[Cboldt]

some of the comprehension of FISA escapes me - because they seem at direct odds with the way the NSA routinely handles foreign intercepts (no warrants, monitoring for keywords all the time, from what I have read about some of their standard practices). Is the NSA "violating" FISA all the time? In this case, they had an even higher probably cause for intercepts - actual contact phone numbers obtained from captured terrorists and other intercepted communications.

NSA activity is outside the bounds of FISA because it is indiscriminate, and its methods and procedures are state secrets.. Those paradigms have been admitted, asserted or conceded many times in open court. Think of NSA as a bucket that has all of everybody's private communications in it - not viewed by a human, but available on request.

The government has access to that bucket. It contains all the discussions of reporters, politicians, terrorists and average citizens going about their business. Hard as it may be, abstract the technical methods away, and ask what "dipping into the bucket" should be obtainable without a warrant. If a terrorist has the phone numbers of all reporters on his computer, are all reporters fair game for wiretapping? I think that is the nature of the question. Obviously, not just regarding reporters. Terrorists come in contact with all sorts of people in their ordinary daily lives. How wide should the net be cast, without a warrant based on probable cause?

Or is it pro-terrorist to even ask that question?

[oceanview]

yes, but then what is a "wiretap". If I put headphones on and listen to your conversation, or I write a computer program to analyze that conversation and email me a summary of what you said - its really the same thing (or can be made to be).