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There is no way of knowing if keeping the army would have made one iota of difference. All this is a exercise in second guessing and revisionism

This is just not an accurate statement - The fact is there are correct principles that need (and can) be applied to help either fight an insurgency or help to stop one from occurring.

Many of these same people we through out (and caused ill will with) who were part of the Iraqi Army we have since brought back in to the new Iraqi Army...only we did this 6,8, 12 months later and asked them to do what they could have been doing from the very beginning.

Another principle that was broke was the notion that higher-ups (way away from the actual battle field) know better then the operators working in Country (many of these operators mind you, who were working in Iraq prior to the actual war beginning). Those operators knew more about the actualities on the ground then those higher-ups could dream of.

Duffawitz didn't have a clue what he was talking about yet he was pushing policy down the military's throat! (bad move!).

What many didn't understand is how much the Iraqi military was loathed and feared. If we would have kept it, and it's officers, the people would have been convinced we did NOT mean to give them freedom. One of the turning points with 80% of the Iraqi people was when we disbanded the military.

Sure, it would have made it easier with the 20% of the Sunni, who would have been convinced they would continue to rule, but we would have lost the other 80% including the Kurds.