Posted on 01/17/2006 6:30:49 PM PST by blam
US helicopters in Iraq face menace of 'aerial bombs'
By Francis Harris in Washington
(Filed: 18/01/2006)
American helicopters in Iraq are facing a new threat from so-called aerial bombs, which are fired into the air from the ground and explode close to passing aircraft.
The new home-made weapons, known to the Americans as "aerial improvised explosive devices" have been used on numerous occasions.
US troops clear up after an unexplained helicopter crash
"The enemy is adaptive. They makes changes in the way they fight, they respond to new flying tactics," Brig Edward Sinclair, a US army aviation commander, told Defense News, which first revealed the new threat.
He refused to say whether they had brought aircraft down. The aerial devices are placed along known flight paths and are triggered when insurgents see a low-flying helicopter approaching.
They are then fired to a height of about 50ft before a proximity fuse detonates the explosive, filling the air with thousands of metal shards.
Based on old anti-aircraft or artillery shells, the bombs would have a devastating effect if detonated close to a thin-skinned helicopter.
Any new threat to helicopters is deeply worrying for coalition forces. Rotary-wing aircraft are widely used in Iraq and although at least 25 American aircraft have crashed in the past three years, they are considered to be safer than road transport.
Ambitious insurgents also know that helicopters are likely to carry more people than road vehicles and that a crash is likely to prove fatal.
In the past fortnight US forces in Iraq have lost three helicopters. In the most recent incident an Apache attack helicopter crashed on Monday, killing two crew.
The earlier crashes of a reconnaissance helicopter and a Black Hawk, in which a total of 14 servicemen died, are still officially unexplained.
Brig Sinclair, who leads a team in the US working on helicopter anti-insurgency tactics, said the army was altering flight paths and seeking new technology to counter the threat.
But another new insurgent technique is proving still harder to counter: guerrillas have begun targeting medical evacuation helicopters.
The new ambush tactic exploits an already tested formula.
Insurgents first attack an American patrol with a roadside bomb. When troops summon helicopters to evacuate the wounded, insurgents detonate further devices pre-positioned on likely helicopter landing sites.
According to Defense News, the Americans say they have lost "more than one" aircraft to this new tactic.
Nothing new. The VC used these kind of tactics in LZs during the war in Vietnam.
Who needs a device like this? Low flying predictable helicopters would be in range of RPGs under this flight plan.
When will we get harsh with these people? How about a total vehicle ban? If it's moving and we don't know what it is, it gets destroyed. Ask questions later. That solution won't stop the IEDs completely, but would slow them down.
I never saw the "shock" or "awe" materialize in this war. Humiliation works wonders....
i guess its "remote"
So what we're talking about here is a SAM with a ceiling of 50 feet?
In the last massed Apache attack during the Iraq war proper the Iraqis, with night vision equipment (gee thanks Russia) shot the hell out of our Apaches. Every single helicopter (thirty or so) took hits. One went down (I think) and two had to land before reaching their base. The brass was astonished at the extent of damage. That was the last of the massed helicopter raids.
The Comanche program was canceled soon after.
Well, at least we're spending money developing another billion dollar super duper death ray.
< / sarc>
Are RPG's proximity weapons? I don't know.
Seems to me a proximity weapon such as this would leave more room for error for an inadequately trained insurgent than an RPG would. A shotgun blast vice a rifle shot if you will...
Hardly. Attack helicopters are in high demand as the close air support weapons system of choice in Iraq and Afghanistan. MANPADS and NVGs have been around for awhile, and while providing the enemy with some capabilities, come with their own limitations and risks as well. The enemy is adapting and our crews must adapt also. The days of low altitude, low airspeed, hovering profiles that we trained to do for attacking massed soviet style armor formations no longer applies in this case. We're back to high energy running/diving fire using lead/wingman teams. Those TTPs carry certain risks as well. It has less to do with the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the airframe and more to do with how you fly and fight the machine. It's inherently risky business. That's why there's flight pay.
In the last massed Apache attack during the Iraq war proper the Iraqis, with night vision equipment (gee thanks Russia) shot the hell out of our Apaches. Every single helicopter (thirty or so) took hits. One went down (I think) and two had to land before reaching their base. The brass was astonished at the extent of damage. That was the last of the massed helicopter raids.
Actually, the primary tactic used was illuminating the hovering aircraft from below with city lights on cue from cell phone traffic (aka Mogadishu) and concentrating fire on the aircraft. 1-227 lost an aircraft to ground fire during that attack (actually landed upright and in recoverable condition). That crew was taken captive and later repatriated. The aircraft was destroyed by a 500lb bomb to deter the Iraqis from gaining any use from it.
Yes, the BDA on aircraft was extensive, yet all but one aircraft survived to fight another day and were all up and operational within 10 days- a pretty strong testament to how rugged the aircraft is.
Actually, the 101st attack units and other Apache units in theater conducted a series of deep strikes in and around the Karbala Gap leading into the Western approaches of Baghdad after the failed 6-6 Cav/1-227 deep attack into the same area. These attacks were coordinated with CAS (whereas they weren't with the 6-6 attack) and designed to help set conditions for the famed Thunder Run by 3rd ID into Baghdad. Actually, the 101st claimed relatively few kills on those missions, since the remaining Republican Guard had melted away by then.
The Comanche program was canceled soon after.
Yes, the failed deep attack was a tipping point factor in the decision to cancel Comanche, but was not the primary reason for it. The Army leadership correctly decided to spend remaining investment dollars on recapitalizing the Army aviation fleet across the board rather than throw down more dollars on a single system that was plagued with large cost over runs and program slips due to design problems and an over-hyped, non-proven mission profile. This was a decision making process months in the making, well before OIF even commenced.
What's old is new.
Universal truth...
Your thoughts on my #16?
why aren't we monitoring patrol paths with drones, video cameras and/or iraqi sniper/recon teams?...they see somebody digging a trench or parking a car where it doesn't belong....kill them. Ride with terrorist/thugs on the top of the vehicle's hood.
of course we're probably doing that but, we're just not hearing about it.
No, but they will detonate after a certian amount of fly time.
ping for later
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