Gas and Germs, a 2002 report on the WMD in Syria, add to this very good report the truckloads of Saddams WMD......
(This is only a snip of the report)
granny
http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:JxZoY4Ry6tYJ:www.meforum.org/article/493+Scientific+approaches+into+Russia,+Middle+East+&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&client=googlet
Third, Syria proved resourceful in identifying a wide variety of suppliers, and in shifting gradually and with perfect timing, from European to Asian suppliers.
The friends were many. Egypt's transfer of chemical munitions (which also included small quantities of chemical warfare agents for research purposes) was a onetime affair. But in the late 1970s and during the 1980s, Syria made important strides thanks to knowledge obtained from the Soviet Union (and later, Russia), West Germany, France, and Iran.
The link with the Soviet army developed from its patronage of the Syrian army. The Soviet contribution to the Syrian chemical enterprise is not completely clear, but it seems to have included institutional transfer of information (in part, by the Soviet Chemical Corps), turning a blind eye to information collection by Syrian scientists and chemists-in-training who came to the Soviet Union, and the provision of sample components of munitions.[20]
When the Syrians first developed an aerial bomb containing binary sarin nerve gas, they made use of the Soviet aerial incendiary bomb ZAB for the weaponization of DF and isopropyl alcohol. From these, sarin is obtained in a binary system.At a later stage, the Syrians also explored the possibility of developing chemical warheads for the Soviet aerial cluster bomb PTAB-500 (which contains bomblets) and for the short-range Soviet missiles in Syrian possession, the FROG-7 and SS-21. By the time the commander of the Soviet Chemical Corps visited Syria in 1988, it was widely assumed that the Soviet Union had provided its Syrian clients with the capacity to arm Scud missile warheads with the persistent nerve agent VX.[21]
The connection has continued between Syria and post-Soviet Russia. In 1993, Syria acquired at least 800 kilograms of raw material for production of an updated version of VX, through a straw company established by the retired general Anatoly Kuntsevich, at that time Russian president Boris Yeltsin's adviser on chemical disarmament and commander of the Russian Military Academy for Chemical Warfare. The material was smuggled from the academy, apparently together with technological knowledge about its use. (Kuntsevich was later sacked.) Russian suppliers are believed to have provided additional raw materials via Cyprus, and to have facilitated Syria's production of advanced VX and its development of improved cluster chemical warheads.[22]
But it is in delivery systems that the Russian role is most pronounced. For a host of reasons, both economic and political, Russian arms manufacturers have been actively marketing upgraded weapons systems to Syria.[23] The Syrian air force is aging and deteriorating, due to lack of maintenance and spare parts. Syria sees its missile arsenal as compensation. Some of these systems are particularly suited to WMD, especially a new optically-guided Scud missile that might be capable of penetrating U.S.- and Israeli-made missile defense systems. According to the Russian sources, the upgraded Scud is much more accurate than its predecessors, with a miss distance not exceeding 10 to 20 meters. Accuracy is crucial to delivering the extremely persistent nerve agent VX.
West German companies also did their share. The first Syrian project involved setting up a production line for serial manufacturing of di-fluoro—DF, from which sarin nerve gas for binary munitions is obtained. The process involves two stages. The first requires resistance to a compound that includes chlorine, which has to be produced before the DF; and the second requires resistance to fluoride, an even more destructive component than chlorine. The processes require highly resistant industrial glass components. Syria chose two German companies to provide them: Schott and Sigri.[24]
Schott is one of the largest industrial glass manufacturers in Germany.The company's commercial name, Boresist, highlights its specialization in installations for the production of chemicals, made from glass of high durability in which boric oxide is a supplement to silicon oxide. It was this that led the SSRC to camouflage the entire operation under the name "Borosilicate Glass Project," whose components—chlorine-resistant chemical-reaction vessels and pipes—were supplied by Schott. Thus began the production of chemical weapons in Syria. A few years later—after many tons of the chlorine compound di-chloro (and from it, DF) had been manufactured—a spokesman of the Schott Glasswerke, answered critics. He explained that the company had no idea of the real purpose the Syrians had intended for the equipment Schott sold them. In competitive industries, he claimed, it was quite common for customers not to tell suppliers the reasons for their purchases.[25]
From this search,
http://www.google.com/search?client=googlet&q=Scientific%20approaches%20into%20Russia%2C%20Middle%20East%20
West German companies also did their share. The first Syrian project involved setting up a production line for serial manufacturing of di-fluoro—DF, from which sarin nerve gas for binary munitions is obtained. The process involves two stages. The first requires resistance to a compound that includes chlorine, which has to be produced before the DF; and the second requires resistance to fluoride, an even more destructive component than chlorine. The processes require highly resistant industrial glass components. Syria chose two German companies to provide them: Schott and Sigri.[24]
Schott is one of the largest industrial glass manufacturers in Germany.The company's commercial name, Boresist, highlights its specialization in installations for the production of chemicals, made from glass of high durability in which boric oxide is a supplement to silicon oxide. It was this that led the SSRC to camouflage the entire operation under the name "Borosilicate Glass Project," whose components—chlorine-resistant chemical-reaction vessels and pipes—were supplied by Schott. Thus began the production of chemical weapons in Syria. A few years later—after many tons of the chlorine compound di-chloro (and from it, DF) had been manufactured—a spokesman of the Schott Glasswerke, answered critics. He explained that the company had no idea of the real purpose the Syrians had intended for the equipment Schott sold them. In competitive industries, he claimed, it was quite common for customers not to tell suppliers the reasons for their purchases.[25] <<<<<<<
from the links/post 3809.
The other day there was a glass container that had one of the nuclear elements in it, I would like to know if the glass was made by this company.
Of course, I am still thinking of the terrorist message that had the glass in it.