Posted on 11/17/2005 5:10:51 AM PST by veronica
November 17, 2005 -- CALL it "Deep Throat 2." The CIA-leak probe is in big trouble because superstar reporter and Watergate hero Bob Woodward has emerged as a surprise witness for the defense — potentially undermining the case against ex-White House aide Scooter Libby.
Woodward yesterday revealed that he's told prosecutors he could be the first reporter to learn from a Bush administration source that Iraq war critic Joe Wilson's wife worked as a CIA analyst — but Libby wasn't his new "Deep Throat."
(Excerpt) Read more at nypost.com ...
Materiality is more like "germaneness." There would be no perjury in this case if the witness lies about what he had for lunch, or what he watched on teevee, etc., because those inquiries have absolutely no bearing on the investigation at hand.
The false statement must be material to the proceedings. A false statement is material if it has "a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed." Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)(denaturalization proceeding). The testimony need not have actually influenced, misled or impeded the proceeding. For example, potential interference with the grand jury's line of inquiry suffices to establish materiality, because of the grand jury's broad investigative function. United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gribben, 984 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1993). The government need not prove the legitimacy of the grand jury's investigation which led to the testimony, only the pertinence of the particular testimony to the grand jury's investigation. United States v. Regan, 103 F.3d 1072 (2d Cir. 1997). A similarly broad construction of materiality is appropriate in the context of false declarations made in connection with civil depositions. United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 99 (1994); United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 924 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 821 (1993). But see United States v. Adams, 870 F.2d 1140, 1146-48 (6th Cir. 1989)(false statement must tend to affect the outcome of the underlying civil suit for which the deposition was taken). The statement may be material to any proper matter of inquiry, including collateral matters that might influence the outcome of decisions before the tribunal, such as determining credibility issues. United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d at 755. Materiality is not negated merely because the tribunal did not believe the testimony or sought cumulative information. United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1419 n.20 (3d Cir. 1994). Furthermore, testimony may be material even if it relates to events as to which the statute of limitations has run, since the grand jury may have legitimate reasons to inquire about such events aside from an expectation of returning an indictment charging those events as crimes. United States v. Chen, 933 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Nazzaro, 889 F.2d 1158, 1165-66 (1st Cir. 1989).If there is no crime and no possibilty of uncovering a crime, than the testimony is immaterial.http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01748.htm
You are trying to make this more complicated that it is.
I think I am wasting my time with you, but others may find the citations useful and edifying.
And, lest we forget, prosecution in cases like this is up to the discretion of the prosecutor. It is selective prosecution to indict for something like this.
I agree with that.
Even you cannot come up with a similar instance. There are none.
I cited one where perjury stood where the underlying offense was impossible because the statute was void due to constitutional infirmity. I don't know the US v. Regan case, so won't comment on it except to say that it appears to stand for the proposition that one does not escape perjury charges just because the investigation is bogus.
Both are probably true, in your mind.
Clinton was under oath in a legal proceeding before a judge. It doesn't matter if it is civil or not.
But your test of materiality was whether or not the defendant could be convicted - i.e., no crime, no way for there to be materiality. In the Clinton case, the cash settlement was a condition that Jones imposed for her to drop the case. She dropped the case, and promised not to sue on the same cause of action.
Libby was under oath, and was being questioned by federal investigators. You are excusing lying in that context, on the condition that the investigation cannot result in a charge of the underlying crime. Even DiGenova disagrees with you on that point.
Yeah, you're wasting your time. LOL
You don't even know how the law works, how a Grand Jury works, and you are pulling up all of these bogus citations like you are a lawyer.
I note that someone even called you on your claim to be a prosecutor. I think you got a little carried away.
Enjoy your fantasies. I'm done wasting my time on you. I should know better by now than to feed the trolls.
Can't refute the cites, can you.
My respect for Woodward went up during this.
For all Fitzy knows, Russert is the liar. But he indicted Libby. The case is built on sand.
There's more to it than that, but Martha's case and Libby's are 99.999999999999% dissimilar.
Well, he came forward only cause he had to and only after it was too late to help Libby and while his colleagues like Pincus were breathlessly panting for Rove and Cheney to be indicted, too..
I agree as well. The question for me is always, what is in it for him. It strikes me that most "always in the beltway" types are out for themselves, period—whether it is money or power or the all important combination of them both.
You are right. And you should know. Bridges can cause serious head injuries.
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