A highly interesting post, as always.
I'm not sure you're entirely correct on this point, however, in the sense that I don't think it's an entirely a "non-phenomenal" matter. Or, at least, one can point to specific phenomena that seem to be closely related to the issues you've raised.
Your discussion of "organic units" touches upon a seldom-discussed facet of this whole "ID vs. Evolution" debate (even though it does inform Behe's ideas of irreducible complexity). Namely, there is a "system-level" aspect to the problem that is hard to address by appealing to individual mutations that may or may not be advantageous.
Consider the human endocrine system. For many functions there are highly specialized cells in one part of the body that produce a hormone in response to signals sent by other highly specialized cells elsewhere in the body, which enables the body to begin some other process that enables yet another process. For example, my son is diabetic, which has forced me to learn at least a little bit about insulin, and how it fits in with metabolism. It's part of an amazingly complex, precise, and delicately balanced system that enables glucose to be properly processed by the body.
It's tempting in these "ID vs. Evolution" threads to focus on individual bits of DNA and the changes therein; however, this is again quite suggestive of the elephant analogy. The real question, of course, is to explain the development of highly specialized, multi-component systems -- whether it be by hypothesizing the actions of a designer, or by proposing that it came as a result of individual undirected changes in small bits of DNA.
The latter is, of course, the predominant view, but (at least on these threads) there is a strong tendency to leave out the other side of the equation, which is that the "undirected DNA change" has to be accompanied by a mechanism that can reliably translate the mutation into something useful, such as the pancreatic beta cell for the production of insulin, plus the various pieces of the metabolic process that rely on insulin.
It's difficult (for me, anyway) to construct scenario by which an enormously complex system like this comes about by a series of random individual changes -- especially in a system that contains other enormously complex systems with which it must be compatible. The dangers of incompatibility are highlighted by the fact that my son's diabetes came from the immune system selectively objecting to the existence of those pesky beta cells.
The "evolution side" of the debate is constrained to treat this "system-level" aspect as an explicit example of "phenomenal reality." It is not necessary to agree with Behe's conclusions to acknowledge that he's brought up the very important point that evolutionary theory often does not provide rigorous answers to these system-level questions.
Thank you so much for your excellent post, r9etb!
You wrote that I may not be entirely correct with respect to my comments about non-phenomenal reality. Maybe you are correct about this, r9etb. Certainly the examples you give of "system-level" relations seem to entail phenomena. For as you wrote, "the 'undirected DNA change' has to be accompanied by a mechanism that can reliably translate the mutation into something useful, such as the pancreatic beta cell for the production of insulin, plus the various pieces of the metabolic process that rely on insulin."
The point I was trying to get at, however, is that the ultimate system-level is the universe itself: The universe appears to be ordered and purposeful. That is, it is "lawful," and its laws may derive from yet deeper principles. (People have been known to vehemently disagree with me over this issue, as it is their right to do.)
It seems to me the ultimate system-level cannot be an object of intentionalist consciousness, however, since the intending consciousness is part and participant in it. To put it crudely, to my understanding, non-phenomenal existents cannot be subjected to the type of tests for which the scientific method is famous. Since the universe itself cannot be reduced to fit the intentionalist method, I think it partakes of the non-phenomenal with respect to this particular aspect. Likewise history is "non-phenomenal" in this sense: We do not know its future course, so we clearly do not have an object for intentionalist consciousness about which reliable propositions can be advanced. Likewise the concept of "human race," for another example, partakes of the non-phenomenal in a certain fashion. And then there is the case of the individual human person, who also partakes of the "non-phenomenal" as a "component" or dimension of his being.
Maybe I'm just splitting hairs here....
Thank you ever so much for writing, r9etb!
Namely, there is a "system-level" aspect to the problem that is hard to address by appealing to individual mutations that may or may not be advantageous.
Likely you've both heard of Richard Sternberg, the evolutionary biologist involved in the Smithsonian flap. I suspect his "process structuralist" school of biology might attempt to address this lacuna, but I can't find much more on it. I came across a talk of his(my sketchy notes are here) where he, like you, notes Darwinism's blindness to the organism as a whole.
Recovering a scientific concept of the organism seems incredibly important, especially since so much is now being dismissed as epiphenomena to be ignored without consequence.