Losing the Battleships

WASHINGTON -- U.S. Marines, while fighting valiantly in Iraq, are on the verge of serious defeat on Capitol Hill. A Senate-House conference on the Armed Services authorization bill convening this week is considering turning the Navy's last two battleships, the Iowa and Wisconsin, into museums. Marine officers fear that deprives them of vital fire support in an uncertain future.

Gen. Michael W. Hagee, the current commandant of the Marine Corps, testified on April 1, 2003, that loss of naval surface fire support from battleships would place his troops "at considerable risk." On July 29 this year, Hagee asserted: "Our aviation is really quite good, but it can, in fact, be weathered." Nevertheless, Marine leaders have given up a public fight for fear of alienating Navy colleagues.

The Navy high command is determined to get rid of the battleships, relying for support on an expensive new destroyer at least 10 years in the future. This is how Washington works. Defense contractors, Pentagon bureaucrats, congressional staffers and career-minded officers make this decision that may ultimately be paid for by Marine and Army infantrymen.

Marine desire to reactivate the Iowa and Wisconsin runs counter to the DD(X) destroyer of the future. It will not be ready before 2015, costing between $4.7 billion and $7 billion. Keeping the battleships in reserve costs only $250,000 a year, with reactivation estimated at $500 million (taking six months to a year) and full modernization more than $1.5 billion (less than two years).

On the modernized battleships, 18 big (16-inch) guns could fire 460 projectiles in nine minutes and take out hardened targets in North Korea. In contrast, the DD(X) will fire only 70 long-range attack projectiles at $1 million a minute. Therefore, the new destroyer will rely on conventional 155-millimeter rounds that Marines say cannot reach the shore. Former longtime National Security Council staffer William L. Stearman, now executive director of the U.S. Naval Fire Support Association, told me, "In short, this enormously expensive ship cannot fulfill its primary mission: provide naval surface fire support for the Marine Corps."

Did it ever occur to you that using your existing stock of usable hulls is a cheaper proposition than buying new ones from Litton until you're broke?

In this case, no. The cost of bringing the ships up to current standards, manning them, and operating them will far exceed newer hulls. Three billion to modernize the two will buy 3 or 4 Burke Class destroyers. Those three or four destroyers will require about 1200 officers and men total, far less than one battleship will require. Cost of fuel and operations and spare parts will be less. So for the same amount of money you have twice the assets that can perform more jobs better than your precious battleships can.

Taking your logic a little further, perhaps you'd like to try to do the job with a mighty fleet of highly flexible Boston whalers equipped with RPG's -- the way the Iranian Revolutionary Guards were doing it, back before "Robocruiser" cleaned their clock.

Now you're just being silly. No surprise there.

That's the rowboat Navy of the future the "on-the-cheap" thinking in the White House and Pentagon is lusting to buy us, in lieu of all those horridly expensive real ships manned by hundreds of real men.

I would point out that the DDGs and CGs and the submarines that we have in the Navy right now ARE real ships manned by real men and women capable of performing gunfire support and ASW and air defense and my logic gives us more of them than your scheme. What passes for your logic gives us two ships that can only perform one task of the three, and that third task can be replaced by carrier aircraft. If we're lucky you'll be named Secretary of the Navy in the reborn confederacy. Then you can dredge up the CSS Virginia off the bottom of Hampton Roads and reuse that hull.

....capable of performing gunfire support and ASW and air defense....

Surface ships are not capable of performing real ASW. Real ASW, and I speak as someone who specialized in it when I was "in", can only be performed by a) aircraft and b) other submarines. It's an unfortunate truism popular among "bubbles" and never yet shown to be false, that all surface ships are just targets to a submarine.

Which is true for all surface types, including CVA's, so if you want to press ahead with your aspersive "logic", you'll have to be internally consistent and get rid of the CV's, amphibs, and cruisers, as well as the BB's.

Oh, yeah -- and destroyers, too.

......and my logic gives us more of them than your scheme.

More isn't necessarily better, if what you want won't survive long enough to get the job done. I once found an old wartime pamphlet in a locker in a decommissioned 1600-class DD that stated that the life expectancy of a DD in combat was 20 minutes. In other words, they were lightly-built ships that couldn't take a punch, although, moored about two piers over, was the USS Farenholt, which had somehow survived several 14" hits from the IJNS Kirishima and lived to tell the tale. The successors of those destroyers are not much more survivable. And the ones with aluminum superstructures burn like a torch.

What passes for your logic gives us two ships that can only perform one task of the three, and that third task can be replaced by carrier aircraft.

I guess you weren't paying attention when our friend recalled the bombardment of Suribachi, when aerial bombing didn't get the job done, but GFS did.

Then there's the matter of the relative expense of 16" rounds manufactured in 1937, paid for ages ago and still good to go, versus JDAM's at a million a copy.

Your source varies from Morrison's account and the excellent narrative "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" by Hornfischer.

"But his orders still stood". Yes, precisely: to engage and eliminate the carriers and then proceed to remove the transports. Regardless of whether he changed or reinterpreted his orders, Kurita could not have attacked the transports without eliminating Taffy3. Taffy3 (and Taffy2 as well) was in his way.

"If Yamato left the pursuit of Taffy 3 to comb torpedo wakes, it wasn't for long. In any case, it was only a few more minutes before Kurita made his decision to break off the pursuit "

Yes, as I said, long enough to effectively remove him from the battle. He thought he was chasing down fleet carriers and the anti-aircraft support of his cruisers and destroyers had been badly mauled by the superstructure strafing of Taffy3 planes and the DD screeners. By the time the Yamato completed her turn to the south, he was far enough out of range that he could not directly shell the carriers and he was faced with trying to chase down what he still believed to be Halsey's main force with no hope of reinforcement.

Kuritas destruction of the force was by no means assured. The screen had exhausted their torpedoes and many of the carriers were unable to launch or recover planes, but Kinkaid had gambled, rightly, when turning his force south and west toward Samar and Leyte. He was running towards Taffy2 and the hope of more air support from both ground and carrier sources.

My original point remains- destroyers and destroyer escorts with superior fire control systems, great maneuverability and a great deal of courage can delay or even halt an attack by vastly superior battleships. The Chinese destroyers and cruisers now afloat and in production are guaranteed to have better fire control systems than the main guns of the Iowa class ships- unless we completely refit the entire ship.

A balanced fleet including CV airpower, Nuke subs, Surface Combatants, and Amphibs as well as adaquate auxiliary and supporting MCM and small craft is essential to our ongoing security. That said, a sub is in fact the best ASW platform but the threat from hostile subs is only one of our current concerns. No CVBG sails into harms way without 1-2 SSNs in direct support and a variable quantity supporting the theater. They are best used this way but recall the absurdity of a nuke in the Red Sea lobing it's 15 TLAMS at Iraq. Certainly you can agree that this was just to let people know that the "Silent Service" was reporting for duty. The newly converted SSGNs will be a quite useful option going forward as a conventional deterent but surface ships can do the day to day TLAM shooter job cheaper and with the neccessary Media punch that the subs just don't give us.

More certainly is better when it comes to maintaining a presence in many theaters at once. It is also a useful asset when the bubble goes up and your enemy must classify and engage multiple dispersed units which are capable of self and area AAW, as well as Strike, ASuW and ASW.

As for survival, "Don't get hit" is the best way to handle this situation. A Burke class DD is not a 'tin can' like the 1600 tonners. They can protect themselves and the BG against some awesome threats and they continue to evolve as the threat does. They are also surprisingly tough, exhibit 1 is the Cole. They have virtually no aluminum except the mast. These ships benefit from advancements in technology since the advent of Spruance/Ticonderoga/O. H. Perry classes which continued the use of aluminum superstructures that started in the 60's. Reduced crew size and the shrinking of combat systems components allowed a return to all steel construction. Even the 70's era ships above are no lightweights in the survivability category. During Desert Storm the Tico class cruiser Princeton survived the detonation of two influence mines. (Torn up? Yes, but combat systems were back online in under 2 hours and if necessary she could have steamed out of the combat zone.)
Samuel B. Roberts, a Perry class frigate, struck an old style contact mine and lived. She's still serving today. The Stark took 2 Exocets and returned to service. (Yes, I know they did not detonate but I know the DCA at the time and the punishment that ship took was amazing)

The above is a good indication that the statement 'they really don't make 'em like they used to' is still true, 'we make 'em better!'.

The lesson in this is that though catastrophic damage was done these vessels protected their crews well. We also had enough of these 'cheap' ships to provide support to the stricken units while continuing the mission. This shows that 'quantity does have quality all it's own'.

There is a disclaimer that I must add. I served in a Spru Can and know first hand that all ships can not be all things, but the Navy has an excellent mix of capability to survivability.

I do agree that there are things that 16" shells do better than anything else, but I believe that 24 Burkes with an 8" gun and no change to current manning levels beats the 2 Iowas and their associated cost in $$$ and manpower. No case can be made that those 2 Iowas could replace 8-9 Burkes from manning and operational costs perspective. Reality says that we would need 4-8 more Burkes to escort the BBs. Additionally, even though the BBs would have 'called away sweepers' in the situations sighted above and continued with their missions, it is unlikely that BBs would have been escorting reflagged tankers (Roberts) or screening the fleet from air attack in shallow waters (Princeton).

I would rather see these ships retained in reserve even as museums (as Wisconsin is currently) for future mobilization. They could be brought out if things change, but for now there are better solutions (Not the DDX though).

"But his orders still stood". Yes, precisely: to engage and eliminate the carriers and then proceed to remove the transports.

I guess we just disagree about Kurita's orders and the objective of Operation Sho.

The presence of Taffy 2 (whose topmasts he could see on the southern horizon) was a factor influencing Kurita to seek an action with (nonexistent) forces to his north, closer to the San Bernardino Strait. He sortied Yamato's two search floatplanes which disappeared, but not before the one sent north reported by radio that no U.S. ships could be seen. So presumably he must have deduced that the U.S. forces whose aircraft he saw in action overhead lay to the south and east. (McCain's Third Fleet task group had been detached from Halsey and sent for R&R at Ulithi, then recalled at flank speed, and was at the moment approaching from the east at 30 knots.)

My original point remains- destroyers and destroyer escorts with superior fire control systems, great maneuverability and a great deal of courage can delay or even halt an attack by vastly superior battleships.

As brave as they were, the "Small Boys" at Leyte didn't stop Kurita -- really, they didn't. What stopped Kurita was

His own deviation from his original orders, which were to expend his force if necessary in breaking up the Leyte landings and destroy the Allied transport capacity.
His own belated realization that a stern-chase against what he (wrongly) assumed to be 30-knot carriers would be a protracted affair, costly in fuel -- a point he obviously hadn't thought out beforehand
His misapprehension of crushingly superior forces all around him (so what, if he had been ordered to "break the jewel" anyway?)
His misidentification of the adversary and wrong assumptions about Kinkaid's forces' composition and capabilities, and lastly
His own fatigue, which unsuited him to crisp, decisive, and correct decisions in the face of the "fog of war" -- a point observed against Kurita early in the action by Admiral Ugaki, who commented about Adm. Kurita and his staff to his own diary, having observed their performance closely on the admirals' bridge of Yamato, "they lacked fighting spirit and promptitude."

The Chinese destroyers and cruisers now afloat and in production are guaranteed to have better fire control systems than the main guns of the Iowa class ships- unless we completely refit the entire ship.

If that test is ever carried out, I sincerely hope you are aboard the BB's.

Put bluntly, how good fire control do you need, given the CEP and destructive radius of a 16" conventional round?

Besides, new radars solve instantly the main source of error in training artillery fire -- ranging the target. That problem was solved 40, 50 years ago. Or are you expecting the BB's to sortie with their 1944 CIC's and equipment?

They are best used this way but recall the absurdity of a nuke in the Red Sea lob[b]ing it's 15 TLAMS at Iraq. Certainly you can agree that this was just to let people know that the "Silent Service" was reporting for duty. The newly converted SSGNs will be a quite useful option going forward as a conventional deterent but surface ships can do the day to day TLAM shooter job cheaper and with the neccessary Media punch that the subs just don't give us.

OTOH, the Silent Service can, without notice or warning, put one down your stovepipe from long range, without anyone's being particularly aware that Sneaky Pete was in the area. Great way to deal with terrorist camps and people like Osama and Abu Ayman.

We need more submarines, but speaking of expense, I think we need to break out some older blueprints and revert to less expensive, more basic nukey-boat designs (638's and 688's) and Fleet reserve callups (yes, I know about the radiation buildup problem) to put generic submarines into service, even diesel boats of the newer designs like the Japanese ones or the Kockums-designed Australian Collinses. Sometimes you don't need a Seawolf on station, sometimes you just need a submarine. We're in danger of becoming a five-submarine Navy if what I suspect are "peace-dividend" motivated build-down trends are allowed to continue. Your comment about quantity having a quality all its own has relevance here.

Samuel B. Roberts, a Perry class frigate, struck an old style contact mine and lived. She's still serving today.

The original Samuel B. Roberts was a DE, one of the "Small Boys" that took their heroic death-ride at Samar. Great little ship, great name. I expect there'll be a Samuel B. Roberts in the United States Navy for the next 200 years.

I do agree that there are things that 16" shells do better than anything else, but I believe that 24 Burkes with an 8" gun and no change to current manning levels beats the 2 Iowas and their associated cost in $$$ and manpower.

I thought that 8" lightweight gun had flunked its operational testing. Like the Army's DIVAD SP AA gun, it was an idea that didn't work.

So you want 24 Burkes? Yeah, well, 120 would be even better, wouldn't they? Point is, you'd have to build them -- the Iowas, four of them, are already there. What else do you want -- vertical-launch Standard? Plenty of room on a BB's weather decks. More SSM launchers? Plenty of room for them, too. Sea Wolf or navalized Patriot SAM systems, or maybe heavier-caliber Dardo AA gun systems to complement Phalanx CIWS? Can do. SURTASS? Nye problema -- 'course, you'll need an ASW asset with an ASCAC and some VDS/Sonobuoy-equipped LAMPS to go shoo away the submarine; presumably, you'll have one along inside your screen somewhere.

Whatever you can hang on a 7,000-ton hull, you can certainly hang more of on a 45,000-ton one.

A little backwards but, 24 Burkes already exist. My suggestion is to replace the 5" Pop gun and the forward 32 round VLS with an 8" MCLWG ~100 Long Range Guided Munition rounds, and about 3-400 rds conventional 8" ammo. These ships are the Flight I/II non aviation ships. They would retain the 64 round aft VLS.

The 8" program was suspended in the seventies as too costly since we had 3 Newport News CAs and 4 Iowa BBs in category B reserve. They were designed to replace the forward gun on Spruance class destroyers. The tests conducted used only conventional rounds and were very sucessful. The 11 calibre round (this is a 7 foot long missile) never was developed as too expensive with the tech of the day. We could without much problem move our ERGM/AGS 5/6" programs into an 8" shell with no significant extra cost. There are also substantial numbers of rounds available since the Army's 8" Rocket assisted Copperhead rounds can be fired from this gun. (By the way, the original 75 round version of this system that tested on the USS Hull is still down at Dahlgren and might be able to be refurbished for a quick startup to testing.)

The problem with the everything to everyone super BBs is that 4 of these (more likely 1-2) are difficult to maintain, expensive to convert and hard to man even after substantial efforts at manning reduction. These are capitol ships and require escorts that are not in our current force structure (2-4 additional Burkes each). They are not able to replace a CVN BG. The chance that 1 of these will be where you need it, when you need it is pretty low. 24 8" Burkes mean that there are 2 with each Expeditionary Strike Group with 4-6 deployed at all times. The BBs admittedly can protect their crews better than the Princeton/ Cole/ Roberts/ Stark did, however once damaged we probably would have extreme dificulty repairing these ships armour schemes.

Subs. Agreed, the "bolt out of the blue" scenario is extremely useful and you won't find any argument here, the case I cited was not a surprise shot since there were plenty of other ships tossing tomahawks at that time.

We agree that "sometimes you don't need a Seawolf" I would go with a number of modern Skipjacks (small, fast, handy). Diesel boats are probably too limited in capabilities. We can train against 'friendly' nation's diesels when we need to, so that argument that I've heard, doesn't stick.

My suggestion is to replace the 5" Pop gun and the forward 32 round VLS with an 8" MCLWG ~100 Long Range Guided Munition rounds, and about 3-400 rds conventional 8" ammo.

Your argument for doing that program doesn't invalidate the usefulness of BB's, since even 8" rounds can't compete with the destructive bombardment capability of nine 16". If you need shore facilities removed quickly, you can't do it better or with more dire penetration than you can starting with a 16" AP round.

And I notice you are reticent about the possibilities of modernization of the 16" ammunition mix, however eloquent you are on the subject of what can be done with the much more modest 8" round. You can fire these same wunderkind rounds from a 16" tube -- but not vice versa.

And we haven't discussed the ranging possibilities of firing your same 8" round as a discarding-sabot round -- a giant spitzer round -- from the 16" battery of a BB, nine at a time.

Face it -- bigger is bigger, and more is more. You can pack a hell of a lot more wallop into these 45,000-ton hulls than you can into a tin can's, however modern.

These are capitol ships and require escorts that are not in our current force structure (2-4 additional Burkes each). They are not able to replace a CVN BG.

You keep saying that, and demanding that we build a group around each one, even after I've pointed out that, their main role nowadays being GFS and C3I, they (and any gun cruisers we reactivated) would likely accompany existing groups carrying MEU's afloat.

And I have not argued for building battle groups around BB's, the way some people did during the Reagan administration -- and my understanding at the time was that such groups were intended mainly for political demonstrations, like the time Harry Truman pointedly parked the Missouri in the Bosphorus for the Russians' benefit, pegging her appearance with the necessity of transporting home with honors the recently-deceased Turkish ambassador to the U.S.

Your argument for a destroyer Navy simply does not recognize the larger contribution that big ships can make, and the more-capable AAW and surface-warfare systems that can be embarked in cruiser-size and bigger ships. You're basically making the same argument the MacNamaras of 45 years ago made, when they condemned the cruiser concept, but then turned around and built bigger and bigger DLG's around more-capable weapon systems, only to re-rate them CLG's and CG's later on. Even the Burke class, in order to float their Aegis systems, have had to be made bigger than the light cruisers built in such numbers under Lord Fisher, as the workhorses of the old Royal Navy. Those ships were 3000-4000 tons, armed with six to ten quick-firing, (eventually) directionally-controlled 6", and capable of 27-29 knots, which was damned fast in late Edwardian terms. Then they went out and built battlecruisers that could do 35 knots, and even (in one incident in 1918) touch 41 knots in a sprint -- Renown and Repulse allegedly did that, trying to chase down a German capital-ship sortie. Imagine the shock of the destroyermen, being left behind by their guides -- "the horror! the horror!" LOL.

More ship is just more ship, and this constant minimization of the big ships' very considerable capabilities reflects, I think, political unwillingness to spend money on the Navy, this constant desire to "do this on the cheap" -- those words will be carved on Don Rumsfeld's headstone ( never mind that the thought came from Dubya and Karl Rove and Slick Willie). It is simply the institutionalized desire, by some taxpayers, to minimize naval spending and naval capabilities. That's why Poppy wanted to mothball the BB divisions in the first place and disband the heavy armored divisions. He wanted to take us back to the 1930's, when the Army Air Corps trained bombardiers with sacks of flour and the National Guard trained with wooden rifles and delivery-trucks with the word "TANK" whitewashed on their sides.

And Poppy was very nearly embarrassed by Saddam Hussain -- and he would have been, had Hussain displayed about 18 months' more restraint before manifesting his plans for Kuwait. Hell, he could have taken control of the entire southern shore of the Persian Gulf. He could have gone all the way to Oman and changed the face of politics. And Bush couldn't have stopped him, because he wouldn't have had the horses any more -- on his own initiative. He'd have ended up being the Republican Carter, the guy who gutted the Reagan-era military for tax cuts on Park Avenue, who introduced another period of U.S. weakness and embarrassment -- not the liberator of Kuwait.

And remember, under DIRTXPOTUS there were senior officers who hitched their wagons to the idea of a mosquito navy of missile-armed PG's and hydrofoils -- based on what? Old destroyer-tenders? -- and cheesebox-on-a-raft "stealth" destroyers that somehow couldn't be seen by enemy weapon systems. Nuts. If you can see it, you can shoot it, and that means a minimum of eight hours a day of vulnerability to old-fashioned naval gunfire and iron bombs, unless you plan to deploy only in seasonal darkness above the Arctic Circle.

All these guys want to do the same thing. The will to build a first-rate establishment and keep it is kitten-weak, and that is what is drawing out the Chinese and making much more likely the need to use whatever naval establishment our politicians will saddle us with.

We agree that "sometimes you don't need a Seawolf" I would go with a number of modern Skipjacks (small, fast, handy). Diesel boats are probably too limited in capabilities. We can train against 'friendly' nation's diesels when we need to, so that argument that I've heard, doesn't stick.

We agree then that a smaller submarine class is needed.....the French designed a 2700-ton SSN and offered it for export, the Rubis class. The Canadians were considering a purchase of about six of them for under-ice patrols (necessitated by evolving Soviet SSBN operational practices) but cancelled when the end of the Cold War mooted the threat.

The Australian Collins and her sisters are quite rangy, and both they and their Japanese counterparts might surprise you, if you've looked at their operational characteristics, endurance, and so on. As a much-more-economical alternative to SSN's of whatever description (even the Rubis type), a couple of squadrons of SS/SSK could handle a number of journeyman jobs, such as covert surveillance, Sneaky Pete operations, and accompanying MEU's as SSK escorts, as well as more-mundane things like fleet visits, VIP ride-alongs, etc. etc. -- I don't ever again want to hear about civilians getting ride-alongs on first-rate SSN's, but that's just me.

It would also be interesting to exercise with our friends down in Oz or in Japan, to see whether their diesel-boats would be more effective in the SSK escorting role for transiting task groups than small SSN's like the Rubis -- I would think so. Diesel-boats with big batteries have been long recognized as an ASW headache for forces afloat. It would be interesting to see what they could do on the other side of the ball.

Absolutly agree with you on there being no substitute for a 16" gun. But, there are just so many targets that require 16" guns. Getting more 8" guns to the various deployed Expeditionary Strike Groups would be more effective than 2 or at most 4 BBs (by the way the only 2 gun cruisers left are the Des Moines and Salem, I've seen them both and they are toast. The other BBs - Alabama, Massachusetts and North Carolina are pretty rough and are best left as museums). I made the case on another post that keeping all four Iowas in good shape is a good idea. If we need them they will be there. With 10-15 years of a fifty year service life used, that means if we had kept them in service they would be approaching 30 years now. They would be done by 2025. China will be approaching real parity by then, by more than a few estimates. What do you do then? We have carriers in real need of replacement, and they don't come cheap. Save the BBs for a rainy day.

I don't consider the Ticos or Burkes anything like being on the cheap (The Knoxs, Spruances, and Perrys, now they were a Navy bought on the cheap, but we still won the war with them). They are extremely capable ships that can be spread around where you need them. They are in fact cruisers in many other navies. The planned DDX is stealthy but not for "daylight ops" instead they are harder to find at sea with satellites from not just a Radar perspective but also IR and wake generation. Admittedly all good things, but not when the carriers and other high value units are distinctly un-stealthy.

I am not a fan of 14,000 ton 'destroyers', that is a cruiser and I would like to see CGX/DDX rolled together to be the Tico replacement with full multimission capability. The DDX will be too limited in AAW. The plan to get 30 DD21 is now 24 DDX at about 3 BILLION bucks each. Almost certainly this will be chopped back. I would rather see 24 CGX and have some more Burkes and maybe a stretched (DLG?) with some of the DDX tech stuff incorporated into them. The LCS is our low end mix and I'm still waiting to see how that works out.

Money, it always come down to money. Money for ships, money for R&D, money for crews it never ends. Yes, I would love to give my navy everything they want/need but facts are facts we don't have the bucks (yes, I know that unconstitutional social dogooding is eatting away at the constitutionally mandated defence of this nation, but we can't even manage to do away with the universally hated IRS, try springing an extra 100 Billion to get more and better ships out of Congress). Reality bites, we need to build the best military we can with what we can get. That means probably no BBs and no 8" MCLWGs. We get DDX with 6" AGS and 5" ERGMs on the rest of the fleet. Hope the 'pop guns' and "Super Hornets" can save the day.

Looking at our potential adversaries, few could track down even our 1st generation nukes let alone the whisper quiet boats of today, so an ultra quiet diesel boat for an offensive force is not really the best choice.

The Soviets used to platoon their diesel boats in the Med from the Northern Fleet, using a Don- or Ugra-class tender and transiting five or six same-type SS boats together (all Foxtrots or all Zulus, etc.), accompanied closely by a Juliett or Whiskey SSG. If there was a nukey-boat in the relief force, like an Echo or a Charlie, he transited independently but on more or less the same timing.

Protecting a transiting MEF with SSK's would be doable if a tender were in the group and transit speeds were less than 15-20 knots. Otherwise you'd need newer, quiet SSN's to protect the transit and then use your SSK's for area protection later, after you'd got where you were going.

You'd want newbuild boats, too -- the recent Canadian experience with the former HMS Upholder, I think it was, being an unfortunate case-in-point. Very good boats when new, with low hours, they were reportedly in poor shape when the British undertook to return them to service for transfer to the Canadians, after laying up for a number of years.

The U-class British design, or the Kockums design bought by the Australians, or the newer Japanese designs would all be contenders. But you'd want to build them yourself, or make some sort of co-production arrangement if absolutely necessary, building a few boats while you figured out which of your bag of quieting tricks you'd like to apply to the basic design, and then modifying the design on later boats, then coming back after five years or so to update the first boats.

You'd also need to bring back the distinction between golden and silver dolphins.

The Barbels were good boats and I know some bubbleheads who retired when they finally went away.

There were the problem boats, too .....

"Harder, Darter, Trigger, Trout,
Always in and never out." -- Anon.

Their engine design was basically a flop, a mechanical disaster area. Albacore was a smash hit, however, and the boat, iirc, was kept in service for many years.

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