Posted on 01/19/2006 5:11:17 PM PST by Tailgunner Joe
The contract that ended the gas war between Russia and Ukraine has been the source of great confusion, consternation and argument since it was signed on Jan 4. There is little agreement as to which side "won," who stands behind the mysterious intermediary Rosukrenergo, how much Ukraine is actually paying and for how long, how much damage was done to Russia's international standing and what it all means for the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations and European energy policy. Given the opacity of the deal and its implications, no consensus on these matters will emerge any time soon.
It is beyond dispute, however, that the Kremlin went about pursuing its goals in a contradictory and incoherent manner. It was never clear who was representing the Russian side -- was it Gazprom chief Alexei Miller or Industry and Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko? Or, as suggested by his last-minute intervention, did the buck stop with President Vladimir Putin himself? In the midst of this foreign policy musical chairs game, it was impossible to make out what in fact the Russians wanted. Upping the price offered to the Ukrainians several times as the Jan. 1 deadline approached solidified the impression of a poorly thought-out negotiating strategy.
Russia's conduct in the dispute resembles the chaotic foreign policy style of the era of former President Boris Yeltsin. In that period, we also never quite knew who was in charge in Moscow; senior officials often freelanced in public and ministries were at loggerheads. Russia seemed incapable of implementing consistent policies. And at times during Yeltsin's presidency, foreign policy became hostage to domestic political disputes.
Putin's first term marked a significant departure from this sort of behavior. During his first few years in office, Putin centralized, streamlined and coordinated foreign policy decision-making to an extent unprecedented in post-Soviet Russia. He asserted direct executive control over the policy-making process and oversight authority over policy implementation. The days of government ministries conducting their own foreign policy were over. Foreign policy was no longer used as a weapon in domestic political battles. The president was now clearly the final arbiter in matters of international significance.
The new trend reflected Putin's general strengthening of the executive branch's authority in Russian politics. By emasculating the once-mighty regional governors and asserting control over both houses of parliament, he eliminated the challenges to the executive's authority faced by Yeltsin. He also cleaned house within executive structures over the course of his first term, installing loyalists in top posts and limiting the extent to which big business could buy policies and officials. For the most part, there was a team approach on major foreign policy issues.
It appears that the Yukos affair marked a turning point in this process. The political friction caused by the event -- and, more importantly, the competition over the massive economic resources that were up for grabs -- precipitated the factionalization of the Putin executive branch. As Putin's second term got under way, it became more and more clear that infighting between individuals and "clans" within the government was intensifying. It appeared as if gang wars between groups dubbed "siloviki," "St. Petersburg lawyers" and "liberals" were simmering inside the Kremlin walls.
Much of what passes for political conflict in Russia now occurs within the executive branch. While the parliament is now little more than a rubber-stamp, it is disputes between Kremlin factions -- especially the siloviki, led by presidential deputy chief of staff Igor Sechin and Putin aide Viktor Ivanov, and the St. Petersburg lawyers, led by First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and Miller -- that determine major policy outcomes. A particularly glaring example was the failed merger of Gazprom with Rosneft. As a result of this factionalization, the strong Putin executive branch is no more. Although the external threats to its dominance, such as the parliament and the regions, are still largely powerless, the executive has been compromised from within by internecine conflict.
The hapless behavior during the gas war demonstrates that the weakening of executive authority has crippled Russia's capacity to pursue a coherent and consistent foreign policy line. The factions were deeply involved in the chicanery. The St. Petersburg lawyers were well represented at Gazprom: Medvedev is its chair, Miller its CEO, and the president of Rosukrenergo also happens to be a law school classmate of Medvedev's. Meanwhile, an ally of the siloviki, Sergei Oganesyan, heads up the Federal Energy Agency, a sub-ministerial organ of the Industry and Energy Ministry that was involved in the talks. With these powerful groups operating at loggerheads, it is no wonder that the Kremlin appeared to be flailing in several directions at once.
As the gas dispute demonstrates, the weakened Russian executive branch is likely to continue to demonstrate Yeltsin-era pathologies. If the past is any guide, we can surely expect more incomprehensible behavior in the future.
<< .... the weakened Russian executive branch is likely to continue to demonstrate Yeltsin-era pathologies. >>
"Weakened?"
Rubbish. It's in extremis. And deadly dangerous as the consequence.
"Yeltsin-era pathologies?"
Epidemic Alcoholism, Korsokoff's Syndrome, thieving, lying, looting and a Hundred Million Dollar South of France Chateau apiece!
Given his salary, the most he has ever earned, he must be getting one heck of a bargain on the joint:
<< Nick Paton Walsh in Moscow
Saturday April 17, 2004
The Guardian
Vladimir Putin has come up with a novel way to fight corruption. In one of the first major reforms of his second term, the Russian president has raised his own salary and those of his ministers by up to five times.
Bribe taking is rife among the army of bureaucrats who retain a stranglehold on Russian business and society.
Yet a presidential move to stem this damaging influence on the country's pride and economic development has started with incentives at the top.
The Kremlin head has not made performance-related pay part of his agenda before. But yesterday the Russian media reported that he signed a decree on April 10 increasing the salaries of about 10% of federal officials.
The respected business daily Vedomosti said the decree "on the improvement of labour wages" for state servants gave Mr Putin a 100% pay rise. His wages last year were 70,000 roubles (£1,400) a month but will this year amount to about 146,000 roubles. (£2,800) ...... >>
More than sixty-five percent of Russian men are drunk when they die.
Russia's birthrate is down to fewer than 1.2 children per woman.
In 15 years there will be almost 50% fewer young people in Russia than there are today and much of the Asian east of it's empire will have been lost.
Russia is a dead man walking!
Well, it is better to be drunk when dying, than sober. Less awareness of the stinky situation.
<< Well, it is better to be drunk when dying, than sober. >>
As I do not, thank God, drink alcohol, [Nor partake of any other mind-altering nor mind-numbing substance] you have the advantage of me and I must therefore, of necessity, take your word for it that you feel it so.
Having experienced the odd habitual drunkard and/or Alcoholic in extremis, however, I can attest to it being a very "stinky situation" for all concerned.
That nice crib Joe
I wonder if Vlad could afford on KGB agent salary TOO
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