Oyvey. This Jesuit has lost his mind.
Sure looks that way. Unlike the physical sciences, philosophy should fall within the competence of a Jesuit.
One insurmountable philosophical problem with the aforementioned view is its conflict with the fundamental intellectual act of the abstraction of universals. If every creature is in the process of change from one species to another, it would be impossible in principle for the intellect to abstract the universal species from the apprehended individual creature.
More evidence that the Jesuits aren't what they used to be.
Why is this?
Let's say there's an interbreeding population of birds. Half a million years from now, the birds aren't able to breed with their ancestors and produce fertile offspring any more.
So why can't one say that this interbreeding population is a species at every time during the half million years?
They wouldn't be considered the **same** species at the beginning and at the end of this period, but they'd be an identifiable species at each instant.
Or is the alleged problem the fact that species are a fuzzy concept, as Darwin pointed out here. You've been on enough crevo threads to be familiar with ring species. (A and B produce fertile offspring, so do B and C, but A and C don't)
Or am I missing the point entirely? (I'm not sure what "universal species" is supposed to mean; what part of the link you provided applies here?)
Actually, it's quite possible (even likely) that most speices are not in a process of change most of the time. The rate of evolution is not constant, and may be very close to zero for many creatures for very long periods of time (on the order of tens of millions of years), followed by relatively short periods (on the order of thousands or tens of thousands of years) of evolution, followed again by periods of stasis.