Posted on 01/28/2006 1:29:23 PM PST by Termite_Commander
bump
"That's just rose-colored speculation, right?"
Considering that Dr. Edwin Kilbourne is an emeritus professor of immunology at New York Medical College I would put a bit more credibility into his assessment than a random poster on FR.
"In any event, it hasn't much mitigated the effect on those thus far infected."
The point he's made, and apparently your missing, is that thousands may have already been infected with mild symptoms. If true, it paints a much different picture than what is being currently portrayed. Observational data from Turkey would certainly suggest a lower mortality rate than what the UN has advertised and it suggests that Kilbourne's hypothesis might be credible.
Many observers have speculated such. Little hard evidence has been presented that this is the case. If you are in possession of the smoking gun I know numerous immunologists, epidemiologists, and virologists would love to see it. The point you, and apparently he, are missing, is that widespread human infections would be a bad thing, even mild ones, as many additional opportunities for recombination and, especially, reassortment would occur.
It appears that this Ed Kilbourne has his posterior glued to his rocking chair and doesn't venture out in the field much these days. A brief Goggle on his name and H5N1 will show that many have already dismissed his comments, such as this poster:
It seems to me that Dr. Kilbourne makes several statements based on old paradigms. Yet a lot of the public are going to accord him expert status on the basis of being an emeritus professor.
Would you be included in that group?
In light of the fact that no seroprevalence studies have been published, a study was recently completed and published in Archives of Internal Medicine that supports the "more widespread and mild symptom theory".
http://archinte.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/166/1/119
Additionally, commentary from Dr. Henry Niman (Dr. Doomsayer some say) last June that suggests the same:
Although the positive western blot data has not been confirmed, positive data would be consistent with more clusters in the north which are large and extend over a longer time period. The alarming increase in admission is further cause for concern because the admitted cases have mild disease, suggesting an even larger number of unreported cases with slightly milder disease.
This H5N1 is silently spreading mild disease in human and asymptomatic infections in poultry, which would move the pandemic to phase 6. The seeding of the human population with H5N1 sets the stage for further recombination in the fall when migratory birds bring in new sequences, which will cause new problems.
http://www.recombinomics.com/News/06260502/H5N1_Silent_Spread_Vietnam.html
If you want me to dig a bit deeper and find more for you, let me know.
Do you believe the situation merits classification as Phase 6, as the Niman quote suggests?
Increasing Lethality of H5N1 Seroprevalence and Animal Studies Agree
31 January 2006
Monotreme at 22:34
There was much speculation in the news recently suggesting that H5N1 may be becoming less lethal. WHO case reports did not support this idea. However, cases that had not been confirmed by the WHO affiliated lab in Mill Hill were often cited as proof that H5N1 was now less lethal. However, it now appears that many of the apparent cases were in fact not infected with H5N1. The tentative case fatality rate in Turkey is now thought to be 33%, similar to what has been reported in some southeast asian countries. The issue of seroprevalence studies came up when discussing the real case fatality rate. DemFromCT added a table from the WHO that appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine summarizing some of the seroprevalence studies. I noticed that there was some evidence of mild cases from the samples collected from the 1997 outbreak, but almost none from the 2004 outbreak. What could this mean? One interpretation is that the virus became more lethal between 1997 and 2004. Is there any other information that would support this idea? Indeed there is. Animal studies were conducted with H5N1 strains collected from 1997 and 2004. The results? Rapid disease progression and high lethality rates in ferrets distinguished the highly virulent 2004 H5N1 viruses from the 1997 H5N1 viruses. Thus both seroprevalence and animal studies suggest the same conclusion, H5N1 became more lethal to mammals, including humans, from 1997 to 2004. There is no evidence that H5N1 has become less lethal since 2004. There may be evidence that it is becoming easier to transmit (more and larger clusters) but we must wait for proper documentation from the WHO to be sure. There is no data to suggest that H5N1 is becoming less lethal or that it must do so before becoming a pandemic strain. Fact-based planning should include the possibility that a pandemic strain of H5N1 may kill 30% or more of its victims, as terrible as that is to contemplate.
Is that available online?
When we get a positive, were sure, Alan Hay at the NIMR told New Scientist. But when we get a negative, we arent. One problem is getting a sample with virus in it. The amount of virus present during the course of bird flu in humans varies more than with human flu. And test samples are usually mucus from the nose or throat. But because H5N1 is a bird virus, it prefers the higher temperatures and the more bird-like cell-surface molecules of the lower lungs.
From a NewScientist RSS feed,
I'm not using false negatives as evidence of a broader spread of a milder disease, rather suggesting that a number of patients who died presumably of other causes actually died of bird flu.
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