There's no question that there have been a lot of wrong predictions. Not knowing what data went into Campbell's 1998 prediction, I cannot identify what was overlooked in his assessment. Obviously something was.
The biggest issue at this time is the OPEC data, or the lack thereof of verifiable data from thos countries, especially but not limited to Saudi Arabia. Most peak oilers would give a peak date ranging from 2005 to 2015, though the earlier dates seem to involve just light sweet crude and the later ones light, heavy (but not tar sands/shale), polar, deep sea and gas to liquids.
If Saudi Arabia can keep it going and increase production to 12 million barrels a day as CERA predicts than we just might make it to 2015, but if Ghawar starts declining before 2015 and with it Saudi Arabia (outside of CERA's predictions) then its difficult to come up sufficient additional oil production to avoid a peak.
As I mentioned earlier in this thread, time to mitigation is a significant issue, and per the Hirsch report to avoid substantial economic hardship and social dislocation due to demand destruction, intensive mitigation strategies should be implemented 20 years prior to peak.
http://www.hilltoplancers.org/stories/hirsch0502.pdf
"I cannot identify what was overlooked in his assessment."
Well, I can. It's really simple.
The "Hubbert peak" is at half the production extracted, supposedly. So they estimate that half-way point using *proven* reserves.... problem is porven reserves tells us what we know is out there now. It doesnt tell us what might be out there that we havent found yet. Inevitably the final number is higher. These models of peak oil are all saying "this is what is left, we used half of it, we're done for!" So Peak Oilers keep using the wrong number as input, getting bad data as output.
as an example, in the 1980s, the USA had less than 10 years of 'proven reserves' left!!! That means you could have been saying in 1985..."hey, we are going to run out of oil in 1995!" Well, it didnt happen. Not only did it not happen, but if you check the 'proven reserves' numbers for 2005, they are about the same as for 1980s. (Off top of my head, I believe the number is around 30 billion barrels of oil.) We pumped out entire proven reserves base in the interim, and *still* have the same level of proven reserves! There is no doubt in my mind that after the next 1 trillion barrels of oil that we use, that the global proven reserves levels will include many oil resources that are not counted today as proven. That alone shifts the ultimate correct Hubbert's peak (which can only be observed either in hindsight or with full knowledge that we *wont* and *cant* find any more oil resources.).
The IEA estimates that show gradual peaking in 20-30 years more accurately estimate that process of both expanding reserves in current fields, and finding some additional new field, but the scenarios are not frightening enough for the fearmongering side of Peak Oil hype. It's very easy to project running out of something if you dont count all of what's out there.
"If Saudi Arabia can keep it going and increase production to 12 million barrels a day as CERA predicts than we just might make it to 2015, but if Ghawar starts declining before 2015 and with it Saudi Arabia (outside of CERA's predictions) then its difficult to come up sufficient additional oil production to avoid a peak."
This is simply not so. While it is true that most models rely on OPEC production increasing from around 30 mbd total to near 40 mpd by 2015, the non-OPEC production is expected to increase by an equal amount. (See the CERA testimony or their analyses, which was 50/50 OPEC and non-OPEC.) The Saudi contribution is important but only a small part of the overall increase in production capacity of 16 million barrels per day over next 10 years. In other words, if Saudi Arabia can't increase by the project 2-3 mbd, there would still be another 11-12 mbd increases on tap. Places like Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, central Asia, are on tap to increase and smaller non-OPEC plays like China, Brazil and GOM are all expected to contribute to that. This also leaves out Iraq, which, if it gets straightened out, could increase by 2-3 mbd above current production.
We have a more diverse supply of oil than is commonly supposed. Saudi's are big, but their 'market share' of oil production is only 14% or so, and if they cannot increase, others will. What *is* important about the Saudis is that they are the one country today with significant reserve capacity - they could pump more if need be, starting tomorrow.