Amazing. You think citizens need to be "delegated" the power to instruct their servants. THE CITIZENS ARE THE ONES DOING THE DELEGATING. What do you think the first three words of the Constitution are supposed to indicate?
That does not mean, however, that, as citizens, we have every right to contact our Senators and urge them to vote against the nominee--once the Constitutional process has been followed.
So it's fine for citizens to instruct Senators to do something that's perfectly constitutional, but not kosher at all for them to instruct the President to do something that's perfectly constitutional?
"That does not mean, however, that, as citizens, we have every right to contact our Senators and urge them to vote against the nominee--once the Constitutional process has been followed."
Clearly, that paragraph should have read:
"That does not mean, however, that, as citizens we do not have every right to contact our Senators . . . ."
To answer your question, my intent in this post was to suggest that the Constitution prescribes a process for seating justices. It also prescribes the sole authority for naming as being the Executive (President). Then, it prescribes the sequence of the process, which specifies that after the President nominates, the Senate is to perform its role. That role is described in Federalist 76 as being one of "cooperation and concurrence." We must notice here that Federalist 76 (the Framers' own explanation of their Constitution) points out the reasons why the prescribed process did not include a provision for citizen group pressure on a President to withdraw or change his nominee. As a matter of fact, here is an excerpt from No. 76:
"I proceed to lay it down as a rule, that one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment.
"The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to them. He will have FEWER personal attachments to gratify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to have an equal number; and will be so much the less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body. There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of mankind as personal considerations whether they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be the objects of our choice or preference. Hence, in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices, by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the assembly. The choice which may at any time happen to be made under such circumstances, will of course be the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other, or of a compromise between the parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party, will be more considered than those which fit the person for the station. In the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: 'Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that.' This will be the usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations."
My point was and is that we who claim "conservatism" as our banner should want to be certain that we adhere strictly to the provisions and prescriptions of our Constitution, or we risk losing credibility. After all, we have spent years criticizing the Left (what we also call "liberals") for wanting to bypass the Constitution's provisions (prescriptions) if things don't suit them. We certainly don't want to be guilty of doing the same thing, do we?
The Founders had a long view. Their concern was not with the fickle opinions of their contemporaries as much as with how posterity would judge them. Their process recognized that it is the President's reputation in the history of liberty that is at stake here. Only they will be able to judge whether he preserved their liberty by naming a justice who would strictly interpret the Founders' Constitution.