Replies

http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-20040623.htm

1998
With the end of Ramadan on January 29 and Saddam still failing to comply with his commitment to the U.N. to disarm, Clinton officials resumed public efforts to make the case on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.

Secretary Albright flew to the Middle East to drum up support for possible war.21 "Saddam Hussein, armed with chemical and biological weapons, is a threat to the international community," she told journalists in Bahrain.22

A few days later, on February 7, Clinton, joined by Prime Minister Blair, devoted his Saturday radio address to Iraq. Noting the two were speaking from the same room where FDR and Churchill "charted our path victory in World War II," Clinton told Americans that we now face "a new nexus of threats, none more dangerous than chemical and biological weapons, and the terrorists, criminals and outlaw states that seek to acquire them." He warned that "Iraq continues to conceal chemical and biological weapon[s]," "has the "missiles that can deliver them" and "has the capacity to quickly restart production of these weapons."23

How fast Saddam could "restart production" was discussed in a 10-page U.S. Government white paper on "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction" released on February 13.24 "In the absence of UNSCOM inspectors," the report stated, "Iraq could restart limited mustard agent production with[in] a few weeks, full-production of sarin within a few months, and pre-Gulf war production levels - including VX - within two or three years." It had a chart listing how many were killed by Saddam's chemical weapons in the 1980s. It noted that although inspections severely curtailed Iraq's wmd programs, Saddam "is actively trying to retain what remains of his wmd programs while wearing down the will of the Security Council to maintain sanctions." But, "even a small residual force of operational missiles armed with biological or chemical warheads would pose a serious threat to neighboring countries and US military forces in the region."25

It detailed the biological and chemical agents and munitions for which Iraq had not accounted. It stated that Iraq "provided no hard evidence to support claims that it destroyed all of its BW agents and munitions in 1991" and "has not supplied adequate evidence to support its claim that it destroyed all of its CW agents and munitions."26

The white paper also discussed Iraqi nuclear activity.

Under the White Paper's "nuclear weapons" section, it observed: "Baghdad's interest in acquiring nuclear or developing nuclear weapons has not diminished"; "we have concerns that scientists may be pursuing theoretical nuclear research that would reduce the time required to produce a weapon should Iraq acquire sufficient fissile material"; "Iraq continues to withhold significant information about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraq's security and intelligence services in obtaining external assistance and coordinating postwar concealment."27

On February 17, President Clinton spoke on the steps of the Pentagon. The president declared that the great danger confronting the U.S. and its allies was the "threat Iraq poses now-a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals who travel the world among us unnoticed." Before the Gulf War of 1991, he noted, "Saddam had built up a terrible arsenal, and he had used it. Not once, but many times in a decade-long war with Iran, he used chemical weapons against combatants, against civilians, against a foreign adversary and even against his own people."28

Clinton furthered explained that:

Iraq "admitted, among other things, an offensive biological warfare capability, notably, 5,000 gallons of botulinum, which causes botulism; 2,000 gallons of anthrax; 25 biological-filled Scud warheads; and 157 aerial bombs. And I might say UNSCOM inspectors believe that Iraq has actually greatly understated its production. . . .

"Over the past few months, as [the weapons inspectors] have come closer and closer to rooting out Iraq's remaining nuclear capacity, Saddam has undertaken yet another gambit to thwart their ambitions by imposing debilitating conditions on the inspectors and declaring key sites which have still not been inspected off limits . . . .

"It is obvious that there is an attempt here, based on the whole history of this operation since 1991, to protect whatever remains of his capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction, the missiles to deliver them, and the feed stocks necessary to produce them. The UNSCOM inspectors believe that Iraq still has stockpiles of chemical and biological munitions, a small force of Scud-type missiles, and the capacity to restart quickly its production program and build many, many more weapons. . . .

"Now, let's imagine the future. What if he fails to comply and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route, which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this program of weapons of mass destruction and continue to press for the release of the sanctions and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made? Well, he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I guarantee you he'll use the arsenal. . . .