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Here is what Fitzgerald says in his press release about Libby's alleged lie to the grand jury about what Libby told Cooper:
"Libby advised Matt Cooper of Time magazine on or about July 12, 2003, that he had heard that other reporters were saying that Wilson’s wife worked for the CIA, and further advised him that Libby did not know whether this assertion was true; when, in fact, Libby did not advise Cooper during that conversation that Libby had heard other reporters were saying that Wilson’s wife worked for the CIA, nor did Libby advise him that Libby did not know whether this assertion was true. Rather, Libby confirmed to Cooper, without qualification, that Libby had heard that Wilson’s wife worked at the CIA;"
Here is what McCarthy says about it at The Corner:
"FOR MARK -- COUNT FIVE [Andy McCarthy] I know Mark has also looked closely at the indictment, so I wonder what he will think of this.
I regard Count Five as a confusing count. (The same confusion arises elsewhere in the indictment, but it crystallizes, for me at any rate, in Count Five.)
Throughout the grand jury testimony excerpted in Count Five, the powerful impression one is left with is that Libby intentionally misled the grand jury about the state of his knowledge regarding Plame’s employment by the CIA – i.e., what he knew and when he knew it. It’s alleged Libby explained that he told the reporters he had gotten his information about Plame from other reporters. More importantly, Libby testified that this was not because he was misremembering how he learned the information, and not because he was trying to avoid discussing what he knew from government sources. Rather, Libby flatly asserted that he said this to reporters because “it was a fact” that his source was a reporter (assertedly, Tim Russert).
So you’d figure the government’s theory of perjury in Count Five must be that Scooter was misleading the grand jury about the state of his information (i.e., that the prosecution is saying his real sources were the numerous government officials with whom Libby had spoken about Plame long before he spoke with Russert).
Yet, that’s not what Count Five alleges. When it finally gets to explaining the perrjury charge, it contends (in paragraph 3 on page 22) that Libby’s statements are perjurious only in that they falsely report the substance of Libby’s single conversation with one particular reporter, namely Matt Cooper. The count does not allege that Libby was tyring to mislead the grand jury about his general state of information.
I find that odd. It seems to me that this reduces Count Five to the old “he said / she said”: i.e., whose story do you believe – Cooper’s or Libby’s? It seems to cancel out the whole point that Count Five seemed to be building to: namely, that Libby was not being straight with the grand jury about what he knew and when, wholly apart from whatever he reported about his conversation with Cooper.
As I said, this is something of a recurrent theme. There are times -- not all the time, but sometimes -- when the indictment makes the case appear to be much more about who is relating conversations more accurately – Cooper and Russert, or Libby – than it is about a general scheme by Libby to obstruct justice. That sure places a lot of the government’s chips on the credibility of the reporters’ recollection of a few key conversations. I would have thought the crucial thing would be whether Libby was generally honest with the investigation about his knowledge of Plame’s classified status."
If that is all Fitzgerald has, the case does strike me as very weak. It would be reasonable that either 1) Libby thought then he said "I heard it too," that he meant from reporters, and who knows if they know the truth, because that is reasonably implied from the context of the conversation, or 2) Libby did say that, and Cooper forgot because it added nothing of any substance to his story.
Moreover, just why would Cooper want to change "I heard that too," to "I heard that from reporters and I don't know if it is true." Even if Libby did know it was true, and not from reporters, lying to Cooper is not a crime, and Libby recounting the conversation the way Cooper remembered it, would not put him in any legal jeapordy. Moreover, Libby using his version of what he told Cooper as proving that in fact was his state of knowledge, is hardly convincing excupatory evidence, since he would have every reason to spin it that way to Cooper.
I can't see proof beyond reasonable doubt on this one, and I don't see how there could be any more evidence as to whose version of the Cooper conversation is correct, unless it was taped, or Libby kept notes that refute his verion. Neither appears to be the case.
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...lying to Cooper is not a crime...
Lying to Cooper should be a duty. :)