most uncertain times in the Commission’s 30-year

history. The sense of international unity that followed September 11 had

given way to disagreements over the tone and conduct of the war on ter-

rorism, and the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq had fueled an open split

among the traditional allies of Western Europe and the United States. As

these developments called into question the utility of many of the institu-

tions at the core of the post–World War II international order, it seemed

to many that we were in the midst of a transition to some sort of new

international system, yet the eventual outcome remained unclear.

Against this backdrop, discussions at the April 11–14 meeting revolved

around three core themes. The Trilateral Commission recently expanded

beyond Japan to include members from throughout the Pacific Asian re-

gion, and the Seoul meeting marked the first time that the annual meet-

ing had been held in a Pacific Asia country other than Japan. Therefore, it

was fitting that a major focus of the discussion was on topics related to

Asia and the prospects for regional integration. Likewise, the looming

showdown with Pyongyang over its nuclear weapons program was clearly

in the forefront of the discussants’minds, and the prospects for a peaceful

resolution were a recurring theme throughout most of the sessions. And

finally, the shape of the international system after the war in Iraq emerged

as the central topic of the meeting, as participants urged a renewed com-

mitment to international cooperation in combating global terrorism,seek-

ing deeper and more just economic liberalization, and overcoming the

animosity that had emerged in transatlantic relations.

Towards a New Pacific Asia Regional Order

The international and domestic agendas of three regional powers—South

Korea, China, and Japan—and the prospects for further Pacific Asia inte-

gration were taken up in the first series of sessions. The meeting began

with an address by President Roh Moo-hyun in which he outlined his

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Global Governance

vision of making the Republic of Korea the “hub of logistics and business

in Northeast Asia.” The key, he asserted, is for the nation to enhance its

capacity to meet global economic standards, specifically by improving

transparency and corporate governance. In keeping with this, one goal of

his administration will be to advance Korea’s ranking on Transparency

International’s Global Transparency Index from 40th place to around

number 20. Meanwhile, in regards to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, he

stressed the willingness of his government to provide support for North

Korea when it becomes a responsible member of the international com-

munity.

In a later session, Joongang Ilbo publisher Hong Seok Hyun and former

Finance Minister SaKong Il discussed the challenges facing President Roh

after his dramatic election victory. Hong focused on the president’s per-

sonality and beliefs, arguing that despite his liberal ideological tenden-

cies,President Roh is ultimately a pragmatist and his slim margin of victory

will ensure that he hews to a moderate course. SaKong Il, for his part,

concentrated on South Korea’s economic agenda, noting that the reforms

implemented after the Asian financial crisis have led to a sea change in the

country’s economic structure. Still, he added, further reform is needed,

and the overarching goal should be to make the entire country into the

“most business-friendly zone in the region.”

In the session convened to discuss the rise of China to regional and

global prominence, Chinese foreign policy analyst Wang Jisi outlined

China’s international strategy, explaining that at its core is a conviction to

avoid becoming entangled in potential conflicts that do not directly affect

the country’s vital interests. This necessitates efforts to avoid confronta-

tion with the United States as well as a commitment to maintain manage-

able relations with Taiwan. The one exception to this conservative stance

is the issue of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program—Beijing regards a

nuclear-armed North Korea as a critical threat and finds itself sharing

more common ground on this issue with Washington than with

Pyongyang.

Heinrich Weiss and Wendy Dobson added their thoughts on China’s

economic and political rise to Wang’s formulation, with Weiss noting that

it is widely understood by everyone involved that domestic political re-

form will unavoidably follow the current economic reforms. Meanwhile,

Dobson counseled prudence to policymakers pushing for a revaluation

of the renminbi, warning that the still immature structure of China’s do-

mestic financial institutions makes it perilous for the country to pursue

this course and maybe even impossible to control such a process if

Page 13

Executive Summary

|

3

launched. Still, she argued, the Chinese leadership’s justifiable reluctance

to undertake such policies should not deeply hurt the country’s trading

partners since China is actually not a major source of global deflation

and, on other counts, it has demonstrated its commitment to act as a

responsible member of global economic institutions.

The session devoted to Japan featured two Diet members who took up

the topic of their country’s international agenda. Upper House member

Keizo Takemi outlined two trends that are helping drive a more assertive

international involvement: the growing conviction among younger po-

litical leaders that Japan should be better prepared to exercise political

and military power in the Asia Pacific region and the increasing desire of

many younger Japanese to take individual action to help improve the lives

of the less fortunate around the world. The willingness to play a more

active role in security issues is reflected in the determined stance of the

country’s leaders not to accept the acquisition and possession of nuclear

weapons by North Korea and a commitment to use all means necessary to

prevent it.At the same time, the growing ambition of many of the younger

generation to participate directly in international cooperation activities

is manifesting itself in the increased overseas presence of Japanese non-

governmental organizations, particularly those whose efforts are in keep-

ing with the concept of human security.

Meanwhile,Lower House member Yasuhisa Shiozaki focused on Japan’s

economic reform efforts, explaining that the country’s major task lies in

overcoming the anti-market, inward-looking trends that have appeared,

both domestically and in its international activities. Warning that recent

years have seen a reemergence of government intervention in financial

markets, Shiozaki called for a renewed political commitment to pursue

domestic structural reform and a deeper national commitment to open

markets and globalization.

The prospects for Pacific Asian integration were taken up by former

Philippines Finance Minister Jesus Estanislao and Singaporean scholar

Wang Gungwu in a later session. Estanislao spoke about the future of

economic integration, arguing that regional trade liberalization efforts

may have reached the point of diminishing returns although there is fer-

tile ground for future cooperation in the areas of finance and develop-

ment. In particular, he advised that the regional agenda be expanded to

include areas such as macroeconomic risk management, financial super-

vision, and corporate governance practices. Where Estanislao focused on

the economic aspects of regional integration, Wang turned his attention

to the sociocultural dimension. Noting how political legitimacy in many

Page 14

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Global Governance

Asian countries is steeped in traditional value systems, Wang concluded

that modernity and the political integration it can usher into the region

cannot be stable or meaningful if built on the denigration of the roles of

religion and spirituality.

Rebuilding Trilateral Cooperation

Fiveadditional sessions focused on global issues central tothe eventual shape

of the emerging post–September 11, post–Iraq War international system.

In one of these sessions, former U.S.Trade Representative Carla Hills urged

the leaders of rich countries to resist pressure to restrict trade and to re-

double their efforts to successfully complete the Doha Round at the World

Trade Organization (WTO). Noting that the extended period of global

growth that began in the mid-19th century and continued through to the

start of World War I was followed by an era of trade restrictions and then

World War II, she warned that the Doha Round is in peril and that the

outcome of these talks will help determine the fate of the global economy

for the next quarter century.Meaningful steps by rich countries to integrate

poor countries into the global economy are far overdue, she declared, and

this round represents our best chance for success in this venture.

Meanwhile,Peter Sutherland,former director-general of the WTO,tack-

led the transatlantic split over the war in Iraq, arguing that an abject fail-

ure of basic diplomacy was a major contributor to the current divisions

between the two sides, which share far more than divides them. Noting

that both Europe and the United States must examine their failures or

else risk repeating them, he traced the rapid rise of mutual antipathy that

threatens to become embedded in public opinion. It is critical, he warned,

that both sides commit themselves to strengthening the transatlantic part-

nership and come to a full realization that unilateralism is not a sustain-

able option in our interdependent world.

Former Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo and former U.S. am-

bassador to Korea Stephen W. Bosworth outlined the security challenges

in East Asia, focusing particularly on the tensions on the Korean penin-

sula. Comparing the 1993–1994 North Korean nuclear crisis to the cur-

rent one, Han argued that, this time, the options for responding to

Pyongyang’s actions are more limited and the situation is more urgent.

Characterizing regime change in North Korea as unrealistic and a mili-

tary response as deeply problematic, he recommended a multi-layered

dialogue with North Korea that is built on close coordination among the

Page 15

Executive Summary

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5

United States, South Korea, and Japan and that allows them to communi-

cate their intention to use a mixture of carrots and sticks to reward and

punish North Korean behavior. In the end, he noted, any comprehensive

resolution is likely to involve a package deal, one that participants in the

subsequent discussion period seemed to feel would be a “larger medium-

sized package” of aid and incentives, in contrast to the “small package”

that emerged from the 1993–1994 negotiations.

Bosworth explained the importance of analyzing the crisis within the

context of a profoundly changed regional security framework, particu-

larly in light of recent significant shifts in the U.S. security role in Asia.

Changes over the past few years, many of them emerging from within the

region, have driven U.S. thinking about regional security policy in un-

foreseen directions. As a result, he argued, we should continue to see U.S.

bilateral alliances in Northeast Asia diminish in importance and U.S. stra-

tegic focus in the region shift toward Southeast Asia. Regardless of the

eventual outcome of the North Korean crisis, one probable result is that,

by the end of the decade, there are likely to be few if any ground troops

forward-deployed in South Korea and Japan.

A variety of measures to combat the new form of terrorism character-

ized by al Qaeda were proposed by Joseph Nye of Harvard University;

Yukio Satoh, president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and

former Japanese ambassador to the United Nations; and Paul Wilkinson

of St. Andrews University. (The papers that were discussed in this session

have been compiled separately as Addressing the New International Ter-

rorism; therefore, the texts are not included in this publication.) While

noting that terrorism has a long history, Nye, Satoh, and Wilkinson ar-

gued that September 11 was a dramatic manifestation of a “new terror-

ism,” one that is truly transnational in nature, reflects the desire and

potential to wreak destruction of a greater magnitude than before, and is

motivated by absolutist and grandiose goals rather than limited, political

intentions. The struggle against this strain of terrorism will be a long and

arduous one with no definitive victory, they predicted; therefore it would

be a mistake to suspend civil liberties indefinitely. What is needed, in-

stead, they asserted, includes more coordinated multilateral civilian co-

operation, stronger actions to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, global steps to delegitimize the deliberate use of force against

noncombatants, and major international efforts to resolve issues and

conflicts that create sympathy and support for terror groups.

In the meeting’s final session,Ambassadeur de France Jacques Andréani,

former French ambassador to the United States; former Speaker of the

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Global Governance

U.S. House of Representatives Thomas Foley; and Tokyo University pro-

fessor Akihiko Tanaka presented views from each of the Trilateral regions

on restructuring the international order after the war in Iraq. Andréani

set out by assessing the damage done to international institutions by the

disagreements over the war in Iraq, concluding that too much has been

made of the weakness of certain organizations such as the European Union,

and that other institutions, particularly the United Nations, are now all

the more important for the United States if it is to succeed in Iraq. He

concluded by calling for the United States and Europe to work together to

strengthen the Atlantic alliance but cautioned that U.S.-Europe relations

need to be built on a respect for the autonomy of Europe.

Foley, meanwhile, maintained that the key to understanding the United

States and its new approach to security issues is to comprehend the dra-

matic impact of September 11 on the American consciousness, an impact

that is not fully understood by even most of the closest partners of the

United States. Now, he argued, the fundamental changes in American

thinking of the past two years dictate that, in order to garner U.S. consent,

any new international system will have to avoid critically limiting the ability

of the United States to deal with direct and immediate threats to its secu-

rity. On the other hand, the United States must realize that it cannot ef-

fectively fight a war against terrorism without multilateral cooperation.

This need, he noted, gives rise to hope that the international community

will be able to find some sort of middle ground between the differing

approaches of small ad hoc coalitions and broad-based multilateralism.

In closing the session, Tanaka, a political scientist, theorized about what

exactly had changed in the international system as a result of the war in

Iraq. Disputing the conventional wisdom of the day, he contended that it

is “too hasty to conclude that a totally new order is emerging after the war

in Iraq” and that, in actuality, very little has changed in terms of power

relations or norms of international behavior. In his view, power relations

in the near future will continue to consist of complex interactions cen-

tered on the United States and involving the United Nations and several

major powers. At the same time, international norms, which have gradu-

ally been evolving to justify intervention to halt genocide or deal with

failed states, have not shifted far enough to completely legitimize inter-

vention against totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. In the post-Iraq

world, he concluded, the United States still needs international collabora-

tion, international politics remain as complex and messy as before, and

diplomacy still matters.

"Is this why our current administration can't undue this?" "Is this why our current administration can't or hasn't stopped illegal immigration? Is it because of these NGOs?"

Our current administration and the previous one have been working for the same goal

Who is this?

The North American group now includes members from Canada,
Mexico and the United States.
See our website for more information:
http://www.trilateral.org

North American Chairman
Thomas S. Foley
European Chairman
Peter D. Sutherland
Pacific Asia Chairman
Yotaro Kobayashi

North American Office
1156 15th St., N.W.
Suite 505, Washington, D. C. 20005

>>> Our current administration and the previous one have been working for the same goal

I thought about that. There are a few things that doesn't make sense yet.

I know one thing for sure, if that is true, we are screwed.

In simple terms the self rightious so called elite

You will find blue-bloods, bankers, and former fed reserve chairmen,ambasadors,ect

Who is a lawyer here at FR? What are our options? Can we fight this? How?

Options are not good at this point

Are you still around?

Can you make sense of any of this?

Are we still a sovereign nation?

Do we have options?

Hello! Any insight you can offer?

Ping!

In cliche

Try the ballot box

Try the soap box

If that fails all that is left is the cartridge box

ping

I'll have to bump for later. Thanks for pinging.