Loopholing.
I agree with limiting the applications of the CSA in a
manner consistent with the principles of federalism and
our constitutional structure. Raich, supra, at ___ (THO-
MAS, J., dissenting); cf . Whitman, supra, at 486487
(THOMAS, J., concurring) (noting constitutional concerns
with broad delegations of authority to administrative
agencies). But that is now water over the dam. The relevance of such considerations was at its zenith in Raich,
when we considered whether the CSA could be applied to
the intrastate possession of a controlled substance consis-
tent with the limited federal powers enumerated by the
Constitution. Such considerations have little, if any,
relevance where, as here, we are merely presented with a
question of statutory interpre tation, and not the extent of
constitutionally permissible federal power. This is par-
ticularly true where, as here, we are interpreting broad,
str aightforward language within a statutory framework
that a majority of this Court has concluded is so compre-
hensive that it necessarily nullifies the St ates' " `tradi-
tional . . . powers . . . to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of their citizens.' "2 Raich, supra, at ___, n. 38 (s lip
op., at 27, n. 38). The Court's reliance upon the constitu-
tional principles that it rejected in Raich--albeit under
the guise of statut ory interpretation--is perplexing to say
the least. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.