Not quite. I said that I will not blame a belief for the acts of somebody who violates its tenets.
But there's another side to this: what if you come upon a fellow who does "evil" things, in accordance with the tenets of his moral philosophy? This is where the idea of Social Darwinism, say, comes into the picture. Here we're faced with a philosophy that explicitly attempts to base human interactions on what we can observe of nature -- it's precisely what Ayn Rand says we should do. The problem before you is entirely different: you've got to tell us why it's not morally permissible to act according to what we can observe. See the difference?
And? How does "more fit" translate into "morally superior"? More importantly, how and why is that translation a necessary consequence of the theory itself?
Ah, yes -- the first and fundamental problem with objectivism, which is: how does one objectively define "good?" Still, I suppose the best approach to this would be to find a scientific definition. One such scientific definition -- which happens to be in accord with the way evolution proponents think things really happen -- would be that of natural selection. If we take the objectivist approach, drawing an equivalence between "natural selection" and "moral good" is obvious -- though it happens also to be rather noxious to our normal standards of good and evil.
The problem is that, like all scientific theories, evolution is descriptive, not proscriptive - it tells you how things will be, given some particular set of circumstances.
Weelllll, sort of.... Objective moral philosophies are supposed to be in accord with reality. I believe Dawkins makes this very point. If we accept this as true, and if we deny the existence of any supernatural or irrational basis for moral principles, it follows either that there is no such thing as morality, or that morality must have a scientific basis. It follows from the latter that any scientific description of "how things really are" must also have moral implications. Dawkins says evolution is "how things are," and if we are to formulate a rational moral philosophy, we must take that into account.
Nevertheless, you're basically taking the first of the paths I described above, which leaves you with the problem of how a morally neutral act (such as killing your rival's offspring, which confers obvious reproductive advantages) can possibly be considered evil if humans do it, but still be morally neutral otherwise. Can it be both, and still be objective?
And again: objectivists essentially claim that moral principles are like laws of nature, and that they're accessible to reason and observation. But again: what we can observe (e.g., in the processes of evolution), and the conclusions we must draw from those observations, are not compatible with what we would usually call moral behavior.
You can certainly describe them as such, but that hardly makes it so.
And your dismissal of same hardly makes it false.
"Reason by revelation" is inherently self-contradictory
"Knowledge by revelation" is not, however.
- while we may, as humans, excel at rationalizing self-contradiction, I see no need to positively embrace it just yet ;)
You might want to defer embracing smug dismissals, also. ;-)
And what do we make of someone who, contrary to all evidence, claims moral tenets for something that doesn't appear to have any? Not to be too much of a bastard about it all, but it appears to me that if you're a creationist, you agree with the fascists about the existence of said moral tenets, and it's left to the dirty atheists to try and hold the line somehow. And if that's the case, I have to say I'm somewhat underwhelmed by "objective" morality.
Social Darwinism is not the theory of evolution, any more than Christian socialism is Christianity - neither social Darwinism nor socialism are necessary consequences of the theory of evolution or the New Testament.
Here we're faced with a philosophy that explicitly attempts to base human interactions on what we can observe of nature -- it's precisely what Ayn Rand says we should do.
Who? Ayn Rand? And we care what she thinks because...?
The problem before you is entirely different: you've got to tell us why it's not morally permissible to act according to what we can observe.
I don't have to do any such thing - I merely point out that all the shortcomings you observe in other systems are, in fact, omnipresent, even within your preferred system. I propose no alternative - I simply acknowledge the shortcomings of yours, much as you do with others.
Still, I suppose the best approach to this would be to find a scientific definition. One such scientific definition -- which happens to be in accord with the way evolution proponents think things really happen -- would be that of natural selection.
Why should we accept that? What makes that more "objective" than defining "good" as "that which gives us the most physical pleasure"?
Personally, I'm not in much of a hurry to defend Objectivism as an ethical system, but if you are, be my guest ;)
Objective moral philosophies are supposed to be in accord with reality. I believe Dawkins makes this very point
I'm sure, but I dispute that it's wise, or even possible, to spin scientific theories into moral systems. I suspect I'll get more votes than Dawkins, if it comes right down to it.
If we accept this as true, and if we deny the existence of any supernatural or irrational basis for moral principles, it follows either that there is no such thing as morality, or that morality must have a scientific basis.
No, it really doesn't follow at all. If morality isn't handed to us on a silver platter, all that really follows is that we're responsible for rolling our own. If it amuses us to make a "scientific" morality - not really sure what that means, but whatever - so be it. If we choose to make a moral system exalting the desires of r9etb over all else, so be it. In any case, it's not an either/or thing - either God does it, or all we're left with is fecundity as a moral imperative.
You can certainly describe them as such, but that hardly makes it so.
And your dismissal of same hardly makes it false.
Indeed. And the really nice thing about that argument is that it works equally well for the existence or non-existence of lots of things. Santa Claus, for example. On the other hand, if you wish others to join you in affirming Santaism, you're probably going to have to lay some actual cards on the table eventually. And asking to see them, or a bit more than "the check is in the mail", is not entirely unreasonble, I think.
You might want to defer embracing smug dismissals, also.
"Smug"? Sure. "Dismissal"? Gotta give me something to dismiss first ;)