"Spent 11 years in the US Navy."
OK. I just read an article somewhere, you actually know something about it.
All I am saying is, the Navy is projecting unbelievable reductions, percentage-wise in the next generation of sailors needed to man the next generation of ships. Repair may be just as labor-intensive, but it seems to me if you cut down the number of sailors on board---the "tail" gets smaller too.
I believe, in fact, the current generation of ships was designed under the philosophy, "Why have a machine do it when sailors are so cheap?" No?
Sailors are not exactly cheap. Good ones require a huge investment in time, money and education to produce. An experienced sailor, regardless of rating or MOS, is a valuable commodity.
It also does not automatically follow that if you reduce the number of men per ship, but then increase the number of ships available (this is one of the selling points of Streetfighter, for example, cheap surge production), you do not necessarily reduce the tail. Particularly if you have to stage them out of overseas bases, which we might have to do in the event of war against China. We wouldn't ncessarily just operate out of Japan, Okinawa and South Korea.
"I believe, in fact, the current generation of ships was designed under the philosophy, "Why have a machine do it when sailors are so cheap?"
No, I don't think so.
The routine maintenance required of a ship of the line and all its gear is unbelievable, from chipping and painting to replacing the klystron on a Vulcan Phalanx.
When you take a hit, or multiple hits, you need men, lots of men, for damage control.
In the end, a ship is still a steel box floating on the ocean, and there is no technology to "auto-repair" a big hole in the hull under the waterline. There is no practical technology to set various conditions of watertight and airtight integrity throughout that steel box.
And when the "automatic" fire suppression systems fail, as is inevitable, you need men to suit up and fight the fire.
Another consideration is watchstanding. Consider a ship steaming in modified condition 1, that only has two qualified TAOs. One of them has to be in CIC at all times.
Suppose they take 12-hour watches, port and starboard. Since the surface navy eats its own, they will also be expected to spend at least 8 hours a day on routine department head functions. That's 20 hours, excluding meals, officers' calls, special briefings, and contingencies.
All too many men spend their entire tours of duty trembling on the bring of collapse from fatigue, even with a crew of 350. Cut that number in half, and what will ensue?
On the other end of the chain of command, take the day of a deck seaman. Midnight to four, watch. 0430 to 0600, sleep. 0600 to 0730, titivate ship, shower, shave, breakfast. 0730, turn to, commence working day (chipping and painting, maintenance, etc.). 1130 to 1150, grab some lunch. 1200 to 1600, back on watch. 1600 to around 1700, back to normal work day. 1700 to around 1745, dinner. 1800 to 1945, there *might* be a chance to get some sleep, unless there's a drill or underway replenishment. 2000-2400, back on watch.
That's with three-section watches. On port-and-starboard watches, it's worse. And I haven't added in things like GQ drills, vertreps, unreps, weapons shoots, and on and on.
Fatigue causes accidents, and even at today's manning levels, fatigue is a serious problem.