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I take it you liked the interview.

Very few in the conservative chattering class ever mention Agenda 21. The interview was as good or better than any I have read on "C-SPAN's Booknotes: Television's Longest-Running Book Program" which included http://www.booknotes.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1056

Trashing the Planet: How Science Can Help Us Deal with Acid Rain, Depletion of the Ozone, and Nuclear Waste (Among Other Things)by Dixy Lee Ray.

As I said in the thread on Kelo, that decision was constitutionally correct on eminent domain being a State matter.

So did Chief Justice John Marshall, and so does the U.S. Constitution, then, and now.

For too many decades constitutional law has superceded the Constitution. Many of those who preferred the Constitution to the majority opinions of SCOTUS have conceded that the war for the Constitutional text, and internal logic is lost, and that each battle for supremacy must reside beyond Madison’s ‘parchment barriers.’

Win a legislative battle, and lose the court battle, and you lose that war for decades. Win a court battle, and you don’t have to bother with state or national legislation. The road to decades of victory for liberal socialists was the federal courts, while the conservatives focused on the legislature and presidency. The Constitution has been rendered so meaningless for so long, that even conservatives ignore it. SCOTUS is supreme, not the Constitution.

So, it is no surprise to see anyone, including conservatives, demanding that SCOTUS dictate in accordance with, or completely contrary to the Constitution. Any ends not only justify, but demand the use of any means.

Federalist #48 concludes with: “The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these observations is, that a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands.”

SCOTUS legislates, adjucates, and dictates for the nation and the states. When is the last time a U.S. President refused to enforce SCOTUS? The House impeached Clinton. When is the last time the House impeached, let alone removed a member of SCOTUS?

The question to ask is not: To what extent must a judicial opinion deviate from the text and internal logic of the written Constitution before it rises to the level of an impeachable offense? The question is: To what extent must a judicial opinion adhere to the text and internal logic of the written Constitution before it rises to the level of an impeachable offense? The follow-up question is: To what extent must any public official adhere to the text and internal logic of the written Constitution before he loses office, or is ‘unelectable?’

The objection to the revelancy of Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore to Kelo (CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO. v. CITY OF CHICAGO, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)) is precluded by the prepared testimony of Matthew J. Franck, Chairman And Associate Professor Of Political Science, Radford University before the House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, January 29, 1998 http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju58804.000/hju58804_0.HTM#115

“Whatever uncertainty there might be about whether the First Amendment is gathered into the scope of judicial review, there is none whatever about the proposition that, along with the rest of the Bill of Rights, it was intended to restrain only the national government and not the states or their subdivisions. And, among scholars who do not hold a prior commitment to judicial activism, a second proposition is virtually settled as well: that the Fourteenth Amendment changed nothing about that fact.” ( See Richard G. Stevens, ''Due Process of Law,'' in Stevens, The American Constitution and Its Provenance (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 123–42; Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997), 155–89; and Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1989).

13th amendment abolished slavery. 14^th Amendment, Section 1 gave Mr. ExSlave citizenship in the U.S., and acknowledged that Mr. ExSlave has the same rights as Mr. NeverSlave. Nothing more and nothing less than what the text in the context of passage did.

http://chrome.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0032_0243_ZO.html

Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the court.

The judgment brought up by this writ of error having been rendered by the court of a State, this tribunal can exercise no jurisdiction over it unless it be shown to come within the provisions of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. The plaintiff in error contends that it comes within that clause in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution which inhibits the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. He insists that this amendment, being in favor of the liberty of the citizen, ought to be so construed as to restrain the legislative power of a state, as well as that of the United States. If this proposition be untrue, the court can take no jurisdiction of the cause.

The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of much difficulty. The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual States. Each State established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated. The people of the United States framed such a government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation and best calculated to promote their interests. The powers they conferred on this government were to be exercised by itself, and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and we think necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument itself, not of distinct governments framed by different persons and for different purposes.

If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the power of the General Government, not as applicable to the States. In their several Constitutions, they have imposed such restrictions on their respective [p248] governments, as their own wisdom suggested, such as they deemed most proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no further than they are supposed to have a common interest.

The counsel for the plaintiff in error insists that the Constitution was intended to secure the people of the several States against the undue exercise of power by their respective State governments, as well as against that which might be attempted by their General Government. It support of this argument he relies on the inhibitions contained in the tenth section of the first article. We think that section affords a strong, if not a conclusive, argument in support of the opinion already indicated by the court. The preceding section contains restrictions which are obviously intended for the exclusive purpose of restraining the exercise of power by the departments of the General Government. Some of them use language applicable only to Congress, others are expressed in general terms. The third clause, for example, declares, that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." No language can be more general, yet the demonstration is complete that it applies solely to the Government of the United States. In addition to the general arguments furnished by the instrument itself, some of which have been already suggested, the succeeding section, the avowed purpose of which is to restrain State legislation, contains in terms the very prohibition. It declares, that "no State shall pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law." This provision, then, of the ninth section, however comprehensive its language, contains no restriction on State legislation.

The ninth section having enumerated, in the nature of a bill of rights, the limitations intended to be imposed on the powers of the General Government, the tenth proceeds to enumerate those which were to operate on the State legislatures. These restrictions are brought together in the same section, and are by express words applied to the States. "No State shall enter into any treaty," &c. Perceiving, that in a constitution framed by the people of the United States, for the government of all, no limitation of the action of government on [p249] the people would apply to the State government, unless expressed in terms, the restrictions contained in the tenth section are in direct words so applied to the States.

It is worthy of remark, too, that these inhibitions generally restrain State legislation on subjects intrusted to the General Government, or in which the people of all the States feel an interest. A State is forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation. If these compacts are with foreign nations, they interfere with the treaty-making power, which is conferred entirely on the General Government; if with each other, for political purposes, they can scarcely fail to interfere with the general purpose and intent of the Constitution. To grant letters of marque and reprisal, would lead directly to war, the power of declaring which is expressly given to Congress. To coin money is also the exercise of a power conferred on Congress. It would be tedious to recapitulate the several limitations on the powers of the States which are contained in this section. They will be found generally to restrain State legislation on subjects intrusted to the government of the Union, in which the citizens of all the States are interested. In these alone were the whole people concerned. The question of their application to States is not left to construction. It is averred in positive words.

If the original Constitution, in the ninth and tenth sections of the first article, draws this plain and marked line of discrimination between the limitations it imposes on the powers of the General Government and on those of the State; if, in every inhibition intended to act on State power, words are employed which directly express that intent; some strong reason must be assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course in framing the amendments before that departure can be assumed. We search in vain for that reason.

Had the people of the several States, or any of them, required changes in their Constitutions, had they required additional safeguards to liberty from the apprehended encroachments of their particular governments, the remedy was in their own hands, and could have been applied by themselves. A [p250] convention could have been assembled by the discontented State, and the required improvements could have been made by itself. The unwieldy and cumbrous machinery of procuring a recommendation from two-thirds of Congress and the assent of three-fourths of their sister States could never have occurred to any human being as a mode of doing that which might be effected by the State itself. Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers of the State governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original Constitution, and have expressed that intention. Had Congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the Constitutions of the several States by affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible language.

But it is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the day, that the great revolution which established the Constitution of the United States was not effected without immense opposition. Serious fears were extensively entertained that those powers which the patriot statesmen who then watched over the interests of our country deemed essential to union, and to the attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a manner dangerous to liberty. In almost every convention by which the Constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the General Government -- not against those of the local governments. In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears thus extensively entertained, amendments were proposed by the required majority in Congress and adopted by the States. These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the State governments. This court cannot so apply them.

We are of opinion that the provision in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the [p251] Government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the States. We are therefore of opinion that there is no repugnancy between the several acts of the general assembly of Maryland, given in evidence by the defendants at the trial of this cause, in the court of that State, and the Constitution of the United States. This court, therefore, has no jurisdiction of the cause, and it is dismissed.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Court of Appeals for the Western Shore of the State of Maryland, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this Court that there is no repugnancy between the several acts of the General Assembly of Maryland given in evidence by the defendants at the trial of this cause in the court of that State and the Constitution of the United States; whereupon it is ordered and adjudged by this court that this writ of error be, and the same is hereby, dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.

END OF TRANSCRIPT.

Constitutional conservatives should want to hear more of “dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.” But that would be repugnant to the conservative lawyers who advise many of the conservative opinion moulders and policy wonks, most of whom would claim that it isn’t Constitutionally possible.

If they would concede the following expert testimony, they would state that it isn’t politically possible. And they would be correct. It isn’t politically possible to consistently adhere to the U.S. Constitution, unless you are Congressman Ron Paul.

http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju94458.000/hju94458_0.HTM#45

Hearing Before The Subcommittee On The Constitution Of The Committee On The Judiciary , June 24, 2004,| Testimony Of Martin H. Redish, Professor Of Law And Public Policy, Northwestern Law School

Professor Redish is a nationally renowned authority on the subject of Federal jurisdiction. He received his A.B. With honors, with highest honors, in political science from the University of Pennsylvania and his J.D. Magna cum laude from Harvard law school. He has been described in a review of his book, The Federal Courts in the Political Order, as quote, ''without a doubt the foremost scholar on issues of Federal court jurisdiction in this generation,'' unquote.

Professor Redish is the author or coauthor of 70 articles and 13 books, including Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Federal Power. He was recently included on a list of the 100 most cited legal scholars of all time.